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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about the relationship between compensation and performance.
The following four chapters empirically investigate the determinants and per-
formance e¤ects of compensation schemes. The studies presented here give
answers to a subset of relevant questions often raised by practitioners and
economists. These topics include the e¤ects of a higher di¤erentiation in
bonus payments on individual performance, the determinants of wage pre-
mia for newly hired employees, the long-term e¤ects of intra-rm training
participation, and the e¤ect of the recent nancial crisis on the determinants
of compensation schemes. Furthermore, if applicable, we derive practical
implications based on the empirical results. All chapters have two things in
common: First, they are all related to compensation policies, i.e. they all
focus either on base salaries or short-term bonus payments or a combination
of both. And second, they are based on two large-scaled data sets, because
in the end the answers to the questions raised above are empirical ones.
As outlined in the following chapters in detail, the design of competitive
and incentive-compatible compensation schemes is one of the major chal-
lenges companies have to face in recent times. Pay decisions have an impact
on a wide variety of activities along the HR value chain as they inuence
activities like recruitment, development, and retainment of employees. Also,
pay is an important element for the motivation and satisfaction of employ-
1
ees.1
Although compensation schemes are a major part of the internal incen-
tive structure inside rms, the "economic understanding of internal incentive
structures is far from complete" (Baker et al. (1988)). This is especially true
for non-executive employees, as the majority of studies has predominantly fo-
cused on CEO and top executive positions (see e.g. Murphy (1985), Coughlan
and Schmidt (1985), Abowd (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), Gibbons and
Murphy (1990), Jensen and Murphy (1990b), Jensen and Murphy (1990a),
Leonard (1990), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Eriksson and Lausten (2000),
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2010)).
In this thesis, we therefore focus on non-executive employees, i.e. lower-
and middle-level employees below the top management level. In the following,
we will shortly present the main research questions of each chapter and try
to highlight similarities and connections between the studies.2
The thesis can be divided into two parts. In the rst part (chapters 2 to
4), the determinants of compensation schemes in a broader sense are being
investigated.
Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview on compensation schemes in one
of the main areas of the tertiary sector, namely the banking and nancial
services industry. This area is of high importance as banks, in their role as -
nancial intermediaries, are responsible for the allocation of nancial resources
between all participants of the nancial system. But more important, poorly
adjusted pay systems in this sector may lead to excessive risk-taking behav-
ior of employees leading to immense external e¤ects as the current crisis has
quite impressively shown. The research questions we address in this chapter
include: What are the determinants of compensation for non-executive em-
ployees in this sector? And what is the impact of the current economic crisis
on the determinants and outcomes of payment schemes? Analyses include
the development of base salaries and short-term bonus payments as well as
bonus eligibility rates and pay dispersion. Finally, econometric results on the
1For the relevance of non-monetary incentives like e.g. awards see a.o. Frey (2007),
Frey and Neckermann (2008), Frey and Neckermann (2009), Frey (2010), Kosfeld and
Neckermann (2011).
2The relevant literature is presented at the beginning of each chapter.
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determinants of xed and variable compensation for non-executive employees
are presented.
The third chapter analyzes wage premia for newly hired employees. It is
often claimed by practitioners, that newly hired employees receive a wage pre-
mium compared to incumbent employees even if both do the same job. The
research questions we study include: Do we observe economically signicant
wage premia for newly hired employees compared to incumbent employees?
And if yes, what are the determinants of these premia? The focus in this
chapter is therefore on xed salaries. It can be shown theoretically as well
as empirically that di¤erences in human capital, i.e. the specicity of human
capital (general vs. rm-specic), determine whether wage premia are paid
to newly hired employees or whether incumbents earn more in the same job.
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between intra-rm training par-
ticipation and monetary outcome variables. In these analyses we focus on
both xed salaries and short-term bonus payments. The questions we ad-
dress include: What are the determinants of intra-rm training participa-
tion? And does training participation have a sustainable e¤ect on individual
performance, measured by monetary indicators? We therefore analyze if in-
vestments in trainings and employee learning are signicant determinants of
individual compensation. Additionally, we study the e¤ects of training par-
ticipation on non-monetary indicators like absenteeism, overtime work and
employee turnover. To conclude, chapters 3 and 4 analyze the role of human
capital as determinants of both base salary and bonus payments, whereas in
chapter 2, a broader set of determinants of individual compensation is being
studied.
In the second part of the thesis (chapter 5), the focus switches from the
determinants to potential e¤ects of compensation schemes. Here, the perfor-
mance e¤ects of a higher di¤erentiation in individual bonus payments are be-
ing studied. This is one of the main challenges practitioners are dealing with
in recent times and many companies discuss this topic quite controversially.3
3For discussions on the controversial issues in the popular press see for instance Per-
formance Reviews: Many Neeed Improvement in the New York Times, September 10,
2006 or The Struggle to Measure Performance in Business Week, January 9, 2006.
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The design of compensation schemes in companies is always characterized
by a potential trade-o¤ between fairness considerations and the provision
of incentives. The key question is whether to treat employees equally, i.e.
to pay equal wages to all workers, or to reward higher levels of e¤orts ade-
quately leading to more di¤erentiated pay schemes. The research questions
we address include: Does a higher di¤erentiation lead to increased individ-
ual performance? What are potential economic e¤ects? And are there areas
where higher levels of di¤erentiation may be harmful?
The analyses presented in this thesis are based on two data sets.4 The
studies presented in chapter 2, 3, and 5 are based on the INbank compensa-
tion data base obtained from the management consultancy Towers Watson5.
This data base is one of the largest of its type in the European nancial
services sector. We contribute to the literature on compensation research by
making use of some new elements of the data set, as a large number of di¤er-
ent companies of a whole industry, the banking and nancial services sector,
are included in the survey. Additionally, detailed rm-specic information
that is comparable between companies is available as a multitude of specic
job functions is dened through a detailed set of job descriptions and proles
of knowledge and skills required for the relevant position. We also make use
of new waves of the data set including years between 2005 and 2009. This
allows us to analyze the rst e¤ects of one of the most severe nancial crises
on the determinants and outcomes of compensation schemes. The second
data set, used in chapter 4 for the analyses of intra-rm training participa-
tion on individual performance, comprises personnel records from a large,
multinational company headquartered in Germany. Detailed information on
training participation, compensation elements and demographic background
is available.
We now discuss the content of the following chapters in more detail. The
rst part of chapter 2 shows descriptive statistics for the main compensa-
tion variables base salary, short-term bonus payments and the bonus-to-base
4Due to reasons of condentiality, the data sheets had to be anonymized. Sparkassen
(publicly owned savings banks), Volks- and Rai¤eisenbanken (cooperative banks) and the
Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) are not part of the sample.
5Formerly known as Towers Perrin.
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ratio. We nd the typical positive, convex relationship between base pay
and hierarchical level, with highest average wages in Switzerland. Regard-
ing functional areas, wages in investment banking, asset management and
treasury and capital markets dominate, with a steadily convergence of wage
levels over time between countries. The nancial services sector is also char-
acterized by a high number of employees that are eligible for short-term
bonus payments, especially at upper levels in the hierarchy. But there are
also employees who, although being actually eligible, receive no (positive)
bonus payment at the end of the year. We nd that for Germany and Aus-
tria, the nancial crisis leads to a signicant increase in the proportion of
employees with zero bonuses at all levels, whereas Swiss banks seemed to
be afraid of bonus cuts as the proportion is quite stable over time. Com-
pared to xed wages, the convex relationship between bonus payments and
hierarchical level is very pronounced and average bonuses are the highest in
capital market-based functions like investment banking, asset management
and treasury and capital markets. We further investigate the impact of the
nancial crisis on variable payments. A key result is the massive decrease
in bonuses especially at upper levels in the year 2009. Interestingly, these
employees also face a loss in bonuses compared to pre-crisis reference years,
whereas lower-level employees are nancially better o¤ in 2009 than before
the crisis.
The second part of this chapter presents regression results for the determi-
nants of xed and variable compensation. Coe¢cients in estimates with base
salary as dependent variable are quite stable over time and broadly conrm
the descriptive evidence and the typical age-earnings prole. Econometric re-
sults for estimates with variable payments, however, are much more di¤erent
between countries with quite volatile regressions coe¢cients over time. Large
di¤erences are visible when comparing the results for functional areas and
the impact of the nancial crisis on bonus payments. In a last step, struc-
tural di¤erences in the explanatory power of the models are investigated.
The results show that xed compensation packages are highly standardized
between companies in all of the three countries, with hierarchical level as the
main single determinant. Bonus payments, however, are stronger related to
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individual e¤orts. In Germany, bonuses vary to a high extent across com-
panies, whereas in Switzerland and Austria company di¤erences are almost
negligible with only marginal increases in R-squared due to additional rm
controls.
In chapter 3, wage di¤erences between newly hired and incumbent em-
ployees are being investigated. This question is studied theoretically as well
as empirically for employees in the nancial services sector.
A formal model is used to derive hypotheses on the determinants of these
wage premia, i.e. the sign and the size of the e¤ect. The model assumes that
employees have similar experience on the labor market, are qualied for only
one type of job in the industry and care for wages as well as match-specic
utility (e.g. satisfaction with colleagues, supervisor or corporate culture).
It is shown that incumbents earn less than new recruits if and only if rm-
specic human capital is not too important. If rm-specic human capital
is very important, rms will pay a higher wage to incumbents to increase
the likelihood that the employees stay with their current employer and the
specic skills are not lost.
The conjectures of the model are then being investigated using the INbank
data set on wages in the German banking and nancial services sector. The
results show that average wage premia for newly hired employees are statisti-
cally and economically signicant, controlling for demographic, workplace as
well as rm characteristics. As the model makes predictions on the inuence
of hierarchical levels and functional areas, results of interaction terms are
also presented. Relative wage premia for new recruits are larger at higher hi-
erarchical levels, where general managerial human capital is more important.
Regarding functional areas, highest premia are found in capital market-based
areas such as treasury and capital markets as well as investment banking and
corporate banking where transferable client-specic human capital seems to
be more important than rm-specic human capital as it is very valuable for
competitors. In a last step, wage di¤erentials for management and expert
positions are being investigated and higher premia in managerial positions
can also be conrmed. In the second part of this chapter, a measure for the
importance of rm-specic human capital is generated that allows a direct
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test of the model. The results indeed show a negative correlation between
the measure of the importance of rm-specic human capital and average
wage premia for newly hired employees.
In chapter 4, the determinants and e¤ects of intra-rm training partici-
pation on earnings and job performance are being investigated. The main re-
search question we address is whether company training sustainably increases
the productivity of employees, as the empirical results in the literature are
mixed so far. Previous studies mainly focussed on the organizational level,
whereas research using individual-level data is mainly based on national sur-
vey data sets. Empirical research based on company data sets, however, is
rare. We contribute to the literature by using a unique company data set
of a large, multinational German company that contains detailed informa-
tion on compensation and classroom training participation. Besides xed
and variable compensation, we also have information on several job indica-
tors like absenteeism and overtime hours as well as turnover probabilities.
Furthermore, we can identify a bundle of di¤erent training categories, like
e.g. leadership, project management, business administration or technical
trainings.
Probit regressions show a higher likelihood of training participation for
junior managers compared to non-exempt employees and senior managers in-
dicating that the training program of the company mainly focuses on younger
university graduates with less labor market experience. A striking result is
the negative selection e¤ect of employees into trainings, i.e. less productive
employees are more likely to participate in classroom trainings. Regressions
with the di¤erent training categories as dependent variable show that even
leadership and project management trainings are more likely to be sta¤ed
with less productive employees.
Applying panel data methods to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, we
do not nd an economically signicant short-term performance e¤ect mea-
sured by base salary. Using individual bonus payments as a productivity
measure, we nd an economically signicant short-term e¤ect. But one year
later the e¤ect disappears, so we do not nd a long-term e¤ect of training par-
ticipation on performance measured by these monetary indicators. Several
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robustness checks conrm these results, as only the incidence of participation
matters and not the number or composition of the training mix. A possible
explanation is the link between training participation and the performance
measurement system of the company. In the second part of this chapter, the
e¤ects of training participation on non-monetary job indicators are being
investigated. We nd a positive relationship between training participation
and overtime hours. Furthermore, training negatively a¤ects the absence of
employees and turnover probability rates.
Chapter 5 analyzes the performance e¤ects of di¤erentiation in bonus
payments on subsequent individual performance. The majority of bonus
contracts, except those in sales functions, are based upon subjective per-
formance evaluations rather than on objective output indicators. Empirical
researchers often claim that supervisors do not di¤erentiate enough between
high performing and low performing employees when evaluating performance.
This leads to a compression in performance ratings what in turn should re-
duce the incentive e¤ects of bonus plans and lead to a lower performance of
employees. But practitioners sometimes argue that a higher di¤erentiation
like e.g. forced distribution systems may lead to a decrease in employees mo-
tivation or a crowding out of intrinsic motivation. We therefore contribute to
the literature by studying the impact of di¤erentiation in bonus payments on
performance empirically with a large panel data set for the nancial services
industry.
We indeed nd that, on average, a stronger di¤erentiation in a given
work unit has a substantial positive e¤ect on individual performance in this
unit in the subsequent year, all other factors constant. Compared to depart-
ments with rather undi¤erentiated incentives, the performance of employees
in departments where the supervisor is among the 20% strongest di¤eren-
tiators is on average about 31% higher. This e¤ect is the larger the higher
the hierarchical level. But di¤erentiation has no signicant e¤ect or even
becomes harmful at the lowest levels in the data set. As objective perfor-
mance measures are only rarely available at lower levels, biased subjective
assessments may therefore outweigh the incentive e¤ects of di¤erentiation,
whereas employees at higher levels are more visible what makes assessing
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their performance easier. Looking at functional areas, di¤erentiation has the
strongest e¤ect in retail banking and corporate and private banking, both
areas with a high coverage of objective performance indicators. A nega-
tive relationship between di¤erentiation and performance can be found for
the lower-skilled service functions, where subjective performance measures
dominate. We also nd a stronger e¤ect of di¤erentiation for managerial
employees than for functional experts. In the second part of this chapter we
present some robustness checks and give a rst indication of the e¤ects of
di¤erentiation on rm performance using a rm-level data set combined with
information on nancial statements. The results show a positive relationship
between higher di¤erentiation levels and rm performance measured by the
return on equity before the nancial crisis, but indicate that a higher di¤er-
entiation in the past may have enforced risk-taking behavior of employees in
the rst year of the crisis.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of the Financial
Crisis on Non-Executive
Compensation1
2.1 Introduction
Human capital as an intangible asset gets increasingly important in modern
economies. More and more companies operate in employee-intensive busi-
nesses where human capital is regarded as a critical asset and not purely a
cost factor (Lev (2001)). As personnel costs often represent the largest part
of total costs in these companies, the design of pay packages is of strategic
importance and therefore directly inuences corporate performance. Im-
portant parameters include the right adjustment between xed and variable
elements and the pay-for-performance relationship. Second, variable pay sys-
tems become more and more popular for companies to make pay costs more
volatile, as increases in xed compensation become part of future salaries
(Milkovich and Newman (1996)). This is expensive in the long run, even
more as nominal wage cuts are only rarely observable in companies. Vari-
able pay, however, is much more exible as it depends to a higher extent
on divisional and corporate performance. This implies that bonus payments
1This chapter is based upon Kampkötter (2010).
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will typically decrease in times of economic downturn and increase otherwise.
Additionally, the structure of the pay mix is highly important for the moti-
vation, commitment, and behavior of employees inside the company as well
as for activities along the HR value chain like e.g. recruiting, developing and
retaining employees. Pay systems therefore have to be internally consistent
and externally competitive (Milkovich and Newman (1996)). And, most im-
portant, performance-related pay helps to align the goals of managers and
employees with those of the company respectively the shareholders. Hence,
the design of competitive compensation schemes is one of the major chal-
lenges companies have to face with in recent times.
But a closer look on previous research about compensation systems and
their practical implementation is necessary. Companies vary extremely with
respect to the design of their compensation systems, even in the same indus-
try. Especially variable payment schemes gained increasing attractiveness in
recent times2 and are implemented with various modications between com-
panies. Past research has predominantly focused on the analysis of CEO and
top management compensation. There is a vast amount of studies on the
determinants3 and e¤ectiveness of top management compensation systems
in the economic literature as required data sets are often publicly available.
These studies mainly address two research questions: 1) Is there a relation-
ship between (executive) compensation and corporate performance? And 2)
What are typical determinants of (top) management and executive compen-
sation? The rst relationship is often referred to as pay-for-performance sen-
sitivity. Relevant studies include a.o. Murphy (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt
(1985), Abowd (1990), Barro and Barro (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1990),
Jensen and Murphy (1990b), Jensen and Murphy (1990a), Leonard (1990),
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Eriksson and Lausten (2000), Aggarwal and
Samwick (2003) and, more recently, Jensen and Murphy (2010).4 A recent
2For a recent survey on more than 1,400 U.S. companies see the 2010 Hewitt U.S.
Variable Compensation Measurement Survey.
3See Tosi et al. (2000) for a meta-analytic review.
4Studies on executive compensation often also include the analysis of long-term incen-
tive payments like stock option plans, because this is an important element of top man-
agement compensation (for a comprehensive overview see e.g. Murphy (1999)). As our
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study by Kampkötter and Sliwka (2011) analyzes this relationship for non-
executive employees.
Although compensation policies as part of the internal incentive structure
seem to be very important, the "economic understanding of internal incen-
tive structures is far from complete" (Baker et al. (1988)). Limitations are
predominantly visible for employees below the top management level. This
may include middle and lower-level as well as non-exempt employees. Up
to now empirical evidence on the practice of compensation schemes, i.e. its
determinants and performance consequences, for these group of employees
is relatively scarce. Indeed, those employees are characterized by a reduced
impact on corporate results compared to the top management team. But
they still have a positive impact and are important for the cascading of the
corporate strategy like e.g. the head of a functional area or a branch man-
ager (Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998)). We therefore want to analyze
the determinants and patterns of non-executive compensation using a large
data set on individual compensation in the nancial services industry of three
European countries.
Additionally, in papers analyzing pay schemes of non-executive employ-
ees, often only xed wages are analyzed (see e.g. Baker et al. (1994b) and
Baker et al. (1994a)5). As a result, there is only a small number of empirical
studies on both xed and variable pay components for the mentioned group
of employees (see e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), Abowd (1990), Leonard
(1990), Stroh et al. (1996), Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998), Eriksson
and Lausten (2000), Nash (2003), and Gibbs and Hendricks (2004)).6 It
is also important to analyze industry-specic and regional di¤erences. Out
of the small number of empirical studies for employees below top manage-
ment level, there are only very few that analyze pay systems in the nancial
services industry.7 The main reason is the restricted access to condential
focus is on non-executive employees, we only concentrate on short-term bonus payments.
5Information on bonus payments is not used in this two studies as it is not available
for all years.
6Furthermore, the majority of these studies uses data sets that have been collected
about 10 to 20 years ago.
7Nash (2003) e.g. analyzes the determinants of nancial incentives in the UK invest-
ment banking sector using a data set from a professional consultancy rm. See also Barro
12
personnel records in this very competitive market. But the banking and
nancial services industry seems to be very suitable especially for the analy-
sis of variable payment schemes as employees short-term bonus eligibility is
above industry average.8 Furthermore, almost all studies use data sets from
the U.S. or UK, whereas data sets for continental European countries seem
not to be present.9
We therefore contribute to the existing literature by addressing some of
the major limitations in this eld of research mentioned above. In a rst step
we study the determinants of compensation schemes for middle and lower-
level employees using a comparatively large data set with up to 120,000
annual observations for the years 2004-2009. Our data set is owned by the
management consultancy Towers Watson10, where it is used for professional
compensation benchmarking. We will shed some light on compensation pat-
terns by using detailed job-specic information other studies often lack (e.g.
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990)) like broader functional areas, detailed func-
tions, career ladders and hierarchical levels. We are also able to distinguish
between areas with standardized products and processes like retail banking
and asset management and more client-specic elds like corporate banking.
Our key variables include, besides base salary, annual short-term bonus pay-
ments and the ratio of variable payments to xed salary. Second, we are
among the rst to introduce an international dimension into the research on
the design of compensation systems by comparing data from Germany, Aus-
tria and one of the worlds leading nancial markets, Switzerland.11 Third,
we are able to analyze the results over time and also make use of new waves
of the data set, which is very important as we can compare if the results
are stable in di¤erent states of the economy. A major feature is that we can
and Barro (1990) and Treble et al. (2001).
8Stroh et al. (1996) e.g. nd that in regressions with variable pay as proportion of total
compensation as dependent variable, the coe¢cient for the nancial services industry is
the largest.
9Except Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998).
10In economics, Towers Watson (formerly Towers Perrin) data sets have also been used
by Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Murphy (1999), and Murphy (2001).
11Abowd and Bognanno (1995) analyze executive and managerial compensation for
twelve OECD countries. Grund (2005) compares personnel records of a U.S. and a German
manufacturing rm.
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also analyze the impact of one of the most severe nancial crises starting in
2008 with the breakdown of Lehman Brothers. Investigating the e¤ects of
compensation packages on corporate performance for employees below top
management is quite di¢cult, as the individual impact on corporate results
diminishes at lower levels of the hierarchy. Therefore, this relationship is not
being investigated in this study.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, the background and
related literature is described. Section 2.3 explains the data set and the
applied empirical strategy. Descriptive statistics of compensation practices
between countries are shown in section 2.4, whereas section 2.5 economet-
rically analyzes the determinants of compensation schemes. Finally, section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background and Related Literature
Di¤erent theoretical approaches are used to formulate hypotheses on the
determinants of compensation schemes. These determinants can typically
be categorized into three di¤erent dimensions: job characteristics, employee
characteristics, and rm/organizational characteristics (see e.g. Baker et al.
(1988), Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), Milkovich and Newman (1996), Ortín-
Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998)). Job characteristics typically include the
hierarchical position of the employee, functional area, detailed function, type
of job (exempt vs. non-exempt, supervisory tasks vs. functional experts),
and region. Employee characteristics include human capital variables like
age, rm tenure, job tenure, labor market experience and years of education.
Firm characteristics are often proxied by rm dummies or key indicators like
e.g. rm size, sales, net income, prots, and the number of employees.
Agency theory predicts that performance-based compensation packages
are helpful in aligning the agents (manager, employee) interests with those
of the principal (e.g. shareholders, boards of directors).12 This is important
12Seminal papers include Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). For a
comprehensive overview see e.g. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) or Milgrom and Roberts
(1992).
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because individual e¤orts may have, dependent on the hierarchical level, a
strong inuence on corporate performance like sales or nancial results, and
the principal is often unable to adequately monitor the agents behavior. In
incentive contracts a signal of the productivity of an agent is used that is com-
posed of the non-observable e¤ort of an employee and an error term measur-
ing external inuences on productivity that are not under the agents control.
The likelihood of performance-related pay is negatively correlated with the
noise of the performance signal indicating that higher-powered incentives are
less suitable in functional areas where the signal (the performance measure)
is noisier. In these cases the agent has to be compensated for the additional
risk in its income, what makes incentive systems more expensive. Therefore,
the size of bonus payments and the probability of receiving a bonus should be
higher in sales areas where indicators are less noisy and capture real perfor-
mance more accurately. Nash (2003) indeed nds that performance-related
pay is more prominent in areas where the observability of output is more
easily measurable, e.g. retail banking and asset management with standard-
ized products and transactions. In support and cross-divisional functions like
marketing or human resources, individual output is, at best, observable after
a longer time period and therefore often not measurable in the short run.
There are several reasons for a positive relationship between hierarchical
level and the size of base salary and bonus payments. According to tourna-
ment theory (see e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986)), employees
compete for higher-level positions in a promotion tournament. The related
wage increase at the next level constitutes the winner prize. Ideally, to o¤er
incentives, wage spreads should increase with the level in the hierarchy, with
the largest di¤erence moving from second-highest to the top level (empirically
shown e.g. in Baker et al. (1994a), Baker et al. (1994b), Grund (2005), van
Herpen et al. (2006)).13 Other explanations refer to deferred compensation
(Lazear (1979)) and decreasing career concerns when one moves up the hier-
archy (Gibbons and Murphy (1992)). As promotion opportunities decrease
at higher levels, additional variable payments have to be o¤ered to employees.
13A recent study by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011) shows that higher wage spreads
also induce negative e¤ects, but agents also act reciprocally to higher wages.
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At lower levels, the whole set of future career opportunities should be a good
motivator for employees, so that career concerns o¤er su¢cient incentives for
younger employees.14 As a result, we expect the size of bonus payments and
bonus eligibility rates to increase with the hierarchical level an employee is
located at. Another argument deals with the leverage e¤ect of individual
e¤orts (see e.g. Gibbons and Waldman (1999)). At upper levels, employees
have a higher impact on corporate results than lower-level employees, which
makes them more productive for a company if their interests are in line with
those of the rm. One possible reason is that higher-level employees with
a wider span of control have a higher marginal revenue product than lower-
level employees. Also tasks and jobs are less programmable, i.e. harder to
monitor, at higher levels in the hierarchy, so we expect a negative relation-
ship between task programmability and the importance of variable payments
relative to total compensation as well as an increasing use of incentive con-
tracts at upper levels. This is indeed conrmed e.g. by Abowd (1990), Stroh
et al. (1996), and Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998).15
The theory of career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy (1992)) can also be
applied to explain a positive relationship between age and the size and prob-
ability of receiving variable payments. With increasing age, career concerns
and career opportunities tend to decrease and employees therefore have to
be incentivized by variable payments. Ortín-Ángel and Salas-Fumás (1998)
indeed nd that bonus payments are more relevant for older managers with
longer tenure. According to human capital theory (seminal contributions are
Becker (1962), Becker (1964), and Mincer (1974)), base pay is determined to
a large extent by human capital variables like education and job and labor
market experience. With investments in education, training, and on-the-job
learning employees accumulate general and rm-specic human capital that
should lead to higher base salaries. Also high investments in human capital
are more likely for jobs with low programmability and higher potential im-
pact on corporate performance, so performance-based pay is more likely for
more experienced employees (Gerhart and Milkovich (1990)).
14For a detailed discussion on the role of information see Dewatripont et al. (1999).
15See e.g. Eisenhardt (1989) for a detailed overview.
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Previous research has shown that job grade or hierarchical level proves
to be the most important single determinant of base salary and variable pay
(Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), Nash (2003)).16 After additionally control-
ling for job and individual characteristics, di¤erences in xed and variable
pay schemes may remain between companies. These di¤erences are then at-
tributed to organizational characteristics, like e.g. industry a¢liation, rm
size, nancial results, competitive position, or a diverse implementation of the
corporate strategy. In studies that lack these indicators, rm dummies are
often integrated into the regression model and a comparison of the increase
in explained variance between the models with individual and job-specic
characteristics as well as rm dummies is carried out. We follow this ap-
proach, as we also have no information on nancial indicators, rm size and
corporate strategy.
Empirical results for the di¤erences in salary levels between companies
after controlling for the whole set of characteristics are mixed so far. Some
studies nd large and persisting di¤erences in salary levels over time (see
Groshen (1991a) and Groshen (1991b) for early reviews), whereas diminish-
ing di¤erences are explained as a result of an increasing use of compensa-
tion benchmarking surveys by professional consulting rms as companies are
forced to o¤er a market-based compensation to potential employees and also
to assure the retaining of high performers. Others argue that these di¤er-
ences tend to be determined more randomly (Leonard (1990)). For variable
payments, this is not so obvious as bonuses should ideally depend on indi-
vidual e¤orts and the performance of the company. Gerhart and Milkovich
(1990) e.g. indeed nd that even similar companies di¤er to a large extent
in their variable compensation policies.
16Leonard (1990) conrms this result for total pay (sum of base salary and bonus pay-
ments).
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2.3 The Data
2.3.1 Data Set
We investigate a large data set on individual compensation in the German,
Swiss and Austrian nancial services industry. A major feature of the data
set is the fact that the vast majority of companies in this industry is being
included in the survey. For Germany, we have annual information on between
105,000 and 140,000 employees for the years 2005-2009, for Switzerland on be-
tween 50,000 and 70,000 employees for 2006-2009 and for Austria on around
20,000 employees between 2007 and 2009. It is important to note that we do
not have information on CEO and top executive positions.17 A crucial char-
acteristic is the high validity of the data, because individual information on
pay and job positions is used for professional compensation benchmarking.18
A common problem with company data refers to a possible self-selection bias,
because rms often voluntarily participate in compensation surveys. But the
problem is mitigated in our study as rms are requested to report more than
2/3 of all employees of a certain job category and, additionally, the survey
covers the vast majority of banks and nancial companies in the respective
market.19
In detail, the data set contains information on individual compensation
like base salary and short-term bonus payments20 and demographic informa-
17The data set is owned by the international management consultancy Towers Watson
(formerly Towers Perrin). Due to reasons of condentiality, the data sheets had to be
anonymized.
18There is always a trade-o¤ between national survey data sets including self-reported
information on pay and data from professional compensation consultancy rms. The
former method is typically characterized by a smaller number of observations accompanied
with a more detailed set of demographic and personal information like e.g. gender, sex,
and educational background. But self-reported compensation data often lack detailed
rm-specic information and, perhaps more important, the reliability of the data has to be
questioned. Compensation data sets from consultancy rms are characterized by a larger
number of observations and detailed rm-specic information and are regarded much more
reliable in terms of data consistency, as information is double-checked by company experts
as well as consultants.
19Sparkassen (publicly owned savings banks), Volks- and Rai¤eisenbanken (cooperative
banks) and the Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) are not part of the sample.
20Swiss Francs are converted to Euros using ECB foreign exchange reference rates (see
http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html)
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tion on employees age, tenure, six hierarchical levels, eight main functional
areas, and regional information. The hierarchical levels include entry level
positions for apprentices and high school graduates up to divisional heads, the
highest position in the data set. The functional areas reect the eight main
areas in the banking and nancial services industry: retail banking (RB), pri-
vate banking (PB), corporate banking (CB), investment banking (IB), asset
management (AM), treasury and capital markets (TCM) as well as the sup-
port and service functions (corporate services (CS)) and the cross-divisional
functions (corporate production (CP)). These functional areas are further
subdivided into 70-80 specic functions that are used for more detailed com-
pensation analyses. Retail banking, e.g., comprises the functions retail sales,
business analysis, and retail product development. The cross-divisional func-
tions include a.o. marketing, legal, HR, nance, and accounting.21
Towers Watson uses the standardized "career ladder methodology" to
make career steps and job positions comparable between di¤erent compa-
nies in an industry and between countries. Therefore, typical career steps in
an employees career (starting with entry as university graduate or appren-
tice) in one of the career ladders management, professional, retail sales and
support are dened using detailed job proles of required knowledge, skills,
and abilities for each possible position in the industry. Jobs in the manage-
ment ladder are characterized by supervisory and general management tasks,
whereas the professional ladder includes functional expert positions with no
direct managerial responsibilities.22 The retail sales ladder encompasses jobs
in retail sales functions and back o¢ce and call center positions are included
in the support ladder.
Tables 2.17 and 2.18 in the appendix show the distribution of employees
by hierarchical level and year for the three countries. It is obvious that the
distribution of employees by hierarchical level remains very stable throughout
the years, despite an increasing number in total observations especially for
Germany and Switzerland. In all countries, a slight increase in proportions at
21For an exemplary overview of the functions see Kampkötter and Sliwka (2010a).
22These are e.g. project managers, who coordinate project teams but typically have no
managerial authority.
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the top levels coincides with a small decrease at medium and bottom levels.
Compared to Germany and Austria, top-level employees are overrepresented
in the Swiss data set and middle-level employees are underrepresented. The
distribution of employees by functional area is shown in table 2.19 for the
years 2007-2009. The distribution within countries changes moderately over
time, but larger di¤erences appear if one looks at the distribution between
countries. Germany and Austria are characterized by a domination of retail
banking and corporate production positions with more than 60% of all em-
ployees working in these sectors, whereas capital market-based functions like
investment banking and asset management as well as private banking only
play a minor role. The Swiss banking sector is characterized by a similarly
high proportion of employees working in the corporate production area, but
the service functions play a more important role than in Germany or Aus-
tria. Furthermore, private banking positions are relatively more important in
Switzerland, whereas retail banking is of minor importance in recent years.
It is crucial to keep these structural di¤erences in mind when it comes to the
interpretation of the results.
2.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is as follows. First we estimate the determinants of
individual base salary for a given individual i in year t with OLS regressions
using either cross sections for the three countries or the pooled data set.23
Like in almost all studies, our compensation variables are positively skewed.
We therefore use the logarithm of base pay and bonus payments. The baseline
specication for individual i is given by
yi =  + Zi + Ci + Fj + "
for the cross sections and for individual i in year t in the pooled data set
by
23For purposes of clarity, pooled cross section results for years before the nancial crisis
are compared with the cross sectional results for the year 2009.
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yit =  + Zit + Cit + Fj + t + "
The dependent variable yi is the logarithm of base salary for employee i
in each of the cross sections. As it is important to account for di¤erences
in human capital and rm and job-specic inuences, our controls include a
vector of demographic variables Zi (age, age squared, rm tenure, rm tenure
squared) and a vector of job-related controls Ci (functional area, hierarchical
level, career ladder and regional area). Organizational e¤ects are captured by
a dummy variable Fj for each rmj in the data set. The constant is denoted
by  and the error term by ". The additional index t represents the time
dimension in the pooled data set and t is a vector of year dummies.
Prior to investigating the determinants of short-term bonus payments, we
explore two interesting research questions: 1) What determines the likelihood
of having a xed compensation regime vs. a performance-based system. And
2) Is there a change in the probability of receiving positive (non-zero) bonus
payments for eligible employees over time?
As we have information on the short-term bonus eligibility of employees
in the banking sector, we estimate probit regressions with bonus eligibility
as dependent variable. The baseline specication is given by
yi =  + #basei + Zi + Ci + Fj + "
The dependent variable yi is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if em-
ployee i is eligible for short-term bonus payments in the given year, and 0
otherwise. As the level of base salary may have a positive impact on the
eligibility and likelihood of bonus payments, we include basei into the model.
The control vectors Zi, Ci, the rm controls Fj and the error term " are equal
to those described above.24
We further observe employees that are principally eligible for short-term
bonuses, but actually do not receive a variable payment at the end of the year.
In companies with target achievement systems a straightforward reason is
that the respective employee did not meet its targets. Another reason is that
24The regression equation for the pooled data set is also similar to that described above.
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rms retain bonuses for potentially eligible employees, i.e. bonus pools are
(completely) reduced, e.g. in the case of economic downturns. We therefore
estimate the probability of receiving a positive, non-zero bonus payment for
an actually eligible employee also with probit regressions. We construct a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if an eligible employee i receives a bonus
payment that is strictly greater than zero, and 0 otherwise.
For the analysis of the determinants of short-term bonus payments we
exclude employees that are principally eligible but receive no positive bonus
payment in the respective year, as the determinants of zero bonus payments
are already analyzed in the previous subsection. Similar to the regressions
with base salary as dependent variable, we apply OLS regressions with the
logarithm of bonus payments as dependent variable.25 The set of indepen-
dent variables in these regressions is equal to those used in the base salary
estimates. Furthermore, robust standard errors are reported in all regres-
sions.
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
The aim of this subchapter is to give a detailed, descriptive overview of the
key compensation variables and their development over time and country.
Table 2.1 reports mean values for base salary, bonus payments, the bonus
to base ratio, and the bonus to total ratio.26 This rst overview shows
that average salaries and bonuses are the highest in Switzerland, followed
by Germany. It is interesting to note that although the di¤erences in salary
levels between Germany and Austria are relatively narrow, there are large
di¤erences in short-term bonus payments between countries. This is quite
visible if one compares the bonus to base ratios. Whereas this ratio lies at
about 23% in Switzerland and 17% in Germany before the nancial crisis,
25As robustness check, we also apply tobit regressions including zero bonus payments
and compare the results.
26The bonus to base ratio is dened as bonus payments divided by base salary and
the bonus to total ratio as bonus payments divided by the sum of base salary and bonus
payments (both multiplied by 100). Table 2.20 in the appendix shows results for median
values.
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variable payments play only a minor role in Austria with values ranging
between 6% and 8%. The deep impact of the nancial crisis on variable
payments is also highly visible.
Country Overview of pay variables (mean values)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Germany
Base salary 52,581 50,545 54,280 56,840 58,299
Bonus payments 9,487 11,995 12,548 13,961 8,121
Bonus to base ratio 13.5 17.2 17.3 17.7 11.2
Bonus to total ratio 10.3 12.7 12.5 12.4 8.9
Switzerland
Base salary 65,620 63,853 69,431 72,399
Bonus payments 20,049 18,076 20,413 15,410
Bonus to base ratio 23.2 22.2 22.9 16.8
Bonus to total ratio 15.6 15.6 15.5 12.2
Austria
Base salary 51,457 54,556 56,189
Bonus payments 4,196 5,542 3,699
Bonus to base ratio 6.5 8.2 5.4
Bonus to total ratio 5.5 6.8 4.6
Base salary and bonus payments expressed in Euros, ratios in %.
Table 2.1: Overview of pay variables (mean values)
But it is important to note that a cross-country comparison of average
values is critical without considering the structural di¤erences in the com-
position of the industry, mainly the proportion of functional areas and hi-
erarchical levels. Higher average values in Switzerland may, besides a com-
pensation for a higher price level, partly be an artefact of a strong focus
on well-paid private banking activities, whereas in Austria the proportion of
employees in the lower-paid retail banking sector is nearly triple as high as
in Switzerland. We will take this heterogeneity into account and show de-
scriptive statistics over hierarchical level and functional area in the following
subsections. Within a certain area, practices and processes are very similar
across countries, as banks o¤er highly standardized products e.g. to retail
and corporate customers. In capital market-based functions like asset man-
agement the standardization of products is even higher as these products are
23
traded at the main stock exchanges in the world and are often regulated. Pay
di¤erences over countries are therefore quite well comparable if one looks at
the same functional area.
2.4.1 Base Salary
Figure 2.1 shows the typical positive and convex relationship between average
wages and hierarchical levels. The pattern looks very stable over time, even
at the beginning of the nancial crisis. According to tournament theory,
pay spreads strictly increase in the hierarchical level with the highest gap
between level 5 and top level 6. The average spreads for Germany are: 22%
(between level 1 and 2), 23% (level 2 and 3), 24% (level 3 and 4), 26% (level
4 and 5), and 41% (level 5 and 6).
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Figure 2.1: Average base salary over level
Figure 2.2 shows average base salaries over functional area and year for
Germany. Employees in treasury and capital markets, investment banking,
and asset management receive, on average, the highest wages, followed by
24
corporate and private banking. The lowest wages can be found in retail
banking and the service functions.
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Figure 2.2: Average base salary over module (Germany)
As explained in the beginning of this chapter, a pay comparison is only
meaningful if one compares the same functional areas between countries,
which is shown in table 2.2. Comparing Germany and Switzerland, percent-
age di¤erences in base salaries in IB, PB, and CS decreased by about 50%
over time, with the highest decrease in IB from 34% in 2005 to 7% in 2009.
In all other areas, di¤erences in 2009 are close to the values in 2005, with fre-
quent uctuations during the years. Interestingly, di¤erences in IB between
Germany and Austria also decreased the most, followed by TCM and AM.
To conclude, di¤erences in base salaries are rather small nowadays.
2.4.2 Individual vs. Average Wage Increases
As we also have information on previous years salaries for Austrian and
German employees, we are able to compare individual wage increases with
25
Percentage di¤erences in base salary between
Germany (reference) and
Switzerland Austria
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
TCM 12 1 9 14 -21 -17 -12
IB 34 16 10 7 -26 -26 -13
AM 16 3 11 13 -18 -16 -11
CB 11 3 8 12 -1 0 -2
PB 29 11 15 14 -1 -12 -10
CP 30 18 25 27 -3 -4 -3
RB 25 17 26 21 2 3 4
CS 27 12 12 15 -3 -2 -3
Table 2.2: Percentage di¤erences in base salary between Germany (reference)
and other countries
the development of average wages in the data set. Di¤erences between both
values may occur due to the recruitment policy of a bank. If the company
hires many new employees for lower entry wages, this may cause a decrease
in average wages of this rm. But at the same time, increases in individual
wages of incumbent workers are typically not a¤ected by this policy.
Figure 2.3 shows mean and median values of individual wage increases
for Austria and Germany between 2007 and 2009. Whereas in Austria wage
increases remain quite stable in the nancial crisis, German bank employees
face a large decrease, with growth rates less than or equal to zero for half of
the German employees.27 This may partially be explained by restructuring
activities with reallocations of employees as a result of the crisis. Growth
rates of average wages in Germany are 7:4% (median 10:3%) in 2007, 4:7%
(2:7%) in 2008, and 2:6% (2:5%) in 2009. To conclude, many incumbents
face wage decreases at the beginning of the crisis, whereas average wages
increase by more than 2%.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 in the appendix show median values of individual
wage growth rates over functional area in Germany and Austria. Two main
27The 1st percentile is  5:4, the 5th percentile is  2:2, and the 10th percentile is
0. Hence, there are between 5% and 10% of German employees with individual wage
decreases.
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Figure 2.3: Individual wage increase (mean and median)
trends are observable: First, wage growth rates in Germany are lower and
much more compressed compared to Austria. And second, median growth
rates in all areas of Austrian banks are positive in 2009, whereas in Germany,
half of the employees receive no wage increases or even face decreases in all
areas except IB and CS.
2.4.3 Bonus Eligibility and Non-Zero Bonus Payments
Prior to investigating recent trends in short-term bonus payments, it is impor-
tant to analyze the changes in bonus eligibility and the likelihood of receiving
positive, i.e. non-zero bonus payments. Table 2.3 shows the proportion of
employees that are eligible for short-term bonus payments by hierarchical
level for Germany. Nearly all employees at the upper three levels in the
data set are eligible. Rates at levels 2 and 3 show a slight downturn during
the crisis but remain proportionately high, whereas the entry level is char-
27
acterized by lower eligibility rates at around 70% nowadays.28 It seems that
companies only slightly reduced the number of employees that are eligible
for bonuses during the current recession. As can be seen in table 2.4, mainly
lower-qualied employees working in service and cross-divisional functions
are a¤ected by this policy, whereas in IB, TCM, or CB eligibility rates re-
main at high pre-crisis levels.
Level Bonus eligibility over level (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 99.4 99.5 99.8 99.6 99.3
Level 5 97.9 98.9 99.0 99.0 98.9
Level 4 94.1 97.3 98.6 98.3 97.4
Level 3 83.1 85.4 88.9 89.8 86.5
Level 2 80.4 83.9 89.6 88.6 85.8
Level 1 83.7 64.9 84.1 72.2 71.4
Total 87.3 87.6 92.4 91.1 89.5
Table 2.3: Average short-term bonus eligibility over level (Germany)
Average eligibility rates in Switzerland and Austria are, compared to
Germany, much higher in recent years with values between 97% and 99%.
Even at lower levels, far more than 95% of all bank employees are eligible
for bonus payments, even in service functions and retail banking. Similar to
Germany, eligibility rates tend to fall during the nancial crisis at the lowest
levels, but the decrease is not that large. Eligibility rates at upper levels
seem not to be a¤ected by the economic downturn.
A further interesting analysis refers to the development of proportions
of eligible employees receiving non-zero bonus payments. Although an em-
ployee is principally eligible for short-term bonus payments, the supervisor
or the company can decide not to pay out a bonus at the end of the scal
year. At higher levels, where bonus contracts typically consist of individual,
divisional and company-specic targets, we expect zero bonus payments less
likely to be observed in times of good economic condition. But in bad times
like the current nancial crisis, with company and divisional targets being
28The decline in bonus eligibility at level 1 in 2006 is driven by below-average eligibility
rates in retail banking for this year.
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Module Bonus eligibility over module (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
AM 93.5 95.1 98.1 97.1 96.5
CB 94.3 96.4 96.9 97.0 98.2
CP 96.3 94.8 97.6 95.9 92.8
CS 81.0 81.1 88.6 84.3 80.9
IB 99.0 98.0 99.0 99.4 97.9
PB 98.4 98.9 97.6 99.3 98.6
RB 81.1 83.3 89.3 88.1 87.6
TCM 99.3 98.3 99.8 99.4 98.4
Table 2.4: Average short-term bonus eligibility over module (Germany)
hardly met, more companies may follow a strategy of bonus cuts. At lower
levels, formula-based incentive contracts are rare and employees rather get a
subjective performance evaluation that is payo¤-relevant. Hence, zero bonus
payments may be seen as an indicator that an employee did not meet her
supervisors expectations. But if the economy is in a bad shape, compa-
nies typically restrict nancial budgets and, hence, bonus pools leading to a
higher likelihood of zero bonus payments.
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the proportion of eligible employees receiving a
positive, non-zero bonus payment by level and country. Before 2009, nearly
all German employees at the top three levels received a positive bonus pay-
ment, at levels 3 and 2 the proportion is about 96% and for entry-level
employees about 90%.
The pattern in Switzerland and Austria looks quite similar with average
proportions that are only slightly below the values for Germany. The main
di¤erence is the impact of the nancial crisis. In Germany and Austria, a
sharp fall in average proportions for the year 2009 is observable with a de-
crease in average rates up to 15 percentage points at the majority of levels
in both countries. This is mainly driven by a huge number of employees
with zero bonus payments in investment banking (above proportion is about
75%), TCM (84%) and RB (88%). Contrary to that development, we observe
only a slight decrease among hierarchical levels in Switzerland combined with
a below-average number of zero bonuses in IB, TCM and RB (proportions
29
Level % of employees with positive bonus (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 97.7 99.3 98.8 99.2 89.0
Level 5 98.1 99.0 99.2 99.0 85.9
Level 4 96.1 99.1 98.4 98.3 89.7
Level 3 77.7 98.9 96.4 95.8 87.5
Level 2 74.3 98.4 95.8 95.6 84.9
Level 1 76.8 97.7 88.9 89.4 85.7
Total 85.0 98.8 96.4 96.4 87.2
Table 2.5: Average proportion of eligible employees receiving positive (non-
zero) bonus payments over level (Germany)
above 95%). It seems that Swiss nancial companies were afraid of bonus
cuts, maybe to retain high-qualied employees, whereas in Germany and
Austria a considerable part of employees at all levels faced zero bonus pay-
ments with the beginning of the nancial crisis, although being principally
eligible.
Level % of employees with positive bonus
Switzerland Austria
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 99.6 98.6 96.9 98.0 96.4 87.9
Level 5 99.5 98.1 96.2 94.0 95.5 92.0
Level 4 98.8 96.7 95.6 91.1 93.8 94.3
Level 3 98.3 94.8 95.4 86.7 94.8 87.9
Level 2 97.4 91.0 90.9 73.5 95.3 83.7
Level 1 91.2 82.2 94.2 71.2 89.3 81.0
Total 97.5 94.1 94.6 84.0 94.4 88.6
Table 2.6: Average proportion of eligible employees receiving positive (non-
zero) bonus payments over level (other countries)
2.4.4 Bonus Payments
In this subchapter, we investigate the development of short-term bonus pay-
ments over level and functional area for eligible employees in each of the three
countries. The positive, convex relationship between average bonus payments
30
and level before the nancial crisis is depicted in gure 2.4. Similarly to base
salaries, the gaps between levels are increasing if an employee climbs up the
corporate hierarchy, with the largest gap between the two highest levels in
the data set. Average gaps in German banks before the nancial crisis are:
49% (between level 1 and 2), 67% (level 2 and 3), 121% (level 3 and 4),
143% (level 4 and 5), and 175% (level 5 and 6). The most pronounced shape
of the graph can be found for Switzerland, whereas for Austria, we observe
a relatively at curve. This is due to very large di¤erences in bonus pay-
ments between countries, with average bonuses of more than 110; 000 Euros
in Switzerland, about 80; 000 Euros in Germany and "only" about 25; 000
Euros in Austria for top-level employees in the data set.
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Figure 2.4: Average short-term bonus payments over level before nancial
crisis
The decrease in bonus payments following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 and the beginning of the nancial crisis is cur-
rently of major interest. We therefore provide some interesting descriptive
statistics that show what happened to bonuses in parts of the European -
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nancial sector.29 And these e¤ects are dramatic. Figure 2.5 shows annual
percentage changes in bonus payments over hierarchical level from 2008 to
2009. It is interesting to note that the pattern is quite similar for Germany
and Switzerland, as all levels are hit by massive decreases in bonus payments,
with increasing losses the higher the level. The reductions in Germany range
between 16% and 25% at lower levels and even more than 50% at the top
level. In Swiss banks, the decreases are slightly lower compared to Germany,
especially at the lowest and highest level. This trend is somewhat contrary
to what is frequently published mainly in the popular press claiming that
managers at top levels faced below-average losses and employees at bottom
levels are hit more severely by the crisis. In Austria, we observe no monotonic
pattern, because employees at levels 2 and 3 face higher or similar decreases
in bonuses than employees at upper levels.
But it is also important to analyze the development of bonus payments
over the last years. Figure 2.6 shows annual percentage changes in bonus pay-
ments relative to the reference year 2005 for German banks.30 This graph
yields some interesting results. Before the crisis, employees at all hierarchical
levels realized large increases in bonus payments over time. In 2008, employ-
ees at bottom levels received, on average, about 40% higher bonus payments
compared to 2005, and top-level employees up to 60%, whereas increases for
middle-level employees ranged between 20% and 30%. But though all em-
ployees face huge bonus cuts at the beginning of the crisis, bank employees
at bottom levels 1 to 3 are nevertheless better o¤ nancially now than in
2005 (+10%). This is not the case for higher-level employees. For employees
located at levels 4 to 6, crisis-related bonus cuts lead to a 20% decline in
variable income compared to 2005.31 To conclude, higher-level employees
not only face the largest reductions in bonus payments in the rst year of the
29As bonuses that are paid out in 2009 are based on the performance during the scal
year 2008, the very rst e¤ects of the crisis (the rst four months since the breakdown of
Lehman Brothers) are investigated here.
30The rst year in the data set is a good reference year, because there were no signs and
warnings about an imminent nancial crisis at that time.
31Even for total pay, lower-level employees are better o¤ with a 10% to13% higher total
income relative to 2005. Increases at level 5 are only 2%, whereas level 6 managers even
face a 4% decline in total income.
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Figure 2.5: Percentage changes in bonus payments over level from 2008 to
2009
crisis, but also their average bonuses are below the level of 2005.32 At lower
levels, many employees are covered by collective wage agreements. This may
be one explanation for the results, because these agreements may protect
employees against high income losses.
Functional Areas
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the main functional areas in the nan-
cial services industry. Figure 2.13 in the appendix shows that there are large
di¤erences across areas between 2005 and 2009 in German banks. Average
bonuses in TCM, IB, and AM are the highest by far, followed by PB and
CB. The lowest variable payments can be found for RB and service function
32For Switzerland we use 2006 as reference year as this is the rst year of the Swiss
sample. Figure 2.12 in the appendix shows that 2006 was a good year for the Swiss
nancial services companies, because the vast majority of change rates is negative. It can
be seen that all levels are a¤ected by the nancial crisis, but similar to Germany, relative
losses are the highest at upper levels.
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Figure 2.6: Annual percentage changes in bonus payments over level (Ger-
many, reference: year 2005)
positions. Similar to the previous analyses, we are also interested in how
bonus payments developed before and during the nancial crisis. Figure 2.7
shows percentage changes in bonuses over functional area and country from
year 2008 to 2009. For Germany, percentage losses are the highest in IB and
TCM with a decrease of about 60% relative to the pre-crisis year 2008, fol-
lowed by CB and AM with losses between 45% and 50% and RB with 31%.
We further nd a below-average decrease of bonuses in private banking with
a reduction of "only" 16%.
In Swiss banks, investment banking employees also su¤ered the highest
losses, but reductions in TCM are only half the size of those in Germany.
Besides high reduction rates in retail banking, too, the relatively small de-
crease in the German private banking sector does not reect the situation in
Switzerland. Here, variable payments decrease by about 45%, nearly three
times as much as in Germany. As private banking is one of the most im-
portant areas in Switzerland, the negative impact of the crisis on wealthy,
34
private clients explains this result. In Austria, change rates are more similar
with highest reductions in CB, TCM and, as opposed to the other countries,
in the lower-skilled service functions with more than 42%.
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Figure 2.7: Percentage changes in bonus payments over functional area from
2008 to 2009
It is also interesting to note that German employees only in asset manage-
ment and private banking are better o¤ in the rst year of the crisis than in
2005. Both areas are characterized by high levels of bonus payments during
the last years and, despite the beginning crisis, average bonuses are about
20% higher in AM and even 60% higher in PB compared to 2005, as can be
seen in gure 2.8. Large income losses can be found in capital market-based
functions like TCM (55% lower in 2009 than in 2005), IB, CB and in re-
tail banking. Figure 2.14 in the appendix shows the percentage changes for
Switzerland with 2006 as reference year. Employees working in areas like IB,
TCM and PB face the largest decreases in bonus payments compared to the
year 2006, when Swiss companies paid out the highest amount of bonuses in
recent years.
35
-6
0
-3
0
0
3
0
6
0
9
0
1
2
0
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 (
2
0
0
5
=
R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
)
TCM IB AM CB PB CP RB CS
Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008
Year 2009
Reference: Year 2005
Figure 2.8: Annual percentage changes in bonus payments over module (Ger-
many, reference: year 2005)
Country Comparison
After having analyzed the development of bonus payments over hierarchi-
cal level and functional area, it is further interesting to look at potential
structural di¤erences between countries within the same functional area. Ta-
ble 2.7 shows annual percentage di¤erences with Germany as reference unit.
Interestingly, there are areas where the average gap in bonus levels between
Germany and the other countries is continuously increasing or decreasing and
areas where di¤erences seem to be relatively constant over time. In TCM
and CB, e.g., the di¤erence between Switzerland and Germany is getting
larger since 2007 with a huge increase in 2009, whereas the variable pay gap
decreases over the same period between Germany and Austria. In CP, RB,
and CS, percentage di¤erences, though being volatile, are close to original
levels in 2009.
36
Module Percentage di¤erence in bonus payments
between Germany and
Switzerland Austria
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
TCM 14 -18 42 160 -79 -61 -43
IB 128 20 39 54 -71 -76 -60
AM 25 -30 -21 9 -65 -71 -65
CB 46 28 59 106 -51 -42 -38
PB 157 47 102 34 -56 -44 -50
CP 89 67 77 86 -54 -50 -54
RB 56 62 96 56 -60 -57 -49
CS 19 7 2 16 -65 -46 -59
Table 2.7: Percentage di¤erence in bonus payments between Germany (ref-
erence) and other countries
Career Ladders
As we also have information whether a job is assigned to the management
ladder (supervisory responsibilities) or to the professional ladder (functional
expert in relevant eld), we also investigate the di¤erences in bonus payments
between countries for these two groups of employees. As can be seen in gure
2.9, the percentage di¤erences in bonus payments between Swiss and German
managers increased dramatically from 17% in 2007 to more than 100% in
2009 indicating that Swiss managers are paid twice as much as their German
counterparts. An increasing di¤erence over time is also evident for functional
experts in the professional ladder, from 70% in 2007 to about 90% in 2009.
For Austrian managers, we nd a decreasing di¤erence compared to their
German colleagues starting with  65% in 2007 up to  44% in 2009, whereas
di¤erences between functional experts in these two countries remain almost
the same. The above-average decreases in bonuses for German managers
from 2007 to 2008 ( 25%) and from 2008 to 2009 ( 41%) may explain
these results, while in Austria and Switzerland crisis-related losses are much
smaller.
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Figure 2.9: Di¤erences in bonus payments between career ladders (reference:
Germany)
2.4.5 Bonus to Base Ratio
After having analyzed base salary and bonus payments separately, we now
want to give an overview on the pay mix of employees in the nancial services
sector. As a measure of pay mix we use the bonus to base ratio, i.e. bonus
payments as a percentage of base salary.33 Tables 2.8 and 2.9 show descriptive
results over level and functional area for Germany. After an increase from
2005 to 2006, the average bonus to base ratio is relatively stable during recent
years. Within levels, major increases can be found at the top, especially at
level 6 with an increase from 52% in 2005 to 78% in 2008. At middle and
bottom levels, ratios are overall constant. Similar to the previous section,
the impact of the nancial crisis on the individual pay mix is also evident at
all levels. The average value decreases to 11:5%; what is mainly driven by
33The bonus to base ratio is given in percentages. We also use the bonus to total ratio
leading to the same results.
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huge declines at the highest levels.
Level Mean bonus to base ratio (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 52.4 66.2 69.6 78.3 39.6
Level 5 30.5 35.4 37.5 36.2 22.4
Level 4 16.2 19.0 20.3 18.3 12.4
Level 3 7.8 10.8 11.2 10.6 7.8
Level 2 5.7 8.9 8.8 7.6 5.8
Level 1 4.7 8.4 6.2 6.6 5.2
Total 13.5 17.2 17.3 17.7 11.5
Table 2.8: Average bonus to base ratio over level (Germany)
Table 2.9 shows that employees in all functional areas face a decrease in
the proportion of variable payments over base salary, with the largest re-
ductions in the capital market-based functions IB, AM, and TCM. Financial
companies in Switzerland generally give a greater weight to variable pay-
ments compared to Germany. But the patterns described above can also
be found in Swiss institutions, as is shown in table 2.21 in the appendix.
Contrary to these results, variable pay plays only a minor role in Austria.
Module Mean bonus to base ratio (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
TCM 53.9 80.9 74.7 57.1 24.3
IB 42.1 53.0 50.3 64.2 26.9
AM 30.2 40.7 57.4 59.9 34.8
CB 21.4 24.0 26.0 25.0 13.5
PB 17.0 22.7 33.1 27.0 23.6
CP 13.2 16.1 18.1 15.7 11.1
RB 10.9 13.0 11.6 12.0 8.3
CS 7.4 10.5 11.0 10.1 7.6
Table 2.9: Average bonus to base ratio over module (Germany)
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2.4.6 Pay Dispersion
This last subchapter analyses the development of pay dispersion in the bank-
ing and nancial services industry. We use two indicators of pay dispersion:
First the level 6/level 1 pay ratio, i.e. average pay (base salary or bonus
payments) at top level 6 divided by average pay at entry level 1, and the
coe¢cient of variation, i.e. the standard deviation divided by the mean.
Whereas the level 6/level 1 pay ratio shows the di¤erence between highest
and lowest average incomes, the coe¢cient of variation is a good indicator of
within-level and within-function variation.
Table 2.10 shows level 6/level 1 pay ratios over year and country sepa-
rately for base salary and bonus payments. Regarding base salary, the ratios
are quite stable over time with values for Germany and Austria ranging be-
tween 3 and 3:5 and slightly smaller values for Swiss companies. But looking
at bonus payments is much more interesting. Compared to base salary, the
ratios in all countries are much higher, with a value of 55:1 for Swiss banks in
2008, meaning that an employee at top level 6 earns, on average, a 55 times
higher short-term bonus than a colleague at the lowest level 1. For Germany,
the ratio is about 45, whereas the lowest ratio can be found for Austria. In
contrast to base salaries, the nancial crisis has a large impact on the level
6/level 1 pay ratio resulting in a huge drop for Germany and Switzerland of
about 20 units. But in Austrian banks, the ratio only slightly decreases.
With our second indicator, the coe¢cient of variation, we are able to an-
alyze the variation in bonus payments within levels and areas, as can be seen
in tables 2.22 and 2.23 in the appendix. It is interesting to note that di¤er-
entiation at intermediate and top levels is the largest in Germany, followed
by Austria and, with distance, Switzerland. In German banks, dispersion
in bonus payments at the top levels has decreased over time, but is almost
unchanged in the rst year of the nancial crisis. But at intermediate levels,
we observe a huge fall in the coe¢cient of variation in 2009, indicating that
the decrease in average bonuses is much stronger than the decrease in the
standard deviation. Contrary to Germany, we nd signicant crisis-related
increases in bonus dispersion at the top three levels for Switzerland and Aus-
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Pay component Level 6/Level 1 pay ratio
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Base salary
Germany 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.1
Switzerland 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.7
Austria 3.2 3.1 3.3
Bonus payments
Germany 42.8 32.1 45.4 45.2 26.0
Switzerland 45.4 43.8 55.1 36.0
Austria 38.7 36.2 32.8
Ratio of highest-level pay to entry-level pay is based on average values
Table 2.10: Ratio of highest-level pay to entry-level pay
tria. To conclude, Austrian and Swiss companies seem to di¤erentiate more
between employees with beginning of the nancial crisis compared to Ger-
man banks. But Swiss companies did not increase the number of employees
with zero bonus payments at the same time.
2.5 Determinants of Base Salary and Bonus
Payments
2.5.1 Base Salary
Table 2.11 reports OLS regression results for the determinants of base salary
in Germany using annual cross sections for 2005 to 2009. The base model
incorporates hierarchical level, age, age squared, rm tenure, rm tenure
squared, and functional area as main independent variables. Further control
variables in all specications include career ladder, region, and company
dummies. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for each
regression.34
Overall, the coe¢cients in the base salary regressions are quite stable
34The decrease in observations in 2007 is due to missing information on regional areas.
Excluding regional area as a control variable leads to the same results and a similar number
of observations compared to previous years.
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over time, with minor decreases in the rst year of the nancial crisis. The
results support the positive and convex relationship between hierarchical level
and base salary, with the largest gap between level 5 and top level 6. In
2008 e.g., employees at level 6 earn, on average, a 156%35 higher base salary
than colleagues at the entry level, all other factors constant. Consistent
with tournament theory, gaps are increasing in the hierarchical level.36 It
is further interesting to note that standard errors also increase in the level.
This supports the theory of internal labor markets which states that cross-
rm variance is lowest at entry-level positions, as the strong competition
for employees at these levels forces rms to focus more on market wages.
We further nd a statistically signicant and very stable inversely U-shaped
age-earnings-prole with an extremum between 49 and 51 years of age. This
a¤ects about 20% of all employees in the data set. All other factors constant,
one additional year of age increases average wages between 2:4% and 3:5%,
with decreasing marginal returns. The relationship between tenure and base
salary shows no stable pattern, with only three of ve years to be statistically
signicant and extrema between 13 and 22 years of rm tenure, which a¤ects
20% to 40% of all employees.37 But the coe¢cients are economically not
signicant.
Referring to functional areas, we also nd relatively stable patterns in
pre-crisis years. Compared to retail banking, employees in treasury and cap-
ital markets, investment banking and asset management receive, on average,
between 35% and 47% higher salaries, followed by corporate and private
banking with up to 25% in recent years. The salary of employees working in
service functions of banks and nancial institutions is quite comparable with
average salary levels in retail banking. The nancial crisis, already beginning
in 2008, partly leads to a harmonization of salary levels, because coe¢cients
are much smaller than in previous years. In some areas like corporate bank-
35Note that the wage increases by
 
e   1

 100 percent in case of dummy variables in
semilogarithmic equations (see e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).
36These results are in line with previous studies like e.g. Baker et al. (1994b), Treble
et al. (2001), and Grund (2005).
37The extremum for 2008 is negligible, as less than 0:5% have a tenure of 39 years or
more.
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ing, di¤erences compared to retail banking even diminish.
Table 2.12 shows regression results for base pay in Swiss and Austrian
banks and nancial companies.38 The results are similar to those presented
in table 2.11. The largest coe¢cients for levels and functional areas can
be found for German banks. Minor di¤erences are visible with respect to
the functional areas. In Switzerland, the di¤erences between RB and AM,
CB, CS and PB increase in 2009, whereas in Austria, similar to Germany,
coe¢cients tend to decrease. Further, average wages in Austrian service areas
are more than 5% lower than in retail banking. This is nowadays also true
for private banking positions. The age-earnings-prole in Swiss banks is very
similar to that in German rms, whereas in Austria, this relationship is more
pronounced.
2.5.2 Bonus Eligibility and Non-Zero Bonus Payments
The rst two columns of table 2.13 show marginal e¤ects of probit regressions
for bonus eligibility in German banks.39 We observe a hump-shaped relation-
ship between bonus eligibility and position in the hierarchy. Compared to
entry positions, the likelihood of being eligible to short-term bonus payments
increases with hierarchical level up to level 4, whereas coe¢cients are smaller
at the highest levels in the hierarchy. This is in line with theoretical predic-
tions, as short-term bonus payments are substituted by long-term rewards
like e.g. option-based remuneration at higher levels (see e.g. Jensen and
Murphy (1990b) and Murphy (1999)). The missing relationship between age
and eligibility rates is probably explained by the level dummies, as older em-
ployees are typically located at higher levels. The analysis also reveals that
eligibility rates in areas with standardized products like retail and corporate
banking tend to be the highest, whereas the likelihood of being eligible is
38Columns 1 and 3 present results from pooled cross sections including year dummies.
The decrease in observations in 2009 for Switzerland is due to missing information on
age. Excluding age as a control variable leads to the same results and a similar number
of observations compared to previous years.
39We show no results for Switzerland and Austria, as eligibility rates and proportions
of non-zero bonus payments are close to 100%.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6a 0.9402*** 0.9007*** 0.9249*** 0.9409*** 0.9038***
(0.0053) (0.0047) (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0047)
Level 5 0.6674*** 0.6382*** 0.6591*** 0.6764*** 0.6329***
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Level 4 0.4913*** 0.4783*** 0.5069*** 0.5052*** 0.4359***
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0019)
Level 3 0.3251*** 0.3046*** 0.3491*** 0.3248*** 0.2731***
(0.00188) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Level 2 0.1650*** 0.1403*** 0.1916*** 0.1716*** 0.1270***
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Age 0.0339*** 0.0345*** 0.0292*** 0.0245*** 0.0347***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Age2  100 -0.0346*** -0.0351*** -0.0290*** -0.0250*** -0.0350***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Tenure -0.0006*** -0.0009*** -0.0001 0.0020*** -0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tenure2  100 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0001 -0.0026*** 0.0054***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Asset Managementb 0.2578*** 0.2761*** 0.3246*** 0.2228*** 0.1292***
(0.0077) (0.0069) (0.0078) (0.0052) (0.0055)
Corporate Banking 0.1791*** 0.1841*** 0.2209*** 0.1483*** -0.0092**
(0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0042)
Corporate Prod. 0.1468*** 0.1514*** 0.2095*** 0.1085*** 0.0534***
(0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0047) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Corporate Services 0.0401*** 0.0488*** 0.0847*** 0.0497*** 0.0017
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Investment Bank. 0.2694*** 0.2750*** 0.3036*** 0.1567*** 0.1255***
(0.0071) (0.0060) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0077)
Private Banking 0.1482*** 0.1665*** 0.2263*** 0.1503*** 0.1098***
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0036)
Treas. and Cap. M. 0.2362*** 0.3442*** 0.3845*** 0.1610*** 0.1104***
(0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0042)
Observations 94,058 90,957 65,435 96,572 101,596
Adj. R2 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.81
a Reference category: Level 1, b Reference category: Retail Banking
Additional controls include career ladder, region, year and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.11: Regression results for determinants of base salary (Germany)
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
Switzerland Austria
2006-2008 2009 2007-2008 2009
Level 6a 0.7677*** 0.7432*** 0.7059*** 0.7625***
(0.0025) (0.0097) (0.0086) (0.0114)
Level 5 0.5560*** 0.5271*** 0.5342*** 0.5517***
(0.0016) (0.0071) (0.0055) (0.0080)
Level 4 0.3798*** 0.3613*** 0.3262*** 0.3659***
(0.0013) (0.0062) (0.0044) (0.0066)
Level 3 0.2274*** 0.1757*** 0.2012*** 0.2339***
(0.0012) (0.0057) (0.0037) (0.0058)
Level 2 0.0932*** 0.0511*** 0.0831*** 0.1164***
(0.0010) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0053)
Age 0.0340*** 0.0324*** 0.0507*** 0.0443***
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Age2  100 -0.0317*** -0.0304*** -0.0428*** -0.0354***
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0016)
Tenure -0.0072*** -0.0081*** -0.0045*** -0.0071***
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Tenure2  100 0.0191*** 0.0211*** 0.0217*** 0.0260***
(0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Asset Managementb 0.0873*** 0.1701*** 0.1495*** 0.1825***
(0.0034) (0.0093) (0.0113) (0.0165)
Corporate Banking 0.0183*** 0.1105*** 0.0933*** 0.0073
(0.0028) (0.0070) (0.0076) (0.0086)
Corporate Prod. 0.0448*** 0.0545*** 0.0170***
(0.0024) (0.0049) (0.0053)
Corporate Services -0.0182*** 0.1143*** -0.0356*** -0.0537***
(0.0027) (0.0160) (0.0053) (0.0057)
Investment Bank. 0.1292*** 0.0662*** 0.0883*** 0.0233
(0.0117) (0.0182) (0.0114) (0.0257)
Private Banking 0.0436*** 0.1605*** 0.0748*** -0.0252*
(0.0025) (0.0070) (0.0107) (0.0144)
Treas. and Cap. M. 0.1137*** 0.1177*** 0.1568*** 0.0125
(0.0043) (0.0117) (0.0091) (0.0116)
Observations 158,480 12,142 39,151 19,419
Adj. R2 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.78
a Reference category: Level 1, b Reference category: Retail Banking
Additional controls include career ladder, region, year and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.12: Regression results for determinants of base salary (Switzerland
and Austria) 45
signicantly lower for employees in lower-skilled service and support as well
as cross-divisional functions. This is in line with theoretical predictions sta-
ting that eligibility rates should be higher in areas where output is more
accurately measurable (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)).40
Columns 3 and 4 indicate that the likelihood for eligible employees to
receive a positive, i.e. non-zero bonus payment also increases up to level 4
and decreases again for higher-level employees. But the economic signicance
of the coe¢cients especially for age, tenure and the functional areas is very
low indicating that rms base the decision whether to pay out a bonus or
not primarily on individual e¤orts of employees rather than on systematic
workplace or demographic characteristics. This is also supported by the
small value of pseudo R-squared of 37% in column 3. In 2009, the value is
much higher, but the coe¢cients are very small. Regressions with company
dummies as sole independent variable revealed that the higher proportion of
explained variation in the data is mainly attributable to di¤erences between
companies in the course of the crisis and not to systematic di¤erences in
job or individual characteristics. This shows that decisions on compensation
policies like bonus cuts have been handled quite di¤erently across companies
in the current economic crisis.
2.5.3 Short-term Bonus Payments
In this subsection we investigate the determinants of short-term bonus pay-
ments. Table 2.14 shows OLS regression results with the logarithm of positive
bonus payments as dependent variable for German cross sections from 2005
to 2009. Compared to base salaries, the coe¢cients are much more volatile
over time, especially for the functional areas. We also nd di¤erent patterns
of the e¤ects of the nancial crisis for the three analyzed countries.
As indicated in the descriptive analyses, we nd strongly increasing co-
e¢cients for bonus payments when moving up the hierarchy. Before 2009,
a German top-level employee receives, on average, between 8 to 12 times
40In 2009, the nancial crisis leads to signicantly lower eligibility rates in capital
market-based functions, as these functions were primarily hit by the breakdown of the
nancial system.
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Dependent variable: Bonus Eligibility (Probit) Positive Bonus (Probit)
2005-2008 2009 2005-2008 2009
Level 6a 0.0044*** 0.0435*** 0.0110*** 0.0068***
(0.0004) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0022)
Level 5 0.0062*** 0.0557*** 0.0134*** 0.0100***
(0.0005) (0.0043) (0.0008) (0.0032)
Level 4 0.0087*** 0.1142*** 0.0213*** 0.0254***
(0.0007) (0.0079) (0.0009) (0.0074)
Level 3 0.0033*** 0.0652*** 0.0029*** 0.0058***
(0.0003) (0.0049) (0.0008) (0.0019)
Level 2 -0.0022*** 0.0368*** 0.0027*** -0.0018***
(0.0003) (0.0030) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Age 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0015*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age2  100 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0016*** -0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Tenure 0.0003*** -0.0022*** 0.0018*** 0.0002***
(0.00005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Tenure2  100 -0.0008*** 0.0041 -0.0046*** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Asset Managementb -0.0080*** -0.1012*** -0.0152*** 0.0029**
(0.0030) (0.0225) (0.0046) (0.0012)
Corporate Banking 0.0029*** 0.0283*** -0.0059*** 0.0026***
(0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0010)
Corporate Prod. -0.0016* -0.0429*** -0.0068*** 0.0042***
(0.0009) (0.0040) (0.0018) (0.0013)
Corporate Services -0.0078*** -0.1525*** 0.0045** 0.0063***
(0.0014) (0.0077) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Investment Bank. 0.0012 -0.3150*** -0.0137*** 0.0037***
(0.0012) (0.0554) (0.0046) (0.0014)
Private Banking 0.0027*** -0.0003 0.0048*** 0.0038***
(0.0006) (0.0094) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Treas. and Cap. M. -0.0027 -0.0781*** -0.0061** 0.0030***
(0.0024) (0.0186) (0.0029) (0.0011)
Observations 235,403 57,509 279,211 76,510
Log likelihood -28239.55 -11182.740 -47107.39 -11129.52
Pseudo R2 0.73 0.62 0.37 0.66
a Ref. category: Level 1, b Ref. category: Retail Banking. Add. controls include
ln base salary, career ladder, region, year and company. Marg. e¤ects reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.13: Probit regression results for determinants of bonus eligibility and
positive bonus payments (Germany) 47
higher bonus payments than a colleague at the lowest level, all other factors
constant. Table 2.15 shows results for (pooled) cross sections of Swiss and
Austrian banks. It can be seen that the coe¢cients are much larger in mag-
nitude, with this di¤erence lying between 12 and 21 times. These results are
in line with incentive theory stating that variable payments should be more
important at levels where tasks are more complex and where the individual
impact on rm performance is stronger (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)).
The above-average losses in variable payments in the nancial crisis lead
to decreasing coe¢cients for all levels in German and Swiss banks, whereas
coe¢cients increase for all levels in Austria in the year 2009. This leads to
growing di¤erences between entry-level and especially top-level positions due
to the crisis with average bonuses at top levels more than 14 times higher
compared to lowest-level payments.
Compared to base salaries, age plays a minor role in bonus determination
as the coe¢cients are smaller in the regressions for each country. It is inter-
esting to note that di¤erences in age-earnings-proles are more pronounced
between countries than in age-tenure proles. In all countries, we nd an
inversely U-shaped relationship between age and variable payments, but the
extrema are quite di¤erent. Whereas in Germany, average bonus payments
increase (with a decreasing marginal rate) up to 46-49 years of age (around
25% of all employees are aged 48 years and older), the value for Austria is
38 years and the extremum in Swiss companies is at 27 years, all other fac-
tors constant. But as 90% of all Swiss employees are older than 27, bonus
payments decrease with age for the vast majority of employees. This nega-
tive relationship, i.e. the decrease in variable payments for older employees,
is conrmed by estimates with age class dummies as independent variables.
All else equal, an employee that is between 51 and 60 (61 years and older)
receives, on average, a 19% (35%) lower bonus payment compared to an em-
ployee that is around 30 years of age. Note that we found no signicant
impact of age on bonus eligibility in the previous subsection, what stands in
contrast to predictions of the career concerns theory. The same is true for
the decrease in bonuses for older employees (and in Swiss banks already for
much younger employees). It may therefore be possible that banks rather use
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Bonus Payments (Germany)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6a 2.5074*** 2.0402*** 2.0737*** 2.3323*** 1.8599***
(0.0219) (0.0241) (0.0270) (0.0179) (0.0198)
Level 5 1.7523*** 1.3833*** 1.4165*** 1.5985*** 1.2627***
(0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0122) (0.0133)
Level 4 1.2045*** 0.8616*** 1.0664*** 1.0470*** 0.7397***
(0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0102) (0.0109)
Level 3 0.5783*** 0.4151*** 0.5681*** 0.4849*** 0.4007***
(0.0119) (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0092) (0.0098)
Level 2 0.1980*** 0.1209*** 0.2395*** 0.1836*** 0.1328***
(0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0084) (0.0087)
Age 0.0336*** 0.0272*** 0.0235*** 0.0216*** 0.0605***
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0024)
Age2  100 -0.0368*** -0.0306*** -0.0250*** -0.0239*** -0.0623***
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0028)
Tenure 0.0015 0.0056*** 0.0051*** 0.0059*** -0.0021**
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Tenure2  100 -0.0041 -0.0167*** -0.0182*** -0.0182*** 0.0019
(0.0030) (0.002) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Asset Managementb 0.8849*** 1.0808*** 1.1415*** 1.0058*** 0.7680***
(0.0342) (0.0315) (0.0335) (0.0239) (0.0231)
Corporate Banking 0.5445*** 0.5947*** 0.7811*** 0.4804*** -0.1187***
(0.0202) (0.0187) (0.0210) (0.0181) (0.0202)
Corporate Prod. 0.2742*** 0.4146*** 0.5401*** 0.2875*** 0.2273***
(0.0185) (0.0171) (0.0197) (0.0087) (0.0102)
Corporate Services 0.0859*** 0.1774*** 0.1990*** 0.1770*** 0.1273***
(0.0208) (0.0236) (0.0263) (0.0097) (0.0111)
Investment Bank. 1.0851*** 1.2225*** 1.2584*** 0.7513*** 0.4878***
(0.0358) (0.0321) (0.0378) (0.0357) (0.0374)
Private Banking 0.4291*** 0.5860*** 0.8543*** 0.5957*** 0.2439***
(0.0205) (0.0120) (0.0274) (0.0185) (0.0166)
Treas. and Cap. M. 1.0448*** 1.6914*** 1.8702*** 0.7240*** 0.4047***
(0.0263) (0.0293) (0.0336) (0.0313) (0.0198)
Observations 64,319 71,692 52,691 86,108 72,628
Adj. R2 0.70 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.62
a Reference category: Level 1, b Reference category: Retail Banking.
Additional controls include career ladder, region, year and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.14: Regression results for determinants of bonus payments (Ger-
many)
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promotions as incentive device than absolute bonus payments, with the large
gap between levels as incentive device.41 Another explanation may refer to a
decrease in individual productivity levels with increasing years of age. Look-
ing at rm tenure, we also nd a hump-shaped relationship for Germany and
Switzerland, with extrema between 14 and 17 years for Germany and around
23 for Swiss companies. But in the rst year of the crisis, the relationship
shows the opposite sign or gets statistically insignicant in all countries.
The comparison between functional areas and countries yields some in-
teresting results. Compared to levels, the results for the main functional
areas are much more volatile. This seems to be rational, as bonuses ideally
depend on individual e¤orts as well as divisional and company outcomes.
These are typically inuenced by external factors like the economic situation
or the competitive position in the market or division. Second, di¤erences
between functional areas are much larger compared to base salaries. Before
the crisis, we nd a similar pattern in all countries with average bonuses in
retail banking and the service functions being the lowest in the industry. The
largest coe¢cients, however, can be found for TCM, IB, and AM, followed by
PB and CB. All other factors constant, employees in TCM e.g. earn average
bonuses that are between 175% and 550% higher than in retail banking.
It is further interesting to compare the impact of the crisis on functional
area regression coe¢cients between countries, which is quite di¤erent. For
German banks, we nd decreasing coe¢cients for all functional areas leading
to shrinking di¤erences between RB and all other areas. The largest decreases
are visible for the capital market-based functions IB, AM and TCM as well
as CB, where average bonuses are signicantly lower than in RB nowadays.
In Switzerland, di¤erences between retail banking and the majority of areas
are getting larger including a massive increase in PB. But also in TCM and
IB, a negative impact of the crisis is visible with bonuses in IB that are
no longer statistically di¤erent from those in retail banking. For Austria,
the most striking result is the huge increase in investment banking, leading
to a di¤erence in average variable payments between retail and investment
41Note that we have no information on promotion probabilities of employees in the data
set.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Bonus Payments (Switzerland)
Switzerland Austria
2006-2008 2009 2007-2008 2009
Level 6a 3.0488*** 2.8903*** 2.4556*** 2.6495***
(0.0118) (0.0514) (0.0371) (0.0533)
Level 5 2.3394*** 2.2058*** 1.9484*** 1.9716***
(0.0092) (0.0364) (0.0277) (0.0419)
Level 4 1.5730*** 1.5472*** 1.4020*** 1.5069***
(0.0081) (0.0314) (0.0242) (0.0366)
Level 3 0.9484*** 0.7238*** 0.9976*** 1.1172***
(0.0074) (0.0296) (0.0226) (0.0343)
Level 2 0.4438*** 0.2510*** 0.5813*** 0.6359***
(0.0067) (0.0278) (0.0222) (0.0331)
Age 0.0174*** 0.0117* 0.0264*** 0.0055
(0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0068)
Age2  100 -0.0332*** -0.0220*** -0.0356*** -0.0152*
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0083)
Tenure 0.0305*** -0.0013 0.0075*** -0.0096***
(0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0028)
Tenure2  100 -0.0664*** 0.0043 -0.0214*** 0.0176**
(0.0019) (0.0071) (0.0051) (0.0071)
Asset Managementb 0.3399*** 0.6078*** 0.5830*** 0.6117***
(0.0165) (0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0731)
Corporate Banking 0.0355*** 0.3007*** 0.5087*** 0.2521***
(0.0136) (0.0365) (0.0307) (0.0380)
Corporate Prod. 0.0659*** 0.1375*** -0.0869***
(0.0105) (0.0191) (0.0243)
Corporate Services -0.2379*** 0.1294 0.1156*** 0.0594**
(0.0127) (0.0849) (0.0195) (0.0240)
Investment Bank. 0.6307*** 0.1179 0.4758*** 0.9035***
(0.0688) (0.1107) (0.0484) (0.1705)
Private Banking 0.3442*** 0.8326*** 0.4571*** 0.4581***
(0.0114) (0.0355) (0.0477) (0.0789)
Treas. and Cap. M. 0.9384*** 0.7891*** 1.0068*** 0.6738***
(0.0235) (0.0650) (0.0445) (0.0668)
Observations 141,342 10,912 30,279 14,950
Adj. R2 0.72 0.75 0.63 0.53
a Reference category: Level 1, b Reference category: Retail Banking
Additional controls include career ladder, region, year and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 2.15: Regression results for determinants of bonus payments (Switzer-
land and Austria) 51
banking of more than 150%. Major decreases can be found for TCM, CB
and CP.
To conclude, the nancial crisis leads to shrinking di¤erences between
hierarchical levels in Germany and Switzerland, whereas the results for func-
tional areas are quite mixed between countries. Hence, further discussions
with nancial company representatives are necessary to derive explanations
for the di¤erent patterns between countries even in the same functional area
like e.g. investment banking. Especially in capital market-based areas, it
seems that nancial companies di¤ered with respect to their portfolio strate-
gies and investments in risky products. But empirical evidence is almost
absent yet.
2.5.4 Di¤erences in Explanatory Power
After having investigated the partial e¤ects of the determinants of compen-
sation schemes in the previous subsections, we now analyze if there are any
structural di¤erences in the explanatory power of the regression models. The
measure we apply is R-squared, i.e. the ratio of explained variance by the
regressors in the model to the total variance in the dependent variable.42
Regarding base salary, hierarchical level is the single variable with the
highest explanatory power, as can be seen in table 2.16. Estimating a model,
where the logarithm of base salary is solely explained by the level the em-
ployee is located at, leads to values of R-squared between 0:71 and 0:76 for
Germany and Switzerland and values around 0:53 to 0:55 for Austria. The
estimates in the second row also include controls for human capital variables
(age and rm tenure) and job characteristics (functional area, career ladder
and region). The incremental changes in R-squared show structural di¤er-
ences between the analyzed countries, as the additional explanatory power
of human capital and job characteristics is only of minor importance for Ger-
many (between 0:05 and 0:08) and Switzerland (0:10 to 0:12), whereas these
additional controls increase R-squared in the regressions for Austria even by
42Our results show almost no di¤erence between the values of R-squared and adjusted
R-squared.
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0:22 to 0:23. Human capital characteristics seem to be of high importance
for the determination of base salary in Austrian banks, as those variables
solely account for around 40% of total variation, whereas for German banks
these values are only half the size. The third row shows changes in R-squared
when rm controls are additionally included into the model. The incremental
changes are very small, especially for Switzerland and Austria with negligible
0:01 to 0:02, but also for Germany we nd small and decreasing changes in
R-squared in the last years between 0:02 and 0:06. As a result, xed compen-
sation packages are standardized to a very high extent between companies in
all three countries. One explanation is that rms have less discretion in xed
salary decisions, because the labor market is highly transparent and compet-
itive for many job positions in the nancial industry. This again leads to an
increasing use of professional compensation benchmarking surveys by consul-
tancies and therefore diminishing di¤erences between companies.43 Salaries
are further tied to hierarchical/career levels to a very high extent in Germany
and Switzerland, whereas human capital plays only a minor role in salary de-
termination. This seems to be rational, because tying pay to job positions
reduces bargaining costs, especially for larger rms, and is a prerequisite for
the use of industry-wide benchmarking surveys. In Austria, career levels are
also the main determinant, but explain "only" about 55% of total variation,
whereas age and tenure proles seem to be much more relevant for xed
salary determination indicating that compensation policies like e.g. seniority
wages play a more important role in Austrian banks.
It is further interesting to note that there are pronounced di¤erences for
bonus payments between countries. Similar to xed wages, the position in
the corporate hierarchy is the main single determinant in the regressions with
the logarithm of bonus payments as dependent variable, as can be seen in
the second part of table 2.16. But the values of R-squared are much smaller
than in estimates for base salary, indicating that bonuses are stronger related
to individual e¤orts rather than to career levels.44 In Austria, levels explain
43Murphy (1999) speaks of a "near-universal use of surveys in determining base salaries".
44Attaching bonuses to levels induces no e¢ciency gains, as they have to be determined
individually for each employee.
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between 36% and 42% of the total variation, in Germany between 48% and
53% and in Switzerland between 61% and 64%. Additionally controlling for
human capital and job characteristics leads to an increase in R-squared that
is very similar in all countries with values between 0:03 and 0:14, again with
human capital variables playing a stronger role in Austrian banks.
The most notable di¤erence between countries is visible when rm con-
trols are included. In Germany, bonus payments vary to a high extent be-
tween companies, because company controls lead to an increase in R-squared
of 9% to 11%45, even in the beginning of the nancial crisis. Contrary to
that result, rm controls only account for a marginal increase in Switzerland
of 1% to 2%. This is very similar to the 3% increase for Austrian banks in
2009, where a sharp decrease from 13% in 2007 up to now is visible. To con-
clude, the explanatory power of the regression models for variable payments
is, compared to xed salaries, much lower in all of the three countries. This
is in line with previous theoretical and empirical research stating that vari-
able payments should more strongly depend on the individual performance
of employees. We have shown that German banks and nancial institutions
follow very di¤erent variable compensation strategies, even with beginning
of the nancial crisis. In Switzerland and Austria however, bonus payments
are, just like xed salaries, very standardized today, what seems to be a
surprising result.
45Leonard (1990) shows that company e¤ects account for an increase of 8% in total pay,
which is quite similar to our results.
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But if wages are highly standardized between companies, how can rms
o¤er attractive pay packages to potential employees or guarantee the retain-
ing of high-performing incumbents? First, bonus payments may play a more
important role in pay packages rather than xed salaries. But it is also impor-
tant to analyze the within-level variation in wages. The largest coe¢cients of
variation for base salaries can be found for entry level 1 and for levels 5 and
6. This shows that although average wages are highly standardized between
companies, banks di¤erentiate between employees at entry and top levels to
be able to o¤er attractive pay packages to current and future employees.46
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide a detailed descriptive overview on the develop-
ment of base salaries and bonus payments over time in the banking and
nancial services industry. We nd the typical positive and convex relation-
ship between hierarchical level and base salaries as well as bonus payments.
Furthermore, the majority of employees is eligible for short-term bonus pay-
ments and only a small number of those employees receives no positive bonus
payment at the end of the year. In a next step we show that the nancial
crisis has a large impact on these gures resulting in massive reductions of
bonus payments and an increasing number of eligible employees not receiving
a bonus for the year 2008. These relationships are then tested econometri-
cally using OLS regressions, which broadly conrm the descriptive evidence.
Regression coe¢cients in estimates with base salary as dependent variable
are relatively stable over time, whereas estimates with variable payments are
much more volatile and di¤erent between countries. This is especially true
for the functional areas. We also show that xed compensation packages are
highly standardized between companies in all of the three countries. Bonuses,
however, are much stronger related to individual e¤orts with large di¤erences
between companies for German banks and negligible di¤erences for Austria
and Switzerland.
46Baker et al. (1994b) nd a similar result.
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This study has several limitations. First, further research should try to
collect more information on business strategies of banks to be able to better
explain the di¤erent results across countries even in the same functional areas.
Due to a lack of information on company performance in this study, further
research is needed to explore the consequences of compensation schemes for
non-executive employees, i.e. if there is a positive relationship between vari-
able payments and company performance. Finally, data sets that include
other industries than the banking and nancial services sector might provide
interesting insights, especially whether the results presented here can also be
conrmed for other industries.
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2.7 Appendix to Chapter 2
Level Germany
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
6 (highest) 2.6 2.4 2.5 3.5 3.3
5 11.1 11.2 11.6 12.8 11.3
4 25.6 24.9 24.2 23.7 26.1
3 24.3 24.7 23.9 23.7 25.0
2 26.5 26.0 26.3 25.5 24.3
1 (lowest) 10.0 10.8 11.5 10.8 10.0
Total obs 105,209 107,587 107,913 121,645 139,429
Table 2.17: Distribution by hierarchical level and year (Germany)
Level Switzerland Austria
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
6 (highest) 3.5 3.7 5.0 5.4 2.1 3.0 3.4
5 12.3 12.8 13.7 15.2 9.2 10.5 12.3
4 22.6 23.0 22.9 22.3 26.1 25.5 27.0
3 24.2 24.0 27.7 24.5 28.2 25.3 25.9
2 23.3 23.2 23.8 21.5 26.4 27.6 24.9
1 (lowest) 14.2 13.4 7.0 11.1 8.0 8.1 6.5
Total obs 53,104 50,633 65,327 68,723 19,282 20,502 20,237
Table 2.18: Distribution by hierarchical level and year (Switzerland and Aus-
tria)
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Module Germany Switzerland Austria
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Asset Management 1.5 2.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.8
Corporate Banking 4.9 3.6 4.9 3.5 3.2 2.7 4.0 3.9 4.5
Corporate Production 26.3 29.4 31.6 26.4 35.6 31.6 21.9 28.4 28.2
Corporate Services 23.5 20.1 19.1 30.9 33.8 28.6 31.4 23.3 21.5
Investment Banking 1.2 1.9 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.6 1.1 0.5
Private Banking 2.3 2.2 3.5 13.4 11.2 21.2 0.6 2.0 3.0
Retail Banking 38.0 36.5 34.1 22.2 11.7 12.1 36.8 36.2 36.8
Treasury & Cap. Mark. 2.3 3.9 3.6 1.1 1.9 1.8 2.7 3.2 3.7
Table 2.19: Distribution by functional area
Country Overview of pay variables (median values)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Germany
Base salary 49,916 46,980 51,800 53,196 54,522
Bonus payments 4,000 5,000 5,150 5,000 4,048
Bonus to base ratio 8.6 11.0 11.0 10.4 7.6
Bonus to total ratio 7.9 9.9 9.9 9.4 7.0
Switzerland
Base salary 60,433 59,081 65,035 68,272
Bonus payments 7,618 8,011 8,098 6,571
Bonus to base ratio 12.7 13.4 12.8 9.5
Bonus to total ratio 11.3 11.8 11.4 8.6
Austria
Base salary 46,912 49,474 51,183
Bonus payments 1,800 2,480 1,600
Bonus to base ratio 3.8 5.0 3.3
Bonus to total ratio 3.6 4.8 3.2
Table 2.20: Overview of pay variables (median values)
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Level Mean bonus to base ratio
Switzerland Austria
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 99.9 85.4 90.0 55.6 22.8 25.6 17.1
Level 5 54.1 50.7 49.8 34.6 14.7 15.5 9.4
Level 4 26.3 25.1 24.0 17.7 8.2 9.4 6.6
Level 3 14.1 14.4 13.1 10.4 4.9 6.7 3.8
Level 2 9.2 9.8 8.6 6.8 3.5 4.2 2.9
Level 1 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.2 2.0 2.4 2.0
Total 23.2 22.8 22.9 16.8 6.5 8.2 5.4
Table 2.21: Average bonus to base ratio over level (Switzerland and Austria)
Level Coe¢cient of variation bonus (GER)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 2.38 1.87 1.37 1.33
Level 5 2.15 1.86 1.50 1.50
Level 4 2.10 1.79 1.52 1.36
Level 3 0.83 1.42 1.55 1.28
Level 2 0.93 1.16 1.12 1.17
Level 1 1.03 1.31 0.92 0.82
Total 1.38 1.49 1.35 1.26
Table 2.22: Average coe¢cient of variation of bonus payments over level
(Germany)
Level Coe¢cient of variation bonus payments
Switzerland Austria
2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Level 6 1.01 0.70 0.77 1.18 1.01 1.23 1.59
Level 5 1.04 0.72 0.85 1.35 1.33 1.45 1.72
Level 4 1.10 0.88 1.06 1.14 1.45 1.41 1.77
Level 3 1.08 0.81 0.97 0.97 1.43 1.47 1.52
Level 2 0.90 0.83 1.02 1.79 1.52 1.04 1.14
Level 1 0.71 0.73 1.43 0.78 1.80 1.17 1.28
Total 0.98 0.81 1.01 1.23 1.47 1.30 1.50
Table 2.23: Average coe¢cient of variation of bonus payments over level
(Switzerland and Austria)
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Figure 2.10: Individual median wage increase over module (Germany)
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Figure 2.11: Individual median wage increase over module (Austria)
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Figure 2.13: Average bonus payments over module (Germany)
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Chapter 3
Wage Premia for Newly Hired
Employees1
3.1 Introduction
It is often claimed by practitioners that employers tend to pay more to em-
ployees hired from the outside than to their incumbent colleagues even when
they do the same job. But whereas the wage e¤ects of individual job moves
across rms have often been studied, much less work has been done on com-
paring the wages of incumbents and newly hired employees at the same job.
The key reason for this lack of evidence is that the typically used individual
data sets have only crude information on the job characteristics of an em-
ployee. Even the matched employer-employee data sets that came available
in the last few years2 often contain only proxies for the hierarchical level of
the employees and often have no detailed information on the departments
and functional areas in which they are working.
More specic details on the jobs studied are known in the literature on
internal labor markets when single-rm case studies are investigated (see
Baker et al. (1994a), Baker et al. (1994b) and more recently e.g. Treble et al.
(2001), Gibbs and Hendricks (2004), Dohmen et al. (2004), Lin (2005)).
1This chapter is based upon Kampkötter and Sliwka (2010b).
2See, for instance, Lima and Pereira (2003), Lazear and Oyer (2004a), Lazear and Oyer
(2004b), von Wachter and Bender (2006).
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However, these papers do not systematically compare wages of incumbents
and new recruits and as these studies work with personnel data from single
rms the evidence may be idiosyncratic to the specic rm studied. We
now make use of a unique data set spanning a whole sector and providing
detailed information on the jobs, hierarchical levels, company, region as well
as information on the individual employees such as wages, bonus payments,
age, and rm tenure.
We study the question raised in the above theoretically as well as em-
pirically.3 First, we analyze a simple model to develop hypotheses on the
determinants of sign and size of wage di¤erentials between incumbents and
new recruits. Firms in an industry compete against each other for the service
of employees who can ll a certain position and are already employed in one
of the rms. An employees utility is a¤ected by his wage as well as by the
personal well-being in his current job (for instance his t to the corporate
culture, his satisfaction with the work environment, supervisor or colleagues).
The risk averse employee has private information about these personal prefer-
ences. However, while he receives wage o¤ers from other rms, he is uncertain
about his personal well-being at a potential new employer. We show that
the current employer will always o¤er a lower wage to the employee than
competing rms when the employees human capital is not too rm-specic.
The reason is that risk averse agents are reluctant to move to new employers
even when wages are higher. Hence, rms earn rents in a competitive labor
market even when human capital is mainly general. Nonetheless, turnover
occurs as employees move to di¤erent rms when they are less satised with
the work environment. When comparing the wages of employees staying with
their rm with those who have been newly recruited by their employer we
should therefore indeed observe that wages are higher for the new recruits.
However, when human capital is very rm-specic current employers may
outbid potential rivals to ascertain that the employee stays with the rm
with a su¢ciently high probability and these specic skills are not lost.
To test our theoretical results we then analyze the wage premia paid
3Note that this paper focusses on wage premia for newly hired employees, so we do not
analyze variable bonus payments.
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to newly hired employees empirically. We investigate a large data set on
compensation in the German banking and nancial services sector provided
by the management consultancy Towers Perrin. In the years 2004-2007,
around 50 banks and nancial service companies of every size participated
in the survey covering a vast majority of all relevant job positions in this
industry. Including all of the largest banks in Germany, the survey covers
around 100,000 employees each year between 2004 and 2007.
We nd that, on average, newly hired employees earn signicantly higher
wages than incumbents at the same job, holding all others factors constant.
We then study the inuence of the hierarchical level and functional area on
these wage premia. The results show that wage premia are negative for lower
levels but are positive and very substantial at higher levels where general
managerial skills are of increasing importance. Moreover, wage premia di¤er
signicantly between functional areas. Wage premia are highest in invest-
ment banking and corporate banking where client-specic human capital is
of high importance which is general human capital in the sense that it is very
valuable for other rms. Hence, rms indeed seem to pay high wage premia
for new recruits to poach them from competitors.
The focus of our empirical study is a within-rm comparison of the wages
of employees doing the same job. But earnings di¤erentials between employ-
ees have also been investigated in the theoretical and empirical literature on
job search (see for instance Rogerson et al. (2005) and Eckstein and van den
Berg (2007) for a recent overview). Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), for in-
stance, show that earnings di¤erentials can arise across identical workers
employed at identical rms. In their paper this is due to sequential sampling
of alternative random job o¤ers. In our simple model, di¤erentials occur
due to a combination of di¤erences in match-specic utility driving employee
turnover and di¤erences in the importance of rm-specic human capital on
the job under consideration. Hassink and Russo (2008) investigated the wage
di¤erence between incumbents and externally hired workers with matched
employer-employee data of Dutch rms. They nd no wage di¤erence be-
tween incumbent workers and employees hired from other rms but do not
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distinguish between hierarchical levels or types of the job.4
3.2 A Simple Model
3.2.1 Description of the Model
We rst analyze a very simple model of an industry consisting of n rms in-
dexed by k with n  3 and a number of employees indexed by i. We consider
only employees who gained some labor market experience and therefore are
already employed in one of the rms. Each employee is qualied for exactly
one type of job J . Initially being employed in one of the rms, an employee
can in principle ll the same job in all rms in the industry. Hence, for each
job all rms in the industry compete for the service of all employees who
are qualied for the job. Consider a certain employee i working at a rm
k. When staying with rm k the employee generates revenue sJ  ai for his
current employer. When moving to the same job in another rm in the in-
dustry, the new employer earns revenues of ai. Hence, ai can be interpreted
as the employees job-specic ability and human capital and sJ  1 measures
the importance of rm-specic human capital for the considered job J . For
instance, when the job mainly consists of managerial tasks and managerial
competencies are rather general, sJ will be relatively small. But when it is
for instance important for the job to know rm-specic software or specic
procedures, sJ will be large. We assume that the job-specic ability ai is
measurable by all potential employers. We further assume that a rm al-
ways benets from employing an employee when the revenue generated by
the employee exceeds the wage costs.
An employee is utility does not only depend on the wage he earns but
also on other aspects of the job. We denote this match-specic utility when
staying with rm k by uik. Of course, the employee knows this match-
specic utility when staying with the rm but we assume that uik is private
4Note that this is not inconsistent with our results as they only consider average wage
premia. In our data, wage premia are negative for lower hierarchical levels but positive for
higher levels.
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information of the employee and is unknown to the current employer as well
as to other employers on the labor market. When she moves to a di¤erent
rm l 6= k it is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
2u and is unknown by the employee before his decision on whether to accept
an external o¤er.5 The employees utility is additively separable in the wage
and the match-specic utility and he is risk averse with constant absolute
risk aversion. His Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is r.
The timing is as follows: First the current employer makes a wage o¤er
to the employee, then other rms in the industry simultaneously make wage
o¤ers to the same employee. Finally, the employee decides on whether to
stay with the initial employer or to move to a competing rm.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Due to the competitive labor market, in equilibrium each employer makes
a wage o¤er of wEi = ai to each external employee i. We now investigate
the optimal wage o¤er made to an employee by his initial employer. Note
that the certainty equivalent of the employees utility when moving to a new
employer is ai   12r
2
u. Employee i stays with his current employer k at a
wage wik whenever
uik + wik  ai  
1
2
r2u:
Hence, the employee stays with probability
P (wik) = 1  F

ai  
1
2
r2u   wik

:
Note that there always will be employee turnover between the rms in the
industry. When considering the optimal wage paid to an incumbent employee
rms now trade-o¤ wage costs against the risk to lose the employee to a
competitor. Although moving to a di¤erent rm is risky, employees will do
so when they are very dissatised with the current working conditions, i.e.
5Hence, the match-specic utility is an experience good such as for instance in Jovanovic
(1979).
69
uik is relatively small. The rm maximizes
max
wik
(sJ  ai   wik)

1  F

ai   wik  
1
2
r2u

: (3.1)
The rst order condition is equivalent to
( 1)

1  F

ai   wik  
1
2
r2u

+(sJ  ai   wik) f

ai   wik  
1
2
r2u

= 0:
(3.2)
From this condition we can derive the following result:
Proposition 1 The wage wIi o¤ered to an employee by his current employer
is characterized by
wIi +
1  F
 
ai   w
I
i  
1
2
r2u

f
 
ai   w
I
i  
1
2
r2u
 = sJ  ai: (3.3)
The wage paid to an incumbent employee wIi will be lower than that paid to
a new hire of the same ability wEi = ai if and only if human capital is not
too rm-specic, i.e. when
sJ  1 +
1  F
 
 1
2
r2u

aif
 
 1
2
r2u
 :
Proof:
Condition (3.2) can be directly rearranged to obtain (3.3). The normal
distribution satises the monotone hazard rate condition, hence, d
dx

f(x)
1 F (x)

>
0 which implies that
1  F
 
ai   wik  
1
2
r2u

f
 
ai   wik  
1
2
r2u

is strictly increasing in wik: Therefore, (3.3) has a unique solution wIi . More-
over, the rst derivative of (3.1) is strictly positive for wik < wIi and strictly
negative for wik > wIi . Hence, a necessary and su¢cient condition for a posi-
tive wage premium paid to newly hired employees is that the rst derivative
of the objective function (3.1) with respect to wik is negative at wik = ai.
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This is the case when
 1 + F

 
1
2
r2u

+ (sJ  ai   ai) f

 
1
2
r2u

< 0,
(sJ   1) aif

 
1
2
r2u

 1  F

 
1
2
r2u

,
sJ  1 +
1  F
 
 1
2
r2u

aif
 
 1
2
r2u
 :
Hence, when the competencies relevant for a certain job type are purely
general human capital, i.e. employees can switch between rms without pro-
ductivity losses, incumbents always earn less in equilibrium than newly hired
employees. The reason is the following: In the competitive labor market em-
ployees who leave their employer will be paid according to their productivity.
When the current employer matches this outside o¤er he makes zero prots.
A lower wage of course increases the probability that the incumbent leaves
the rm. But if he stays, prots will be strictly positive. Hence, expected
prots are only positive when incumbents are paid at a wage below the mar-
ket level. It is interesting to note that this e¤ect even arises when agents
are risk neutral. However, the more risk averse the employee the lower can
be the incumbents wage as the switching costs due to the uncertainty about
the new job are higher.
But when rm-specic human capital is more important, market wages
will be below the productivity of the employee in the current rm. Hence,
the rm makes positive prots even at market wages. When rm-specic
skills are very important, paying less than market wages becomes too risky
as agents with below-average levels of job satisfaction will be tempted to
leave the rm. In equilibrium, the rm will then pay wages that exceed the
market level to assure the employees retention.
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3.3 The Data
We investigate a large data set on compensation in the German banking and
nancial services sector6 for the years 2004-2007 owned by the management
consultancy Towers Perrin. In 2004 we have information about 43 rms and
more than 95,000 employees, in the years 2005 to 2007, more than 50 banks
and nancial service companies of every size located in Germany participated
in the compensation survey covering around 105,000 employees each year.
The survey participants report information for a variety of job positions in
all relevant functional areas of the nancial services sector.7
We have individual information on base salary, age, rm tenure with the
current employer, hierarchical level (6 levels), functional area (8 areas), func-
tion (60-80 functions), and region (15 regions) for selected employees of each
participating company. The functional areas represent a broad classication
of the main sectors in the banking and nancial services industry: Retail
banking (RB), asset management (AM), corporate banking (CB), investment
banking (IB), private banking (PB), treasury and capital markets (TCM),
the typically lower-skilled service functions (corporate services (CS)) as well
as the cross-divisional functions (corporate production (CP)). A unique fea-
ture of the data set is that information on the functional area, function8 and
hierarchical level is quite precisely comparable across rms in the sample
as Towers Perrin uses a so-called career level methodology. This standard-
ized evaluation method denes a number of career levels that are described
through detailed job descriptions and proles of e.g. skills and knowledge
required for the relevant job position in an employees career path. These
career levels therefore reect di¤erent career steps for individuals from entry
levels to senior expert positions for each function and job family. In a next
step these career levels are matched to the huge number of functions and
disciplines that can be identied in the nancial services sector resulting in
four di¤erent career ladders: one for management positions and three for
6Sparkassen (publicly owned savings banks), Volks- and Rai¤eisenbanken (cooperative
banks) and the Deutsche Bundesbank (German central bank) are not part of the sample.
7Executive and senior management positions are excluded.
8A functional area comprises a large number of specic functions.
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individual expert positions (professional, sales and support).
We can distinguish six hierarchical levels in the data set, where level
1 denotes the lowest level, typically the entry positions of apprentices and
university graduates, and level 6 the highest level, typically divisional heads.
Most of the employees belong to levels 2, 3, and 4. Only 2.5% hold the
highest positions in the data set. The average proportion of newly hired
employees ranges from 1.5% in 2004 to 2.1% in 2007, as can be seen in table
3.9 in the appendix. The mean age of incumbents (new hires) in the sample
is about 40 years (33 years). About 34% of all employees work in the retail
banking area, followed by about 25% in both the cross-divisional support
functions like e.g. HR, legal, nance and accounting (corporate production)
and the lower-skilled service functions including mostly back-o¢ce positions
(corporate services). About 2% can be assigned to asset management and
investment banking positions.9
3.4 Results
3.4.1 The Aggregate E¤ect
As a starting point consider the OLS baseline regression results reported in
table 3.1. The dependent variable is the logarithm of wage (base salary)
and the dummy variable Newly hired indicates that an employee has been
hired in the relevant year. We control for age, age squared, hierarchical level,
functional area, geographic region and company and run separate regressions
for the years 2004 to 2007. Recall that our model made a prediction on the
di¤erence between the wages of new recruits and incumbents with a similar
previous experience on the labor market. Hence, we restrict the data set to
levels 3 to 6 as we can rule out that there are new recruits without prior
professional experience on these levels.10 The employees age then serves
9As we exclude levels 1 and 2 (entry levels) in the following regressions, descriptive
statistics for levels 3 to 6 are provided in table 3.8 in the appendix.
10Levels 1 and 2 are typical entry levels, so there is a large proportion of young graduates
among the newly hired employees. In that case we should expect lower wages for new
recruits as a new recruit should not only have less rm-specic human capital but also less
73
as a proxy for labor market experience. Further, heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are reported in each regression.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0491*** 0.0165*** 0.0298*** 0.0282***
(0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0082)
Age 0.0258*** 0.0273*** 0.0279*** 0.0202***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age2100 -0.0241*** -0.0256*** -0.0259*** -0.0173***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Level 6a 0.654*** 0.690*** 0.670*** 0.673***
(0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.338*** 0.374*** 0.364*** 0.395***
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Level 4 0.160*** 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.179***
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 40248 57021 59724 54147
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.70 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.1: Baseline regressions
On average, newly hired employees earn between 1.7% and 4.9% more
than incumbents and these wage premia are highly signicant. The results
also show the typical inversely U-shaped age-earnings prole as well as a
wage structure which is convex in the hierarchical level.
It is also interesting to investigate the size of wage premia of new recruits
in comparison with employees on the same job with di¤erent levels of se-
niority. Therefore we classify rm tenure into four groups: The rst includes
only newly hired employees, the second includes incumbents with rm tenure
from 1 to 5 years, the third employees with 6 to 10 years of rm tenure and
the last group comprises employees who work more than 10 years for their
current rm. The results of the regression including variables for di¤erent
general human capital. This is indeed conrmed by table 3.10 in the appendix showing
regression results for the two lowest levels.
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tenure classes are shown in table 3.2, with newly hired employees as reference
category. It can be seen that employees with the longest rm tenure face the
strongest disadvantage relative to the new recruits in the same job. In 2007
for example, a newly hired employee earns on average 4% more than an in-
cumbent with 1 to 5 years of tenure. This premia increases up to 5.7% when
comparing to incumbents with more than 10 years of rm tenure. Note that
we control for age, job, and rm characteristics. Hence, each job move leads
to a wage premium for the mover providing him with a persistent advantage
relative to his colleagues on the same job who have stayed with the rm for
longer periods of time. These results are robust over the years.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
1-5 years of tenurea -0.0400*** -0.0053 -0.0246*** -0.0186***
(0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
6-10 years of tenure -0.0524*** -0.0210*** -0.0313*** -0.0275***
(0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
11-max years of tenure -0.0572*** -0.0308*** -0.0370*** -0.0415***
(0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0083)
Observations 40248 57019 59526 54147
R2 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.74
Additional control variables include age, hierarchical level, functional area,
region and company. a Reference category: Newly hired employees
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.2: OLS wage regressions with tenure classes
3.4.2 Hierarchical Levels
Given the prediction of our model, these results seem to indicate that rm-
specic human capital is on average not too important in the banking in-
dustry. However, we expect di¤erences between the hierarchical levels and
functional areas with respect to the importance of rm-specic human cap-
ital. We can use these expected di¤erences to provide a better test of the
theoretical predictions.
First of all, managerial skills and talent will become more important
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the higher the hierarchical level. But managerial talent is mostly general
human capital. As qualications for managerial positions become more and
more similar between rms when an employee climbs up the hierarchy, our
simple model therefore suggests that wage premia for new recruits should be
increasing in the hierarchical level. To test this prediction we add interaction
terms between each hierarchical level and the Newly hired dummy to the
baseline regression model.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0010 -0.0337*** -0.0535*** -0.0064
(0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0100) (0.011)
Newly hired  Level 4 0.0486*** 0.0775*** 0.110*** 0.0138
(0.0122) (0.0110) (0.013) (0.015)
Newly hired  Level 5 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.171*** 0.131***
(0.0197) (0.0178) (0.020) (0.027)
Newly hired  Level 6 0.147*** 0.157*** 0.193*** 0.187***
(0.0407) (0.0425) (0.034) (0.061)
Age 0.0255*** 0.0271*** 0.0275*** 0.0201***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age2100 -0.0238*** -0.0253*** -0.0254*** -0.0171***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Level 6a 0.651*** 0.687*** 0.666*** 0.671***
(0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.336*** 0.372*** 0.361*** 0.394***
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Level 4 0.160*** 0.183*** 0.169*** 0.179***
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Observations 40248 57021 59724 54147
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.3: Interaction with hierarchical level
As level 3 is the reference category, the coe¢cients for the interaction
terms measure the di¤erence in the new recruits wage premia relative to that
premium at level 3. Our hypothesis concerning the e¤ect of the hierarchical
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level on the wage premia is indeed conrmed by the results reported in table
3.3: First note that the coe¢cient for Newly hired is negative and statistically
highly signicant in 2005 and 2006 when the interaction terms are included.
That is on level 3, the lowest level in the data set, newly hired employees
earn less than their incumbent counterparts. This di¤erence is sizeable at
about -3.4% in 2006 and -5.4% in 2005, but not signicantly di¤erent from
zero in 2004 and 2007. However, already on level 4 new recruits receive a
positive wage premium relative to incumbents in all years except 2004. This
premium increases up to 13% at level 5 and further up to 13%-20% at the
highest level.11 For divisional heads, the average premium amounts to 18,000
Euros.
Hence, at the lowest level considered in the data set rm-specic human
capital such as the knowledge of rm-specic software systems, specic bank-
ing products and administrative processes seems quite important such that
rms pay less to employees hired from the outside. But at higher levels wage
premia become positive and are increasing with the level which is well in line
with our hypothesis that rm-specic human capital becomes less important
at upper levels in hierarchy.
As in German banks many employees at lower levels are covered by col-
lective wage agreements, which impose restrictions on market wages, it is
important to check whether some of the observed e¤ects are due to such
agreements. In the regressions reported in table 3.11 in the appendix we
therefore exclude all employees covered by a collective wage agreement from
the data set. It is interesting to note that, at the lowest level, the wage
discount for new hires even becomes more negative, indicating that the min-
imum wage character of a collective wage agreement seems to favor new
recruits relative to the outcomes of a market-based wage-setting process as
analyzed in our model. At higher levels the results remain unchanged.
11Recall that the wage increases by
 
e   1

 100 percent in case of dummy variables
in semilogarithmic equations (see e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).
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3.4.3 Functional Areas
Another test of our theoretical prediction makes use of a comparison of wage
premia between the di¤erent functional areas in the considered banks and
nancial services companies. Table 3.4 shows the results of a wage regression
where we interact the Newly hired dummy with the di¤erent functional areas.
As reference group we have chosen retail banking as this is the largest func-
tional area covering more than 30% of all employees. It is quite interesting
to note that there are substantial di¤erences between the functional areas.
The results show that wage premia are negative and signicant in retail
banking (up to -5.3%). Positive and economically signicant wage premia can
be found in treasury and capital markets in all years, with average premia
that are up to 16% higher than in retail banking. We also nd large and
economically signicant wage premia in three of the four years in corporate
banking and investment banking.
Of course, the data must be interpreted carefully in this respect, but it
seems as if the observations may quite well be understood by the reason-
ing suggested in our model. In capital market-based functions like treasury
and capital markets, employees mainly deal with trading in debt, equity, for-
eign exchange, derivative and money market products that are highly stan-
dardized and therefore very similar or even identical across banks. Hence,
acquired human capital should be rather general than rm-specic. Jobs in
investment banking and corporate banking are often characterized by human
capital that is much more client-specic than rm-specic. But client-specic
human capital is general human capital in the sense that it is very valuable
for a competitor. Hence, rms will be willing to pay high wages to lure in-
vestment and corporate bankers away from their competitors.12 However,
retail banking is concerned with the day-to-day business with less wealthy
private customers where it is important for an employee to be more familiar
with rm-specic products and procedures.13 This has been conrmed in
12This is indeed the case, as e.g. Merrill Lynch recruited two teams of nancial advisors
from UBS in 2009, both managing in total around $500 million in client assets. Further-
more, Deutsche Bank lured away a group of more than 15 investment bankers from Merrill
Lynch and Lehman Brothers.
13Note that new recruits earn relatively more in private banking than in retail banking.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Asset Managementa 0.158*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.138***
(0.0072) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0078)
Corporate Banking 0.0689*** 0.0565*** 0.0589*** 0.0342***
(0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Corporate Production 0.0418*** 0.0200*** 0.0214*** 0.0181***
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0014)
Corporate Services -0.0148*** -0.0452*** -0.0236*** -0.0274***
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Investment Banking 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.118***
(0.0073) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0067)
Private Banking 0.0694*** 0.0424*** 0.0226*** 0.0103***
(0.0041) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Treasury and Capital Markets 0.210*** 0.206*** 0.143*** 0.179***
(0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.005)
Newly hired -0.0254*** -0.0346*** -0.0528*** -0.0448**
(0.0097) (0.013) (0.0177) (0.0161)
Newly hired  Asset Man. 0.0105 0.0777*** 0.0438 0.0564
(0.0238) (0.0276) (0.0346) (0.0429)
Newly hired  Corp. Banking 0.0387 0.0979*** 0.158*** 0.222***
(0.0311) (0.0250) (0.0295) (0.0552)
Newly hired  Corp. Prod. 0.0058 0.0690*** 0.0991*** 0.0707***
(0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0193)
Newly hired  Corp. Services -0.0461** 0.0019 0.0619** 0.0470
(0.0230) (0.0220) (0.0300) (0.0313)
Newly hired  Inv. Banking 0.0779** -0.0008 0.169*** 0.207***
(0.0342) (0.0315) (0.0401) (0.0493)
Newly hired  Priv. Banking 0.129*** 0.0173 0.0853*** 0.0282
(0.0242) (0.0265) (0.0297) (0.0326)
Newly hired  TCM 0.0543** 0.148*** 0.111*** 0.162***
(0.0265) (0.0301) (0.0294) (0.0384)
Age 0.0257*** 0.0273*** 0.0279*** 0.0201***
(0.0009) (0.00074) (0.00073) (0.00069)
Age2  100 -0.0240*** -0.0256*** -0.0259*** -0.0172***
(0.0010) (0.00087) (0.00086) (0.00082)
Observations 40248 57021 59724 54147
R2 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include hierarchical level, region and company
a Reference category: Retail Banking
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.4: Interaction with functional area
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discussions with company representatives and consultants.
3.4.4 Managers and Functional Experts
Our data set o¤ers an additional feature that allows another test of the pre-
dictions of the simple model. The consultancy Towers Perrin distinguishes
between four di¤erent career ladders. Here we investigate themanagerial and
the professional ladder. The managerial ladder includes employees in super-
visory roles with mainly managerial tasks whereas the professional ladder
encompasses functional experts. As argued already above, managerial skills
should mostly be general human capital. On the other hand, among the
functional experts in the professional ladder, rm-specic knowledge should
be more important for individual productivity. Hence, we expect that wage
premia for external recruits are higher when we consider jobs in the manage-
rial ladder as compared to the professional ladder. To investigate this claim
empirically we interact the Newly hired dummy with the dummy variable for
the managerial ladder.14
The results are reported in table 3.5. A newly hired employee in the
professional ladder receives a wage premium of about 3-5% across the levels
3 to 6. We indeed nd that average wage premia are higher in the managerial
ladder as the interaction term is signicantly positive in all four years. Hence,
an employee in the managerial ladder receives a 4-7% higher premium than
a comparable employee in the professional ladder, holding all other factors
constant. These results are signicant and stable over time, as can be seen
in table 3.5.
Private banking deals with wealthy private clients. In this case hiring employees from
competitors should be more attractive as they may bring more valuable client relations
with them.
14The reference category is the professional ladder.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0469*** 0.0322*** 0.0357*** 0.0353***
(0.0068) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0094)
Newly hired  Management 0.0568*** 0.0413** 0.0666*** 0.0499*
(0.0213) (0.0181) (0.0207) (0.030)
Management 0.1402*** 0.1353*** 0.1341*** 0.1109***
(0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Age 0.0228*** 0.0227*** 0.0244*** 0.0216***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age2100 -0.0202*** -0.0197*** -0.0214*** -0.0183***
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Level 6a 0.573*** 0.601*** 0.598*** 0.609***
(0.0056) (0.0045) (0.0049) (0.0047)
Level 5 0.317*** 0.346*** 0.340*** 0.369***
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Level 4 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.170*** 0.178***
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018)
Observations 28098 39962 41776 37782
R-squared 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.73
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.5: Interaction with career ladder
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3.4.5 Measuring the Importance of Firm-Specic Hu-
man Capital
So far we have tested our key hypothesis only indirectly and argued that rm-
specic human capital should be less important at higher levels, for certain
functional areas and less important for managerial as compared to expert
positions. Indeed, we found strong evidence based on these conjectures. In
this section we develop a more direct test for our key hypothesis derived from
the theoretical model by generating a measure for the importance of rm-
specic human capital. We then investigate whether the size of this measure
in fact determines the di¤erence between the wages of incumbents and newly
hired employees.
For about 1/3 of all employees in our sample we can construct a panel
data set by matching individuals in the cross sections over the period 2004-
2007.15 This panel data set contains identical information to that used in
the cross sections and the distribution of employees across hierarchical levels
and functional areas is very similar. The human capital measure is dened
as follows. We rst generate cells as unique combinations of the specic
function, hierarchical level and career ladder for each year in the data set.
This detailed combination reects that the importance of human capital is
rather function- and job-specic than company-specic, i.e. in many areas
rm-specic human capital is of the same importance across di¤erent com-
panies. As a result, we obtain between 380 and 435 unique cells per year.
In a next step we conduct separate regressions for the years 2004 to 2007
for each of these cells with the individual performance measure (logarithm
of bonus payments) as dependent variable and rm tenure and age as ex-
planatory variables.16 The coe¢cient of rm tenure in each regression now
gives a measure for the importance of rm-specic human capital in a cell:
The more important rm-specic human capital in a certain area the more
the performance of an employee should depend upon his tenure at the rm
15Note that not all companies report a time-invariant unique (anonymous) personal ID
number for each employee in the data set.
16In line with our previous analyses we do not make use of entry levels 1 and 2. We also
exclude cells with insu¢cient observations to run OLS regressions.
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controlling for overall experience (proxied by age).
We then standardize this measure by generating a variable containing the
distribution function of this measure for each cell, i.e. the fraction of all cells
in which the impact of tenure on performance is smaller. Hence, for the cell
with the lowest tenure coe¢cient this specicity measure takes on the value
0; for that with the highest coe¢cient it is close to 1 and for the median cell
it is 0:5.
Table 3.6 shows estimation results where the dummy for newly hired em-
ployees is interacted with our specicity measure. According to our theoret-
ical model we expect the sign of the interaction term to be negative, because
wage premia for newly hired employees should be lower in areas where human
capital is more rm-specic. We indeed nd that our measure for the impor-
tance of rm-specic human capital is the highest in retail banking, whereas
lowest values can be found for capital market-based functions like investment
banking and treasury and capital markets. The regression results seem to
be very robust over the years, as can be seen in table 3.6. We indeed nd
a signicant negative interaction e¤ect for all years, i.e. the wage premium
for newly hired employees is economically as well as statistically signicant
when rm-specic human capital is not important. In these areas, new hires
receive an average premium between 8% and 12%, all other factors constant.
But this premium decreases in those areas where specic human capital is
of high importance. In 2007 for example, the wage premium gets close to
zero for new employees entering a company in areas with the highest degree
of rm-specic human capital.17 In 2006 and 2004 we even observe negative
premia for new hires.
A further robustness check is done by comparing the wage premia for
newly hired employees between areas with above- and below-median val-
ues for the specicity of human capital. To test the di¤erences between
these both groups, we use a dummy variable equal to one if the standard-
ized measure is greater than the median and zero otherwise. As we would
have expected, in all years average wage premia for the below-median group
17A one standard deviation increase in the human capital measure reduces average wage
premia for new hires by 1.9% to 3.5%.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0851*** 0.0816*** 0.1141*** 0.0913***
(0.0231) (0.0277) (0.0211) (0.0145)
Newly hired  HC Specicitya -0.0815** -0.0990** -0.0642* -0.1191***
(0.0395) (0.0478) (0.0370) (0.0271)
Human Capital Specicitya -0.0154*** -0.0248*** -0.0498*** -0.0188***
(0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Observations 35718 49486 51683 50542
R-squared 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.73
a Standardized measure (distribution function). Additional control variables include
hierarchical level, age, region, functional area and company
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.6: Interaction with measure for specicity of human capital
are highly signicant and larger than those for the above-median group. The
wage premia range from 6.6% to 9.0% in areas reecting below-median speci-
city, and from 1.0% to 6% otherwise.
3.4.6 Di¤erences in Ability?
In the regressions presented above we compared a newly hired employee with
an incumbent at the same age, hierarchical level, functional area, region and
company. But there might be still unobservable di¤erences in individual
ability between employees. For instance, if rms would systematically re-
cruit employees from the outside that are of higher ability than incumbent
employees in the same jobs, wage premia may to a certain extent simply
reect productivity premia. Hence it is important to know whether the wage
premia are a¤ected by a potential omitted variable bias as individual ability
is unobserved.
Our data set provides a natural proxy for ability as we can observe in-
dividual annual bonus payments for almost all employees. But newly hired
employees will typically not receive a full bonus in the year in which they
moved to a new employer and therefore the bonus paid in the year of hire is
not a suitable proxy.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
(1) (2)
Newly hired in 2005 0.0273*** -0.0520***
(0.0094) (0.0165)
Newly hired  Level 4 0.0964***
(0.0202)
Newly hired  Level 5 0.1638***
(0.0268)
Newly hired  Level 6 0.1874***
(0.0425)
Ln Bonus 2006 0.0688*** 0.0687***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Level 6a 0.559*** 0.556***
(0.0070) (0.0070)
Level 5 0.293*** 0.291***
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Level 4 0.136*** 0.134***
(0.0020) (0.0021)
Observations 21519 21519
R-squared (within) 0.77 0.77
Additional control variables include functional area, age, region and
company. a Reference category: Level 3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.7: Bonus payments in subsequent year as proxy for ability
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Hence, we now use the actual bonus in 2006 as a proxy for productivity
when comparing the wages of new hires and incumbents in 2005. We replicate
the baseline regressions for 2005 additionally controlling for bonus payments
in 2006 as a productivity measure. The results are given in table 3.7. Note
that the coe¢cients are very close to those reported in tables 3.1 and 3.3.
These results are also conrmed for newly hired employees in the year 2004
and 2006, also controlling for bonus payments in the subsequent year. Hence,
the wage premia seem not to be driven by systematic di¤erences in ability
between incumbents and new recruits.18
3.5 Conclusion
First, we analyzed a simple model in which rms compete for the service of
employees. An employees decision to stay with his current employer or to
move to a di¤erent rm depends on the wages o¤ered as well as his personal
current job satisfaction. The uncertainty about the job satisfaction in a new
rm leads to switching costs. We have shown that when rm-specic human
capital is mainly general, rms will o¤er higher wages to new recruits than
they pay to comparable incumbents.
When rm-specic human capital is more important, however, this is no
longer clear. In that case a competitors willingness to pay is lower than
the value of the employee for the current employer. But paying only this
market wage to an incumbent agent is too risky as agents with lower levels
of current job satisfaction may well leave the rm and move to a di¤erent
employer. Hence, incumbent employees may earn more than new recruits at
the same position.
We then examined these predictions empirically using a large data set
on wages in German banks and nancial services companies. We found that
newly hired employees earn more than incumbents at higher levels of the hier-
archy where managerial skills, which are rather general, are more important.
18Even controlling for bonus payments in 2006 and 2007 leads to the same results. As a
further robustness check, we use future promotions as proxy for ability, what also conrms
the results.
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These premia are economically highly signicant. Moreover, we found that
these hiring premia are larger in functional areas where human capital is of-
ten client-specic rather than rm-specic as well as in managerial positions.
We also apply a direct test of the model by including a generated measure
for the specicity of human capital into the regressions, which supports the
theoretical predictions empirically. A further robustness check shows that
wage premia are not driven by systematic di¤erences in individual abilities
between incumbents and newly hired employees.
Our study thus shows that rms (have to) pay more when poaching em-
ployees from competitors. In turn, new hires typically earn more than equally
able incumbents on the same job. An important implication of the result is
that rms must earn rents from working with incumbents. This supports the
claim put forward in the literature on internal labor markets that rms are
indeed able to shield their incumbent employees from external market forces.
But the extent to which this happens di¤ers strongly between di¤erent types
of jobs.
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3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired -0.0469*** -0.0394*** -0.0243*** -0.0235***
(0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0053)
Age 0.0319*** 0.0427*** 0.0412*** 0.0405***
(0.0006) (0.00043) (0.00046) (0.00047)
Age2100 -0.0341*** -0.0470*** -0.0452*** -0.0443***
(0.0008) (0.00056) (0.00059) (0.00061)
Level 2a 0.198*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.178***
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Observations 25187 33938 34588 33738
R2 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.67
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
a Reference category Level 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.10: OLS wage regressions regarding only entry levels 1 and 2
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of Base Salary
2007 2006 2005 2004
Newly hired 0.0081 -0.0558*** -0.0854*** -0.0234
(0.0133) (0.0125) (0.019) (0.018)
Newly hired  Level 4 0.0571*** 0.0963*** 0.143*** 0.0400*
(0.0201) (0.0145) (0.020) (0.021)
Newly hired  Level 5 0.155*** 0.140*** 0.194*** 0.133***
(0.0324) (0.0203) (0.026) (0.031)
Newly hired  Level 6 0.115** 0.190*** 0.230*** 0.210***
(0.0576) (0.0457) (0.037) (0.067)
Age 0.0330*** 0.0204*** 0.0234*** 0.0164***
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.00078)
Age2100 -0.0316*** -0.0066*** -0.0195*** -0.0128***
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.00091)
Level 6a 0.635*** 0.603*** 0.624*** 0.634***
(0.0089) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0043)
Level 5 0.305*** 0.297*** 0.331*** 0.360***
(0.0042) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0022)
Level 4 0.136*** 0.127*** 0.158*** 0.146***
(0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0015)
Observations 13933 37715 38851 44172
R-squared 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.74
Additional control variables include functional area, region and company
in all specications. a Reference category: Level 3
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 3.11: OLS wage regressions excluding employees covered by a collective
wage agreement
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Chapter 4
The E¤ects of Intra-Firm
Training on Earnings and Job
Performance1
4.1 Introduction
Human capital as an intangible asset has become increasingly important for
the competitiveness and performance of organizations (Lev (2001)). As a
result, organizational investments in intra-rm trainings are signicant. In
2005, total costs of continuing vocational training (CVT) amount to 1.6% of
total labour costs in the EU-27, according to a recent study by the European
Union2 (Cedefop (2010)). Almost 70% of all German companies provide
CVT and about 30% of the workforce participate in training courses. In
companies with more than 500 employees, like the rm analyzed here, even
90% provide intra-rm trainings.3 Companies investing in trainings expect
that these trainings enhance employee performance by improving general
and rm-specic skills, knowledge and abilities. The overall goal is to make
1This chapter is based upon Breuer and Kampkötter (2010).
2Figures for training courses. Other forms of vocational training like on-the-job train-
ings or job rotation excluded.
3Furthermore, in large companies, training provision is formalized to a large extent, as
more than 70% of these companies have a specic person/unit responsible for training,
pursue training plans, prepare a training budget and measure participant satisfaction.
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human capital as an asset even harder to imitate what should result in a
competitive advantage in the market. If such an investment is made, the
returns should be systematically evaluated.
Former research has mainly focused on the e¤ects of training participa-
tion at the organizational level (e.g. Bartel (1994), Black and Lynch (1996),
Barrett and OConnell (2001), Dearden et al. (2006), Zwick (2006)). At the
individual level, empirical research on the e¤ects of training participation on
performance is mainly based on national survey data sets (e.g. Barron et al.
(1989), Lynch (1992), Barron et al. (1993), Veum (1995), Parent (1999)). Al-
though these data sets are valuable by covering detailed information about
individual characteristics and wages, major drawbacks are the respondents
di¢culty to reliably report the details retrospectively (Barron et al. (1997))
and, more importantly, heterogenous denitions about intra-rm trainings
between companies. Personnel records from a single company can overcome
these problems (see e.g. Bartel (1995), Tharenou et al. (2007)) and therefore
o¤er the possibility to more reliably analyze the e¤ects of trainings, as all em-
ployees are exposed to the same corporate training policy and participation
details are often tracked in a database.
We contribute to the literature in several aspects. First, only a few stud-
ies have analyzed the performance e¤ects of intra-rm training participation
based on company data sets so far (Bartel (1995), Krueger and Rouse (1998),
Fahr et al. (2010)). Therefore we follow the recommendation of Bartel (1995)
to "focus on collecting more comprehensive data from companies" in order
to analyze determinants and e¤ects of rm-sponsored vocational trainings,
as the empirical results are mixed so far. Our study contributes by using a
unique data set consisting of personnel records from a large, multinational
German rm which is representative for that kind of companies. Second,
we make use of several monetary as well as non-monetary performance in-
dicators, as in the literature only xed salaries have been used in the vast
majority of studies so far. We use annual (short-term) bonus payments as
a further individual performance measure, as they are well suited to reect
individual performance of employees. Additionally, we look at absenteeism
and overtime hours as well as turnover rates. Third, using bonus payments
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as performance indicator, we are also able to o¤er a di¤erent explanation for
the rather weak performance e¤ects that have been manifested in previous
studies.
We can conrm only some of the previous ndings for the determinants
and performance e¤ects of trainings which may be explained by varying train-
ing policies of rms operating in di¤erent industries or countries. Using sim-
ilar estimation techniques accounting for endogeneity in training participa-
tion, we do not nd a long-term e¤ect of training on performance measured by
monetary indicators. We argue that this result may partially be attributed to
the anchoring of training participation in individual target agreements or per-
formance appraisals. Also, employees may act reciprocally and increase e¤ort
during a training period if training is perceived as an employers investment
in skills and abilities of its employees. But for non-monetary indicators like
turnover rates and overtime work, a signicant e¤ect of classroom trainings
can be conrmed. A further feature of our data set allows us to di¤erenti-
ate between several training categories including a.o. leadership, language,
business administration, and project management trainings. Therefore, we
can closely analyze the impact of di¤erent training categories, which only
few studies have analyzed before.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2,
the background and related literature is described. Section 4.3 explains the
data set and the applied methods for the empirical analysis. Descriptive
statistics of training participation are shown in section 4.4, whereas section
4.5 analyzes the determinants of training participation in general and for
di¤erent training categories using probit regressions. Section 4.6 investigates
the performance e¤ects of training participation and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background and Related Literature
The overall objective of intra-rm training is the accumulation of human cap-
ital. Ideally, employees are provided with knowledge, skills and competencies
4Only Bartel (1995) uses information on di¤erent training categories yet.
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that are needed for their actual as well as for future jobs and assignments.
It is obvious that investments in trainings require a cost-benet-analysis:
There is a need to investigate if training positively a¤ects future employee
performance and therewith organizational, mainly nancial, results.5
Several studies focused on the e¤ects of training participation on organi-
zational level outcomes based on rm-level surveys. In these studies, produc-
tivity, measured by accounting gures like sales per year (Bartel (1994), Black
and Lynch (1996), Barrett and OConnell (2001)) or value added (Dearden
et al. (2006), Zwick (2006)), ss predicted with a Cobb-Douglas production
function. However, the results di¤er widely which can be partly explained by
the high level of aggregation, but may also be caused by di¤erences in esti-
mation techniques (Zwick (2006)). Other studies focused on the combination
of human resource management practices arguing that a bundle of high per-
formance work practices may lead to improved performance (Arthur (1994),
Huselid (1995), Delaney and Huselid (1996), Huselid et al. (1997), and Ich-
niowski et al. (1997)). But as company training is only one component of
these practices, disentangling these e¤ects seems to be quite di¢cult. Most
studies have reported a positive relationship between rm performance and
human resource practices using rm-level data sets. Ichniowski et al. (1997)
even stress that the complementarity between di¤erent human resource prac-
tices leads to further productivity e¤ects. These studies, however, rely on
survey responses of rm representatives that were asked about general train-
ing opportunities. But the content of the trainings and the connection be-
tween training needs and the current job remains unclear. To get a deeper
insight into training practices, we use individual-level data from company
records that provide detailed information on both the type of training and
the trained employees.
Before these investments may result in organizational-level outcomes,
trainings have to increase general and job-specic skills of the individual
employee. Given that the acquired skills are useful for the job, individual job
performance should improve (Salas et al. (1999)). So far, a broad literature
on intra-rm training participation and the e¤ects of training on individual
5For a prominent approach to evaluate trainings see Kirkpatrick (1979).
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performance exists. But most of the empirical research in this eld analyzes
the e¤ect of training participation on individual wage growth using national
survey data sets (compare e.g. Barron et al. (1989), Lynch (1992), Barron
et al. (1993), Veum (1995), and Parent (1999)). But there are potential
drawbacks of these studies.
First, productivity is mainly measured by wage or wage growth, whereas
variable bonus payments are almost neglected. Although wage has proven
to be a good proxy for performance, some problems remain as a divergency
between wages and productivity may still occur. Possible explanations com-
prise seniority wages, i.e. wages above individual productivity levels in later
years of rm tenure (Lazear (1981)), and human capital theory predicting
that training in rm-specic human capital may not equivalently result in
higher wages although there might be a productivity increase. Also, labor
market frictions may lead to lower wages if employees that invested in general
human capital are not paid their full marginal product when they change jobs
(Acemoglu and Pischke (1999)). Therefore, other productivity measures on
an individual level are needed. We try to solve this problem by additionally
using information on annual bonus payments of employees that seem to be
a good proxy for individual productivity.
Second, survey data sets are often concerned with measurement problems
(Bartel (1995)). These include e.g. the respondents di¢culty to reliably re-
call their training participation and the existence of various denitions of
training policies across di¤erent rms. Using personnel records from one
company, we can avoid these measurement problems, because a more ho-
mogenous understanding of training patterns is guaranteed. But access to
company data remains di¢cult which might be one reason why only few
studies have investigated training e¤ects based on personnel records so far.
In one of the few exceptions, Bartel (1995) investigates the determinants
and e¤ects of on-the-job training using a ve-year panel data set of a large
US manufacturing company. She is able to divide the o¤ered trainings into
three categories: core trainings, developmental trainings and technical train-
ings. The results show that employees with a higher position in the salary
distribution of their department (i.e. comparable employees performing the
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same job), are less likely to participate in a developmental training, but
are more likely to participate in the other trainings. This result indicates
employee selection into training programs and gives a reason to control for
ability in the performance regressions. Using a xed e¤ects and instrumen-
tal variable approach Bartel nds a signicantly positive wage e¤ect for the
participation in developmental and technical trainings while controlling for
a person´s relative position in the salary distribution. As a robustness check
she includes a multinomial logit estimation using individual performance rat-
ings as additional productivity measure. She can conrm the productivity
e¤ects by showing that training participation increases the likelihood of a
better performance rating in the subsequent year.
Krueger and Rouse (1998) examine the impact of on-site trainings on a
range of outcome variables using two US company data sets for the years
1992 and 1994. The outcome variables include wage, turnover, performance
awards, job attendance and the self-assessment of productivity. Besides in-
vestigating the determinants of training participation, they nd a positive
wage e¤ect for only one of the companies applying xed e¤ects regressions.
But only a small fraction of employees receive a performance award which
leads to a low variation in the dependant variable.6
Fahr et al. (2010) evaluate a training program of a single retail sales com-
pany. They can identify both a treatment group of branch managers taking
part in a 6-month sales training program and a control group. The objec-
tive performance measure they use are monthly sales gures. Controlling
for seasonal inuences and store manager and store xed e¤ects, they nd
no performance e¤ect of trainings on rm productivity after the 6-month
training period or even a negative e¤ect in some specications.
6Also, it may be unlikely to receive a performance award in two consecutive years,
as political reasons might play a role which will then be interpreted as a performance
decrease.
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4.3 The Data
4.3.1 Data Set
We investigate personnel records from a multinational company headquar-
tered in Germany for the years 2006  2008.7 The records comprise data on
about 15; 000 German full-time employees each year resulting in a total of
about 46; 300 employee-year-observations. In detail, the panel data set con-
tains information on individual compensation like base salary and short-term
bonus payments8 as well as on individual overtime and absenteeism hours and
turnover rates. Demographic information includes employees age, years of
rm tenure, highest educational level and sex. Information on training par-
ticipation, the number of attended trainings and the content of training is
also available for each employee and year.
According to the companys training policy, there are three main reasons
for training participation: First, there are mandatory trainings that have to
be completed by all employees in the company. As these trainings are only
used to provide information on legal requirements (e.g. Anti-discrimination
law or workplace safety trainings), they are excluded from further analy-
ses. Second, employees can independently choose to participate in "Open
Enrollment" trainings, which do not depend on a supervisor´s advice or di-
rective. And third, employees can be registered for trainings by their direct
supervisor.
Additionally, detailed information on employee status, strategic business
unit and subdivision is available. The variable employee status (which is
based on the hierarchical level an employee is located at) comprises four
groups: Non-exempt employees (levels 1 to 12) and three groups of exempt
employees. These cover junior managers (levels 13 to 15), which include the
typical entry positions for university graduates, senior managers (levels 16
to 17) and senior executives (levels 18 to 22).9 Table 4.1 shows that about
7Due to condentiality reasons, the data sheets and the company name had to be
anonymized.
8Note that only exempt employees are eligible for bonus payments.
9Top executives are not part of the sample.
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2/3 of all employees in this rm are non-exempt employees, about 30% are
working as junior or senior managers and about 3% are senior executives.
Employee status 2006 2007 2008
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Non-exempt 9,969 68.05 10,674 67.63 10,377 65.47
Junior manager 2,558 17.46 2,708 17.16 2,988 18.85
Senior manager 1,778 12.14 1,989 12.60 2,044 12.90
Senior executive 345 2.35 412 2.61 442 2.79
Total 14,650 100.00 15,783 100.00 15,851 100.00
Table 4.1: Distribution of employees by employee status and year
Average rm tenure (age) is 22 years (42) for non-exempt employees and
it ranges between 15 and 20 years (43 and 50) for exempt employees. We
further observe three main subdivisions: The holding, the service units, and
the operational/industrial units. About 4% of all employees work in the
holding, 22% in the service units and about 74% in the operational units.
4.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy is as follows. First we estimate the determinants of
training participation for a given individual i in year t with a probit regression
using the pooled data set. The baseline specication is given by:
yit =  + Zit + Cit + promotedit + #moveit + qit 1 + "
The dependent variable yit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
employee i has participated in at least one training in year t. Our demo-
graphic control variables include employee status, sex, age, rm tenure, and
level of education (vector Zit). Controls for subdivision and year are given
by the vector Cit. When moving to a new job or after being promoted, a
higher training participation may be expected. We therefore include control
variables identifying promoted employees (promotedit) and employees who
moved between subdivisions (moveit).10
10Due to collinearity problems, we cannot include a separate dummy for newly hired
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In the literature much attention is paid to the selection problem stating
that the likelihood of participating in a training will be higher for more able
and productive employees. To test for possible e¤ects of employee selection
into trainings, we follow Bartel (1995) and include a proxy variable qit 1 for
ability in the probit regressions. This variable is dened as the percentile
rank of an employees base salary in period t   1 in her salary class and
work unit, i.e. it shows how much salary an employee earns relative to
her colleagues. The relevant work unit is dened as a unique combination
of year, subdivision, strategic business unit and hierarchical level. As a
result, we obtain 2,745 unique values for work units with a median size of 58
employees. The error term is denoted by ".
In a further specication we additionally include work unit size and the
number of attended trainings of the direct supervisor in period t   1. The
department size could have a positive impact on training participation as
it is easier to replace an absent employee who is participating in training
courses in a larger department (Krueger and Rouse (1998)). We also include
the number of trainings of the direct supervisor, as a more intensive training
behavior of the supervisor may have a positive inuence on subordinates
participation rates. As there are many observations with the value zero
for the number of training hours, we apply tobit regressions for robustness
reasons.11
In a second step we conduct xed e¤ects regressions to estimate the ef-
fects of training participation in period t and t   1 on individual outcome
variables pit, i.e. base salary, short-term bonus payments, absenteeism and
turnover rates. The xed e¤ects approach allows us to control for individual
heterogeneity. We use the same set of demographic control variables and
include subdivision and year xed e¤ects. Individual, time-constant hetero-
geneity like e.g. ability is captured by the parameter i, whereas "it is the
individual, time-variant error term.
employees.
11The probit regressions have also been used in studies by Bartel (1995) and Krueger
and Rouse (1998). Bartel (1995) also investigates the number of trainings.
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pit =  + Zit + Cit + i + "it
It is important to note that some employees move to a new position
throughout the year. But bonus payments are not a good performance in-
dicator for employees in the year of the job change, as it is very di¢cult for
their supervisors to evaluate their performance.12 We further expect these
employees to take more training courses which might also inuence the re-
sults. Therefore we exclude newly hired employees, promoted employees and
subdivision movers in the xed e¤ects regressions.13
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 Training Participation
Classroom trainings are usually o¤ered to a group of employees and are in-
structed by an internal or external trainer. For employees who attain at
least one training in a respective year, we observe 15; 109 training-year ob-
servations during the time span 2006   2008, i.e. for about one third of all
observations in the sample. This indicates that classroom trainings are a
widely used personnel development instrument in the analyzed company.14
Overall training participation decreased from 36% in 2006 to 30% in 2008.
The rate of training participation may depend on the economic situation of
a company as in growth periods employees may have fewer days left to par-
ticipate in training programs. We indeed nd evidence for this relationship
as the observed rm increased net sales signicantly between 2006 and 2008.
Figure 4.1 shows the average training participation (in at least one training)
by employee status and year. Junior managers show the highest rates with
a three-year average of about 52%.
12Regressions indeed conrm that movers earn signicantly lower bonus payments in
the year of the job change than stayers.
13Note that Bartel (1995) follows a similar approach.
14We also have information on so-called webbased trainings, which are completed by
employees on their own via an online platform. But as these trainings are only very rarely
used we exclude them from further analyses.
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Figure 4.1: Average training participation by employee status and year
Additionally, it is interesting to consider the di¤erent training categories,
as can be seen in gures 4.2 and 4.3. Overall, participation rates for language,
leadership and communication as well as IT trainings are the highest in the
company followed by trainings in business administration. Figure 4.3 shows
that junior managers are the group with the highest participation rates in
each of the six categories.15 It is notable that the participation rate of junior
managers in leadership and communication trainings is the highest compared
to the other training categories. One could assume that especially promoted
junior managers drive this result, but that is not the case as training par-
ticipation in leadership and communication trainings for promoted junior
managers is 23% and 21% for non-promoted junior managers. This shows
that the focus of personnel development instruments like classroom trainings
is on junior managers which are supposed to be the future leaders of the
company. Interestingly, promoted senior managers are trained more in lead-
15Table 4.13 in the appendix shows the same statistics but only for trained employees
(contrary to all employees in gure 4.3).
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ership and communication skills (15%) than non-promoted senior managers
(9%).16
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Figure 4.2: Average training participation by training category
4.4.2 Training Hours and Numbers of Training
Besides participation rates, the data set covers information on training hours
and the number of attended trainings. On average, a training takes 19:5
hours in this company, which is equivalent to about 2:5 training days. The
rst three columns of table 4.2 show the average number of training hours
per employee, i.e. the total number of training hours divided by the number
of full-time employees. It can be seen that this number decreases from 12:4
in 2006 to 11:6 in 2008. The last three columns show the average number of
training hours for the group of trained employees, i.e. who participate in at
least one classroom training in the relevant year. Here, we nd an increase
16Note that some employees participate in more than one training each year. Therefore,
the total participation rate for each employee group in gure 4.3 may be higher than the
average training particpation rate in at least one training in gure 4.1.
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Figure 4.3: Average classroom training participation by employee status and
training category
from 34:9 to 38:2 hours indicating that the average training duration for
trained employees in the company has been rising over the years.17 For
exempt employees, we nd a negative correlation between the position in
the hierarchy and all of these indicators, i.e. training hours and number of
trainings are lowest at the top levels of the hierarchy.
4.4.3 Training Behavior of Employees in New Job Po-
sitions
As already mentioned, we expect employees working in a new position to
be trained more frequently in order to acquire the needed job-relevant skills.
We can di¤erentiate between newly hired employees, promoted employees
and employees who moved to a di¤erent subgroup. In fact, these employees
show, on average, higher training participation rates as can be seen in the
17The average number of classroom trainings per full-time employee decreases from 0:8
in 2006 to 0:6 in 2008 (per trained employee from 2:1 in 2006 to 1:9 in 2008 respectively).
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Average number of training hours
per employee per trained employee
Employee status 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
Non-exempt 10.0 10.8 9.5 32.2 38.1 36.1
Junior manager 24.7 23.2 22.0 44.7 45.5 45.5
Senior manager 9.6 7.6 8.7 29.1 30.3 32.2
Senior executive 3.5 4.3 2.4 13.6 25.6 15.0
Total 12.4 12.4 11.6 34.9 39.2 38.2
Table 4.2: Average number of classroom training hours by employee status
and year
rst column of table 4.3. Compared to job stayers, the participation rate of
new hires is, on average, about 13 percentage points higher, for employees
that moved between subgroups 11:5 and for promoted employees 7 percent-
age points. The same pattern is visible for training hours, which can be seen
in the second column of table 4.3. These results indicate that the di¤er-
ent training behavior of job movers has to be to taken into account in the
following regressions, which we will do so.
Job status Train. participation (in %) Training hours
No job change 30.7 11.8
Newly hired 43.9 15.9
Promoted 37.9 16.2
Subgroup move 42.2 15.5
Note: Averages reported. Data source: Pooled data set 2006-2008.
Table 4.3: Training statistics by type of job change
4.5 Determinants of Training Participation
4.5.1 Overall Training Participation
Columns 1 to 4 of table 4.4 show marginal e¤ects18 for di¤erent specications
of probit regressions for the determinants of participation in at least one
18Marginal e¤ects are evaluated at the mean of the independent variables and, for
dummy variables, report the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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classroom training. The base model in column 1 incorporates the percentile
rank of individual i0s base salary in her work unit in period t   1, age, age
squared, tenure, tenure squared, sex, employee status, and subdivision as
main independent variables. The results of model 1 for the subgroup of non-
exempt employees are shown in column 2 and for exempt employees in column
3. Model 4 additionally controls for department size as well as the number
of trainings of the direct supervisor in period t  1. Column 5 reports tobit
regression results for the number of training hours as dependent variable.
Further control variables in all specications include the level of education
and year dummies. Robust standard errors are reported for each regression.
As can be seen in column 1 of Table 4.4, we nd an inversely U-shaped
pattern for the relationship between classroom training participation and age,
with a maximum at 40 years of age. This seems to be in line with predictions
of the human capital theory (Becker (1962)) as the return on investment in
employee training for older employees may be lower due to their shorter
remaining time in the rm. The tenure coe¢cients show the opposite result,
i.e. a U-shaped relationship for the likelihood of participating in company
trainings. Employees with lower levels of rm tenure seem to be trained more
intensively to enable them for their jobs and provide them with rm-specic
knowledge, whereas longer-tenured employees might have lost recent trends
and developments in the market and their skills and knowledge have to be
refreshed. However, the economic size of the e¤ect is quite small.
As already shown in the descriptive section, the likelihood of training
participation is signicantly higher for managers that are at the bottom
management levels (+13%) and lower for senior executives at the top levels,
compared to non-exempt employees. The group of junior managers com-
prises both the entry positions for university graduates, which are typically
between 25 and 35 years of age, as well as more experienced employees. Re-
gressions show that within this group, training participation rates are steadily
declining with age.19 This pattern shows that especially younger employees
with less work and labor market experience need to accumulate general and
rm-specic human capital, which seems to be the driver of the results here.
19The results are available upon request.
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Dependent variable: Training participationt Hourst
(All) (Non-ex.) (Exempt) (All) (All)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentile salaryt 1 -0.0921*** -0.0983*** -0.0719*** -0.0948*** -12.003***
(0.0132) (0.0162) (0.0242) (0.0198) (2.002)
Age 0.0397*** 0.0338*** 0.0338*** 0.0308*** 6.899***
(0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0096) (0.0052) (0.5774)
Age squared -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.092***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0068)
Female 0.0440*** 0.0527*** 0.0007 0.0380*** 8.281***
(0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0178) (0.0124) (1.2602)
Tenure -0.0069*** -0.0021 -0.0108*** -0.0069*** -1.563***
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.2621)
Tenure squared 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.041***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0068)
Junior managera 0.1336*** 0.1229*** 19.603***
(0.0113) (0.0156) (1.6384)
Senior manager -0.0162 -0.1247*** -0.0012 -4.616**
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0208) (2.1366)
Senior executive -0.1248*** -0.2167*** -0.0805** -25.770***
(0.0203) (0.0196) (0.0381) (3.9705)
Promotedt 0.0448*** 0.0702*** -0.0076 0.0452*** 8.208***
(0.0101) (0.0127) (0.0166) (0.0117) (1.5117)
Subdivision movet 0.1074*** 0.0844*** 0.1376*** 0.1218*** 13.377***
(0.0247) (0.0326) (0.0377) (0.0381) (3.3098)
No. of trainings of 0.0493***
direct supervisort 1 (0.0055)
Department sizet -0.0452***
(0.0118)
Observations 23292 15908 7384 19651 23283
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.02
Marginal e¤ects reported in columns 1 to 4. Reference category: a Non-exempt
employees. Additional control variables include education, subdivision, and year.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 4: Clustered standard errors (2,246 supervisor/department clusters)
Table 4.4: Probit regression results for determinants of classroom training
participation
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We further nd a signicantly higher likelihood of training participa-
tion for female employees (+4:4%). This seems to be driven by non-exempt
employees, as the coe¢cient for female managers in column 3 is neither sta-
tistically nor economically signicant. Especially in lower-skilled positions,
the career tracks of females may be characterized by more interruptions than
those of male employees, often due to maternity and parental leaves.20 These
career breaks result in a higher demand for trainings to compensate missed
on-the-job and classroom learning during periods of maternity leave.21 Some
may argue that the overall positive e¤ect for females is only attributed to
larger functional units with a high proportion of female employees. As ro-
bustness check, we replicated the baseline regressions for smaller business
units (especially production units) and in the majority of estimates the fe-
male dummy remains positive.
But the most striking result is the negative coe¢cient of our proxy vari-
able for previous performance indicating that less productive employees are
signicantly more likely to participate in trainings. In detail, compared to
an employee whose salary is the lowest in a given department in period t 1,
the probability that an employee with the highest salary participates in at
least one training in period t is about 9% lower. For exempt employees this
"reversed selection e¤ect" seems to be less intense with a coe¢cient of 7%
(column 3). To facilitate the interpretation of the negative selection e¤ect,
we subdivided the proxy variable into quintiles and reran the baselines re-
gressions.22 The results show that the negative e¤ect is mainly driven by
best-paid employees, i.e. employees that belong to the 4th and 5th quintile
of previous years salary distribution in a given work unit. This is quite plau-
sible as opportunity costs for these employees are much higher than for peers
in the lower quintiles. We therefore nd no evidence for the usual positive
selection e¤ect in this company.
20See e.g. Altonji and Blank (1999) and Kunze (2008) for a discussion on gender di¤er-
ences in job mobility and training.
21Another possible explanation is the decreasing proportion of female employees at
higher hierarchical levels. For non-exempt employees, the share of female employees is
about 23%, for junior managers 19% and it decreases down to 7% for senior executives.
22These results are available upon request.
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As a specic feature of the data set, we also have information on short-
term bonus payments and performance grades for exempt employees. To test
if the negative selection into trainings is robust for this subgroup, we reran
the baseline regression for classroom trainings with two new proxy variables
for previous performance: the percentile rank of the annual bonus payments
an employee receives in a given department and the individual performance
grade of the annual performance management process both in period t  1.23
The results of table 4.5 conrm the previous results, as employees that are
higher in the bonus distribution or that receive better performance grades
show a signicantly lower likelihood of training participation.
Dependent variable: Training participationt
(1) (2)
Percentile bonust 1 -0.0634***
(0.0216)
Grade 1 t 1
a -0.1278**
(0.0599)
Grade 2 t 1 -0.0284*
(0.0145)
Grade 4 t 1 0.0468
(0.0381)
Observations 7301 6994
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11
Marginal e¤ects reported. Reference category: a Grade 3 t 1.
Control variables: see table 4.4. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.5: Robustness checks for selection into training participation
In specication 4 of table 4.4 the logarithm of department size is incor-
porated into the baseline model. We nd that the likelihood of training
participation decreases in larger departments which is the opposite of what
has been expected. In detail, if department size increases by 1%, the likeli-
hood of training participation decreases by 4:5%, all other factors constant.
Additionally, we include the number of trainings of the direct supervisor in
23The grades are from 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest grade and 5 the worst, respectively.
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period t 1 into the model.24 One could expect that an increasing number of
trainings of the direct supervisor in the previous year should have a positive
e¤ect on subordinates training behavior. And indeed, we nd a positive and
economically signicant e¤ect of about 4:9%. Also, as predicted, employees
in a new job position show a signicantly higher likelihood of training par-
ticipation in the baseline specication.25 Finally, the tobit regression results
in column 5 for the number of training hours per employee broadly conrm
the results discussed above.
4.5.2 Training Categories
As mentioned earlier, we are able to distinguish between di¤erent types of
classroom trainings. Table 4.6 shows some interesting estimation results for
each of these categories. In this company, less productive employees (with
lower relative base salaries) are more likely to participate in trainings of
each category. This stands in contrast to Bartel (1995) who founds that high
performers are awarded with leadership and project management trainings.26
For language trainings, we nd no signicant results.
It is further interesting to note that job movers are more likely to attend
language, business administration and leadership trainings. For leadership
trainings this is not surprising, as especially promoted employees are trained
for future leadership tasks, whereas lateral moves between subdivisions are
typically not characterized with an increase in managerial authority. Com-
pared to non-exempt employees, the likelihood of participating in leadership
trainings is the highest for junior managers (+8:7%), followed by senior man-
agers (+4:4%). This indicates that leadership skills are very important for
managers at the bottom levels.
Sex has a signicant inuence on training participation in all specica-
tions. Female employees are more likely to participate in all categories of
24Standard errors in this specication are clustered on supervisor-level, as we are able
to identify 2; 246 unique supervisors.
25Holding all factors constant, promoted workers (subdivision movers) show, on average,
a 4:5% (10:7%) higher likelihood of training participation than stayers.
26It is important to note that the denition of the various training categories in the
study by Bartel (1995) and our study cannot be compared exactly.
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classroom trainings except technical trainings than male employees, with the
highest likelihood for language trainings. As mentioned above, the loss of
human capital during out-of-job periods like maternal leaves might be one
reason, whereas the lower share of women among technicians might drive the
results for technical trainings.
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4.6 Performance E¤ects of Training Partici-
pation
To analyze the performance e¤ects of classroom training participation on
monetary outcomes, we conduct xed e¤ects regressions with the logarithm
of the compensation variables as dependent variable. Our key independent
variable is a dummy for training participation in the same or in the previous
year. The control variables are identical to those used in the probit and tobit
regressions. It is important to note that we exclude job movers in the year
of the job change from all regressions.27
As previous studies on the e¤ects of intra-rm trainings used xed wages
as productivity measure, we present xed e¤ects regression results with base
salary as dependent variable in table 4.7. Classroom training participation
signicantly increases individual base salary only in the same year, holding all
other factors constant. But the economic e¤ect is very small. An employee
who participated in at least one training in year t, attains, on average, a
0:2% higher wage in the same year compared to an employee with the same
occupational characteristics that did not participate.28 To test the robustness
of our results, we also estimate the baseline regressions using individual wage
growth rates and the percentile rank of base salary as dependent variable. We
nd no statistically signicant e¤ect of training participation in period t and
t 1 both for wage growth and the percentile rank29, so that the economically
weak e¤ects of training attendance on base salary are conrmed.
For exempt employees, we additionally run xed e¤ects regressions with
the logarithm of short-term bonus payments as proxy of individual perfor-
mance and nd an economically signicant short-term e¤ect. As can be seen
in column 1 of table 4.8, training participation leads to an average increase
27As shown in section 4.5, these employees tend to participate in more trainings com-
pared to job stayers. Promoted employees e.g. receive signicantly lower bonus payments
and higher base salaries in their rst year in the new job. This would bias the outcome of
the regressions.
28This is equivalent to 120 Euros (based on an annual mean salary of about 58; 000
Euros).
29These results are available upon request.
114
Dependent variable: Ln base salaryt Ind. wage growtht
(1) (2)
Training participationt 0.0013** 0.0278
(0.0005) (0.0830)
Training participationt 1 0.0000 -0.1036
(0.0006) (0.0850)
Observations 31973 21536 19937 21536
R2 within 0.738 0.726 0.077 0.201
Additional control variables include employee status, age, age squared,
tenure, tenure squared, subdivision, education and year. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.7: Fixed e¤ects regression results for base salary and wage growth
in bonus payments in the same year of 3:3%. However, the e¤ect of training
participation in period t  1 disappears as the coe¢cient in column 2 is both
statistically and economically far from signicance. We additionally use the
individual growth rate in bonus payments as dependent variable, as shown
in columns 3 to 4. Actual training participation results, on average, in an
about 7 percentage points higher individual bonus growth rate, compared to
employees that did not attend at least one training in the respective year.30
But having participated in at least one training in the previous year leads to
an average decrease in the bonus growth rate of about 9 percentage points,
all other factors constant.
To analyze the drivers of the aggregate e¤ects we also include interaction
terms between training participation and employee status in the baseline re-
gressions. The results in table 4.14 in the appendix show that the short-term
performance e¤ect is not di¤erent for the three groups of exempt employees,
as the interaction terms are not signicantly di¤erent from zero at conven-
tional levels.
All these results indicate that training participation has a signicant per-
formance e¤ect only in the short run and only for variable payments. These
ndings are in contrast to the outcomes of previous studies like Bartel (1995),
but support the results by Fahr et al. (2010). We try to give a new explana-
30The median bonus growth rate in the data set is 10%.
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Dependent variable: Ln bonus paymentt Ind. bonus increaset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tr. participationt 0.0329*** 0.0660*
(0.0076) (0.0396)
Tr. participationt 1 0.0051 -0.0865**
(0.0051) (0.0397)
Ln Salaryt 0.8972*** 0.4456*** -2.5144 -0.7599
(0.2567) (0.1479) (1.5422) (0.5674)
Aget -0.0843 -0.0310 -0.5500** -0.3253
(0.0952) (0.0707) (0.2298) (0.2102)
Tenuret 0.1114 -0.0287 0.2864 0.0487
(0.0938) (0.0701) (0.2198) (0.2073)
Observations 9327 6376 5846 6179
R2 within 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.12
Additional control variables include employee status, subdivision,
education, and year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.8: Fixed e¤ects regression results for bonus payments and bonus
increase (baseline)
tion for the considerable short-term e¤ect that has not been addressed in the
literature so far. As already mentioned, training needs are often integrated
into the annual target agreements between a supervisor and its employees.
This is especially true for large, international companies. If our company fol-
lows a similar personnel development strategy, we would expect that only the
incidence of training participation matters and not the number of attended
trainings or the training composition. As we have information on di¤erent
training categories and the number of trainings an employee attended a year,
we can directly test the "target achievement" explanation for the short-term
performance e¤ects.
Project and leadership trainings are typically most important for junior
managers at the beginning of a management career and may therefore be
part of an individual target agreement for these group of employees. Hence,
we would expect the dummy variables for these training categories to have
the largest coe¢cients in magnitude. The results in table 4.9 indeed show the
highest e¤ects of training participation on bonus payments at the end of the
116
same year for project management (+4%) and leadership trainings (+3:7%),
followed by IT (+2:7%) and business administration trainings (+2:2%). Lan-
guage and technical trainings, however, seem to have no signicant e¤ect in
the short run.
Dependent variable: Ln bonus paymentt
Leadershipt 0.0328***
(0.0075)
Business Adm.t 0.0256***
(0.0096)
Projectt 0.0369**
(0.0147)
Languaget -0.0147
(0.0118)
ITt 0.0289***
(0.0083)
Technicalt 0.0031
(0.0113)
Number of trainingst -0.0053**
(0.0025)
Ln salaryt 1 0.9295***
(0.2578)
Observations 9327
R2 within 0.17
Additional control variables include employee status,
subdivision, education, age, tenure, and year.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.9: Fixed e¤ects regression results for logarithm of bonus payments
by training category
4.6.1 Number of Trainings and Training Diversity
In a next step we investigate whether an increasing number of trainings or
a more diversied training composition have a positive e¤ect on individual
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bonus payments in the current year.31 As can be seen in column 1 of table
4.10, the coe¢cients for one, two or three attended trainings are very sim-
ilar.32 Compared to employees that did not attend any training in a given
year, having participated in one, two or three trainings leads to an average
increase in bonus payments of 3:2% to 4:3% in the same year, with a peak
for participation in two trainings. Hence, a larger number of trainings seems
to have no signicant e¤ect on performance, rather economically nor statis-
tically. In column 2, the number of training hours is additionally included
in the regression model. Comparing two employees with the same number
of trainings in a given year, an additional training hour has no signicant
performance e¤ect, all other factors constant.
These two interesting results support our previous explanation. Having
participated in the rst training in year t leads to a signicant increase
in bonus payments, whereas one or more additional trainings seem to have
nearly the same e¤ect. This suggests, that only the incidence of participation
matters and not the number of attended trainings.
But one may argue that not the number of attended trainings is an im-
portant driver for actual performance, but rather the training composition
may be much more relevant. There are several arguments supporting this hy-
pothesis. Especially for junior managers, who are supposed to lead a project
team in the near future, there may be a complementary relationship between
di¤erent types of trainings as e.g. the benet of a project management train-
ing may be higher if one additionally participates in a leadership training.
Also, when participating in more than one training of the same category,
a decreasing marginal learning e¤ect can be expected. A more diversied
training program would therefore lead to the highest e¤ect.
We are able to test this hypothesis by using the information on the dif-
ferent training categories. Therefore, a variable is generated that counts in
how many di¤erent training categories an employee has attended at least one
31We focus on the e¤ect of training participation on bonus payments in the same year,
as we found no e¤ects of lagged training participation on performance before.
32The hypothesis, that the coe¢cients for one, two and three trainings are equal, cannot
be rejected at conventional levels (Wald test, p=0.4455).
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Dependent variable: Ln bonus paymentt
(1) (2)
One trainingat 0.0321*** 0.0336***
(0.0079) (0.0082)
Two trainingst 0.0432*** 0.0439***
(0.0111) (0.0120)
Three trainingst 0.0302*** 0.0316**
(0.0114) (0.0128)
Four or more trainingst 0.0003 0.0040
(0.0116) (0.0148)
Training hourst -0.0001
(0.0001)
Ln salaryt 1 0.8989*** 0.8972***
(0.2557) (0.2577)
Observations 9327 9286
R2 within 0.17 0.17
Reference category: a No training. Additional control variables
include employee status, subdivision, education, age, tenure,
and year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.10: Fixed e¤ects regression results for number of trainings
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training in a given year.33 The distribution of this variable is shown in table
4.15 in the appendix. It can be seen that the majority of trained employees
participates in trainings of the same category followed by trainings of two
di¤erent categories, whereas individual training compositions with more than
two di¤erent categories are not very prominent.
Table 4.11 reports xed e¤ects regression results with the diversity mea-
sure as key independent variable. But again, the coe¢cients are very similar
in magnitude indicating that a more diversied training portfolio has no
signicant performance e¤ect in the same year.34
Discussions with company representatives of the training department re-
vealed that supervisors are generally requested to consider training needs in
the annual performance management process and to reach agreements with
their subordinates. Therefore, training participation is likely to be one of
the individual goals in the target agreement process and thus linked to an-
nual bonus payments.35 The main focus is on junior manager positions, as
these are typical ports of entry for university graduates. Out of this group
of employees, successors for higher-skilled management positions are being
recruited. These high performers therefore serve as talent pool for the com-
pany. As most of them have gained almost no job experience and leadership
skills, the average training participation in this group is very high. There-
fore, the observed positive e¤ects of trainings in the current year may be
attributable to this policy to a high extent. But one year later, the e¤ect
disappears, so that trainings do not seem to have a long-term performance
e¤ect. This argumentation also ts to the signicant reduction in individual
growth rates of bonus payments. Employees benet from successful training
participation in the current year, but a year later, the growth rates tend
to go back to original levels. A possible reason might be that supervisors
increase individual target values after successful training participation. An-
33We therefore only include employees who participate either in no or in at least two
trainings in a given year.
34The hypothesis, that the coe¢cients on training diversity are equal, cannot be rejected
at conventional levels (Wald test, p=0.9483).
35Besides individual targets, subdivisional- and company-specic targets are typically
included in a target agreement. The weights of these elements depend on the hierarchical
level.
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other plausible explanation may refer to social preferences. Particularly in
the case of "open enrollment" trainings, employees may show reciprocal be-
havior if they perceive the o¤er of company-sponsored trainings as a special
benet (Tzafrir (2005)). The reciprocal behavior then may lead to higher
e¤orts in the year of the training, but employees seem to adapt to former
productivity level afterwards.
Dependent variable: Ln bonus paymentt
Same categoryat 0.0487***
(0.0171)
Two di¤erentt 0.0482***
(0.0167)
More than three di¤erentt 0.0526**
(0.0207)
Training hourst -0.0003***
(0.0001)
Ln salaryt 1 0.8799**
(0.3784)
Observations 7345
R2 within 0.15
Reference cat.: a No training. Additional control variables
include employee status, subdivision, tenure, age,
education, and year. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.11: Fixed e¤ects regression results for training composition
4.6.2 Absenteeism, Overtime Work and Turnover
As we also have individual information on annual overtime work, absenteeism
and turnover, we can further analyze the e¤ects of training participation on
these non-monetary job indicators. Information on overtime and absenteeism
(both measured in hours per year) is only available for non-exempt employees.
An employee works, on average, 11 hours overtime and is absent from work
for about 89 hours each year.36 The variable turnover probability, which takes
36Absenteeism is dened as absence through illness and other unpaid absence days
(exluding absence for holidays).
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on the value 1 if the respective employee leaves the company in the following
year, is available for all employee groups with an average annual turnover
rate of 6%.
Intra-rm training normally takes place during the regular working time
which partly reduces the e¤ective working hours of an employee. We there-
fore expect a positive relationship between training participation and over-
time hours. Furthermore, we expect training participation to be negatively
correlated with absenteeism, if employees value the participation in training
courses more than their day-to-day business. Krueger and Rouse (1998) em-
pirically investigate this relationship on a weekly basis and found a negative
e¤ect of training hours on absence time.
Classical human capital theory predicts that, if training increases general
human capital, trained employees become more valuable for competitors.37
We should therefore expect a positive relationship between training partici-
pation and turnover, if wages are not increased after training participation.
If only rm-specic human capital is acquired, the employee is only valu-
able to the current employer and the relation with turnover remains unclear.
Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between general and specic
human capital as well as voluntary and involuntary turnover, which would be
necessary to closely analyze these mechanisms. When investigating the deter-
minants of training, we found that less productive employees are more likely
to participate in training. If training participation improves the performance
of these employees, we should expect them less likely to be discharged by
the company implying a negative relationship of participation and turnover.
Thus, the direction of the hypothesis is not clear.
Fixed e¤ects regression results in columns 1 and 2 of table 4.12 show that
actual training participation signicantly increases overtime working hours
and decreases absenteeism of employees, therefore conrming our hypotheses.
Participation in at least one training per year increases overtime work of a
non-exempt employee by about 2 hours and leads to a decrease of about
15 absence hours per year (excluding holidays), holding all other factors
37According to the theory, training in general human capital will not be nanced by the
employer. For contrary results see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999).
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constant. Note that the size of the coe¢cient on absenteeism is economically
signicant. Given that a non-exempt employee earns 24 Euros per hour on
average38 in this company, this e¤ect produces a "recovered value" of about
360 Euros. This result is in line with Krueger and Rouse (1998).
The last two columns report marginal e¤ects of a probit regression with
turnover probability as dependent variable. Column 3 reports regression
results for all employees, whereas additional controls for bonus payments in
column 4 are only possible for exempt employees. The results indicate that
employees who participate in at least one classroom training in the current
year show a signicantly lower turnover probability compared to non-trained
employees. This pattern is robust in both specications and the e¤ects are
quite large. Regressions with lagged training participation also conrm these
results. The results therefore t to the hypotheses mentioned above.
Dependent variable: Overtime workt Absenteeismt Turnover probabilityt
(1) FE (2) FE (3) Probit (4) Probit
Train. participationt 1.995*** -15.3956*** -0.0724*** -0.114***
(0.627) (2.6541) (0.0038) (0.0122)
Ln Salaryt -1.508 14.2949 -0.203*** -0.218***
(5.340) (43.0314) (0.0092) (0.0698)
Ln Bonust 0.0402
(0.0256)
Observations 22481 22481 22892 7470
(Pseudo) R2 within 0.02 0.01 0.53 0.80
Additional control variables include education, sex, age, tenure, employee
status, subdivision and year. Columns 3 and 4: Marginal e¤ects reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.12: Regression results for overtime work, absenteeism and turnover
4.7 Conclusion
Analyzing the e¤ects of intra-rm training on employees performance based
on company records of a multinational company, we nd that the productiv-
38This was calculated based on the average annual salary of non-exempt employees
divided by 1,776 working hours (222 working days per year*8 hours a day).
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ity e¤ects shown by other studies have to be interpreted with caution. There
seems to be no clear evidence that training sustainably improves the perfor-
mance of employees. The data set we use is unique because we have infor-
mation on monetary performance indicators like individual bonus payments
and xed wages, but also on non-monetary job indicators like absenteeism,
overtime work and turnover rates. Additionally, we use information on the
relative position of employees in the income distribution to control for possi-
ble selection e¤ects and nd that less productive employees are more likely to
participate in trainings. We show that managers at lower management lev-
els are most likely to participate in classroom trainings. Also, participation
is signicantly higher for female employees which might indicate a higher
necessity of training for women who face interruptions in their professional
career mainly due to maternity leaves.
Applying xed e¤ects regressions to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity
between employees we nd a positive e¤ect of training participation on xed
wages only in the same year. But this e¤ect is economically insignicant.
Using bonus payments as productivity measure, our results show that train-
ings only have a considerable e¤ect on employee performance in the short
run. We argue that this result may be driven by the annual performance
management process, as training requirements are typically integrated into
target agreements between employees and supervisors especially for junior
managers. Further analyses investigating the e¤ects of an increasing number
of trainings or a more diversied training composition conrm this explana-
tion as only the incidence seems to be a driver of the short-term performance
e¤ect. Another explanation refers to short-term reciprocity behavior of em-
ployees.
Besides the unique data set we use, this study has several limitations.
First, further research should try to collect more years of company records in
order to better evaluate potential long-term performance e¤ects. Also, ob-
jective performance measures like sales gures would be helpful to overcome
a possible bias in subjective performance evaluations.
Of course, our results may only partly be generalizable because we use a
single rm data set. But still, there is a need for analyzing the structure and
124
benets of training programs in companies to get a closer understanding of
the relevant mechanisms and the mixed empirical results. Future research
should focus mainly on personnel records when investigating the e¤ects of
training to mitigate possible measurement problems of survey studies.
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4.8 Appendix to Chapter 4
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Dependent variable: Ln bonus paymentt
Training participationt 0.0329***
(0.0120)
Ln Salaryt 1 0.8984***
(0.2566)
Tr. part.t* Sen. manager
a -0.0031
(0.0139)
Tr. part.t* Sen. executive 0.0193
(0.0191)
Observations 9327
R2 within 0.17
Reference cat.: a Junior managers. Additional control variables include
status, subdivision, education, age, tenure, and year. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.14: Fixed e¤ects regression results for logarithm of bonus payments
(interactions with employee status)
Diversity Freq. Percent
No training 31,151 82.08
Same category 3,321 8.75
Two di¤erent categories 2,664 7.02
More than three categories 818 2.16
Total 37,954 100.00
Table 4.15: Composition of individual trainings
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Chapter 5
The E¤ects of Di¤erentiation
on Performance1
5.1 Introduction
Most bonus contracts for employees in practice are not based on objective
measures of performance but rather on a subjective performance assessment
by a supervisor. But it is often stressed (compare e.g. Prendergast and
Topel (1993), Murphy and Cleveland (1995)) that supervisors tend to give
performance ratings that are too compressed relative to the true performance
of their employees. In that case bonus payments presumably will not reward
high performance or sanction low performance adequately.2
Simple economic reasoning suggests that rating compression should lead
to a lower performance as the subordinates marginal return to e¤ort is re-
duced. But on the other hand it is sometimes claimed by practitioners that
di¤erentiated ratings may destroy employee motivation or crowd-out in-
trinsic motivation. However, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on
this issue so far. In this chapter we therefore study the performance e¤ects of
di¤erentiated ratings empirically in a unique large data set spanning di¤erent
companies from one industry.
1This chapter is based upon Kampkötter and Sliwka (2010a).
2In the recent Global Workforce Study 2010 by Towers Watson, only 41% of the re-
spondents agree that supervisors di¤erentiate enough between low and high performers.
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The question of whether more di¤erentiated ratings increase or reduce
employee performance is of high practical importance, as for instance many
rms quite controversially discuss methods to increase di¤erentiation in per-
formance appraisals such as so called forced distribution systems.3 Moreover,
as di¤erentiated ratings lead to higher powered incentives this study also adds
to the still rather scarce empirical literature investigating the e¤ects of in-
centive schemes on productivity (Lazear (2000), Knez and Simester (2001),
Bandiera et al. (2007), Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez (2009)).
The data set we study contains information on individual compensation
in the German banking and nancial services sector for the years 2005-2007
and is owned by the management consultancy Towers Watson4. On average,
around 50 companies participated in the survey each year. We use individual
information on salary, annual bonus payments, age, rm tenure, functional
area, specic function, career ladder and hierarchical level. For a substantial
part of the employees in the survey unique personal identiers are reported
such that we can construct a panel data set.
Empirically we observe large di¤erences between various departments (in
the same rm or across rms) with respect to the di¤erentiation in bonus
payments. In some departments all employees receive the same bonus, in
others there are huge di¤erences in the bonus payments made to individual
employees at the same job. These di¤erences will of course be driven to some
extent simply by di¤erences in ability between the individual employees. But
they will also be driven by the personal preferences of the supervisor5, by
characteristics of the appraisal system or by the specic corporate culture of
the rm. There are companies that prefer an egalitarian approach paying
mainly xed wages or team bonuses without a strong emphasis on individual
performance. Others consider di¤erentiation a key part of their culture. As
for instance Jack Welch, who has put a large emphasis on establishing a
3For discussions on the controversial issues in the popular press see for instance Per-
formance Reviews: Many Neeed Improvement in the New York Times, September 10,
2006 or The Struggle to Measure Performance in Business Week, January 9, 2006.
4Formerly known as Towers Perrin.
5Kane et al. (1995) for instance show that there are substantial di¤erences between the
ratings given by di¤erent supervisors to the same employees.
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culture of di¤erentiation as CEO of General Electric, puts it Di¤erentiation
comes down to sorting out the A, B, and C players. [..] Managers who cant
di¤erentiate soon nd themselves in the C category (pp. 195).6
The key idea of the paper is the following. The e¤ective power of individ-
ual incentives is mainly driven by the extent to which there is di¤erentiation
in bonus payments. We therefore measure this power of individual incentives
for each organizational unit by computing the coe¢cient of variation (or al-
ternatively the ratio of the 90th and 10th percentile or the standard deviation
of the logs) of the bonus payments. A unit is identied by a unique combina-
tion of year, company, module, function, career ladder and hierarchical level.
Our key hypothesis is that a higher variation in bonus payments in a certain
unit in the previous year should lead to higher bonus payments for an em-
ployee in this unit in the subsequent year, holding all other factors constant.
Of course, unobserved individual heterogeneity will be an important issue as
di¤erentiation will also be driven by the specic amount of heterogeneity in
abilities in the di¤erent units. To control for this unobserved heterogeneity,
we investigate regression models with individual xed e¤ects.
We indeed nd that di¤erentiation on average has a substantial positive
e¤ect on individual performance. The e¤ect is also of economic signicance:
When ranking units by their degree of di¤erentiation the overall model pre-
dicts that units in the highest quintile pay about 31% to 36% higher bonuses
in the subsequent year than units in the lowest quintile, holding all other
factors constant. We also analyze whether the inuence of di¤erentiation
on individual performance di¤ers between hierarchical levels and functional
areas. We nd very strong positive e¤ects of di¤erentiation at the highest
and intermediate levels. Regarding only those levels, employees in the most
strongly di¤erentiating units have an about 30% higher performance than
employees in the unit with the weakest di¤erentiation. But surprisingly, we
nd a reversed or diminishing performance e¤ect of di¤erentiation for the
top quintiles at the lowest hierarchical levels. Additionally, di¤erentiation
6He also admits Di¤erentiation isnt easy. Finding a way to di¤erentiate people across
a large company has been one of the hardest things to do." (p. 153) and [..] we spent
over a decade building a performance culture with candid feedback at every level (Straight
from the gut, p.199).
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has the strongest e¤ect in retail banking, where objective performance mea-
sures are rather widely available. We also nd that di¤erentiation has a much
stronger e¤ect on performance for managers than for experts controlling for
the level of responsibility.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview on
the related literature, whereas in section 5.3 the data set and the empirical
strategy are described in detail. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 then investigate the
performance e¤ects of bonus dispersion for the whole data set as well as
for separate subsamples. In section 5.6, robustness checks are presented as
well as a rst indication on the relationship between di¤erentiation and rm
performance. Finally, section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
The design of compensation schemes in companies is always characterized
by a potential trade-o¤ between fairness considerations and the provision of
incentives. The key question is whether to treat employees equally, i.e. to
pay equal wages to all workers, or to reward higher levels of e¤orts adequately
leading to more di¤erentiated pay schemes. Many theoretical and empirical
studies only consider dispersion or di¤erentiation in wages, mainly focussing
on pay spreads between hierarchical levels. According to the tournament
theory (e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)), a higher di¤erentiation in agents
income enhances individual performance and that again leads to increased
rm performance. Also, large pay gaps are required to motivate employees.
But also fairness considerations seem to play a role, as workers compare their
own wage with the average wage of a comparable reference group. If their
own wage is lower than the perceived fair wage they will decrease e¤ort (see
e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990)). Wage equity, i.e. a more compressed wage
structure, may therefore be benecial for the organization. Additionally,
high levels of intra-rm wage dispersion may induce competition and lead
to sabotage e¤orts (if possible) that negatively a¤ect current or future rm
performance (Lazear (1989)). Hence, the question which of these e¤ects will
dominate is an empirical one.
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Di¤erentiation strategies may be useful as recent studies show the im-
portance of income comparisons between workers and co-workers. Equally-
skilled employees care more about their position in the salary distribution
of the reference group than about the average reference group income, i.e. a
higher rank induces higher e¤ort levels and an individuals rank is the more
important determinant of e¤ort (Clark et al. (2010)). Abeler et al. (2010)
show in a laboratory experiment that agents who receive the same wage exert
signicantly lower levels of e¤ort, that are also declining over time, than those
who are paid individually by their supervisor. One explanation is the adjust-
ment of e¤ort levels by high performers to the levels of the low-performers in
their group as a response to the violation of the equity principle. In contrast,
Charness and Kuhn (2007) only nd very weak e¤ects of coworker wages on
e¤ort levels. But productivity di¤erences between workers in their exper-
iment may have justied a more di¤erentiated pattern of income from an
employees perspective.
There are several empirical studies investigating the relationship between
intra-rm wage dispersion and rm performance using company data sets.
But these studies report quite mixed results, as some nd a positive and oth-
ers no or even a negative relationship. They all di¤er in the use of applied
dispersion measures (e.g. coe¢cient of variation, standard deviation,...), in-
dicators of rm performance (e.g. return on equity, sales,...), country, and
employee group. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) nd a positive rela-
tionship between wage dispersion and rm performance for Austrian blue-
collar workers, while there seems to be a hump-shaped relationship for white-
collars. This is in line with the results of Lallemand et al. (2004) and Mahy
et al. (2010) for Belgian private rm employees and for most of the indus-
tries in the UK manufacturing sector (Beaumont and Harris (2003)). For
German manufacturing companies, Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) report a pos-
itive relationship, but it decreases in establishments covered by collective
wage agreements or with installed works councils. Braakmann (2008), how-
ever, nds no signicant e¤ect using a linked employer-employee data set for
Germany. A negative e¤ect of pay dispersion on total sales per worker is
found in a recent study by Martins (2008) after applying worker and com-
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pany xed e¤ects estimates on a sample of Portuguese employees. Grund and
Westergaard-Nielsen (2008) follow a di¤erent approach and nd a negative
impact of the dispersion in wage growth on rm performance for a sample
of Danish rms. Instead of analyzing data on company employees, Pfe¤er
and Langton (1993) show that wage dispersion in UK academic departments
negatively e¤ects research performance output. Using data on professional
baseball players, Bloom (1999) nds a positive e¤ect of di¤erentiation on in-
dividual performance for higher-ranked team members, but a negative e¤ect
of di¤erentiated pay schemes on team performance.7
A di¤erent strand of literature also takes executive and managerial em-
ployees into account. Studies by Main et al. (1993) and more recently by Lee
et al. (2008) show a positive inuence of greater variation in top executive
team salary on company performance in the US. This result is supported by
Eriksson (1999) for Denmark as well as by Heyman (2005) using data on
Swedish managers and white collar employees. In contrast, Leonard (1990)
nds no signicant relationship between an increasing variance in total pay
and subsequent return on equity for top executive and managerial employees
in the US. Also Conyon et al. (2001) show for a cross sectional sample of
UK directors that the coe¢cient of variation in short- and long-term board
member compensation has no signicant impact on rm performance.
As reported above, these rm-level studies show no clear pattern of the
relationship between wage dispersion and rm performance. Pay dispersion
is often dened as the size of the pay spread between hierarchical (pay) levels
in most of the studies or the gap between the CEO and the top management
team. Additionally, there are only a few studies that investigate the e¤ect
of pay dispersion on individual productivity, which is often approximated
by alternative measures as indicators of individual performance are rarely
available. Drago and Garvey (1998), for example, nd a positive relationship
7Other studies using sports data are a.o. Mondello and Maxcy (2009) for NFL teams,
Richards and Guell (1998), Depken II (2000) and DeBrock et al. (2004) for MLB baseball
teams, Frick et al. (2003) for all US major leagues and Becker and Huselid (1992) for
professional racing car drivers. The mixed results described above can also be found in
these studies.
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between pay spread and individual productivity approximated by worker ab-
senteeism for Australian non-managerial employees. Bingley and Eriksson
(2001) support this result for Danish managers and non-managerial white
collars, whereas no signicant e¤ects can be found for blue collar employ-
ees. For a sample of US top managers, Bloom and Michel (2002) nd a
positive correlation between pay dispersion and turnover probability. But
many of these studies only use cross sectional instead of panel data sets, so
heterogeneity between individuals and rms is not taken into account.
Our study is also very closely related to eld and experimental studies
analyzing the relationship between subjective performance evaluation, espe-
cially supervisor ratings, and individual productivity. Bol (2009) shows that
rating compression, here the centrality bias8, negatively a¤ects the incen-
tives of both above-average and below-average performers in a large Dutch
nancial services company. This result is supported by Ahn et al. (2010)
and Engellandt and Riphahn (2011), who nd a positive incentive e¤ect of
a higher variability in ratings on future individual performance. In a recent
experimental study Berger et al. (2010) analyze the impact of a forced dis-
tribution system on individual performance and show that productivity is
signicantly higher if supervisors are forced to di¤erentiate between employ-
ees.
We contribute to the literature by addressing some of the shortcomings
of previous studies. Using a unique panel data set, we are able to analyze
the performance e¤ects of di¤erentiation for a large sample of non-executive
employees in various job positions. We also concentrate on individual bonus
payments instead of xed salaries and compute dispersion measures for a
large number of comparable work units rather using only between-level com-
parisons.
8For an overview on rating distortions see e.g. Murphy and Cleveland (1995), Pren-
dergast (1999), or Moers (2005).
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5.3 The Data
We investigate a panel data set on compensation in the German banking
and nancial services sector for the years 2005-2007. The data set is owned
by the management consultancy Towers Watson and is used for professional
compensation benchmarking.9 It covers all the largest German banks and
nancial services companies and contains detailed individual information on
base salary, bonus payments, age, rm tenure, hierarchical level (6 levels),
functional area, and specic function.10
The functional areas represent a broad classication of the main sectors
in the banking and nancial services industry: Retail banking (RB), as-
set management (AM), corporate banking (CB), investment banking (IB),
private banking (PB), treasury and capital markets (TCM), the typically
lower-skilled service functions (corporate services (CS)) as well as the cross-
divisional functions (corporate production (CP)). Most of the employees in
the data set are working in retail banking and in the service and corporate
functions, followed by corporate banking. But we make also use of a much
more detailed classication of industry-specic jobs, as these functional ar-
eas are subdivided into about 60 specic functions.11 The distribution of
employee-year observations by hierarchical level is shown in table 5.1.
Level Panel 2005/07
Frequency Percent
6 (highest) 514 1.18
5 6,007 13.78
4 11,150 25.58
3 11,275 25.86
2 12,619 28.95
1 (lowest) 2,029 4.65
Total 43,594 100.00
Table 5.1: Distribution by hierarchical level
9Towers Watson (formerly Towers Perrin) data sets have in economics also been used
by Abowd and Kaplan (1999), Murphy (1999), and Murphy (2001).
10Due to condentiality reasons, company names had to be anonymized.
11A list of exemplary functions is given in table 5.12 in the appendix.
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A very useful feature of this data set is the systematic comparability of
employee positions across di¤erent rms. As the consultancy o¤ers com-
pensation benchmarking services, it applies a standardized job evaluation
method to determine the specic function and hierarchical level of a job.
Therefore career levels are dened that reect typical career steps in an indi-
viduals career, i.e. they depend on the career progression for the considered
job. Each career level is described through detailed proles of the skills,
knowledge and behaviors that are required for that task or position. These
levels are then integrated into four career ladders for managerial positions
and functional experts (i.e. professional, sales and support). In our sample,
about 48% of all employee-year observations belong to the sales ladder, more
than 20% to the professional ladder and about 10% are managerial positions.
The empirical strategy is as follows. In the baseline specication we
analyze a balanced panel data set to investigate the e¤ects of di¤erentiation
within a department on individual performance in the subsequent year. In a
rst step, we generate cells capturing the organizational units of a company.
A unit is characterized by a unique combination of year, company, functional
area, function, career ladder and hierarchical level. We restrict our analysis
to cells with a minimum number of three observations. Then we compute
di¤erent measures of bonus dispersion within each unit and for each year:
the coe¢cient of variation, i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation to the
mean, the P90/P10 ratio, i.e. the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile
and the standard deviation of the logs. We include only observations with
non-missing and positive actual bonus payments to capture only positions
which are eligible for a bonus payment.
The sample is restricted to employees staying at the same hierarchical
level, in the same functional area, the same specic function and the same
career ladder in their initial company throughout all the years. We therefore
obtain a balanced panel data set. This is important to exclude variability
in bonus payments due to employee movements like promotion, functional
rotation, entry, or exit. Hence, the results of the estimates can not be at-
tributed to changes in an employees career. In the 2005-2007 panel, about
12,000 individuals can be observed over a three-year period with 1,455 unique
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cell-year combinations and a median size of 244 observations per cell.
We then run regressions with employee xed e¤ects where the log of the
individual bonus payment of a person i in a year t is the dependent variable.
Our key independent variable is the measure of dispersion (coe¢cient of vari-
ation, P90/P10 ratio, and standard deviation of logs) of bonus payments in
year t   1 in the relevant cell. Additional control variables include the log
of base salary, age, functional area, career ladder and year. In the baseline
regressions, we use two specications to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erentiation:
In the rst specication, the dispersion measures are included as independent
variable in the regression models. To allow for nonlinear e¤ects of di¤eren-
tiation, these measures are further categorized into quintiles and we include
dummy variables for each quintile in the second specication.
5.4 Performance E¤ects of Di¤erentiation
5.4.1 How much Di¤erentiation?
There is substantial variation in the degree of di¤erentiation between the
organizational units. Descriptive statistics of the dispersion measures for the
balanced panel are shown in table 5.2.
Level Balanced Panel 2005/07
Mean Median SD Min Max
CV 0.33 0.27 0.20 0 2.06
P90/P10 2.59 1.93 2.76 1 77.28
SD of logs 0.33 0.29 0.18 0 1.90
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for measures of dispersion
The lowest coe¢cient of variation, for example, is 0 and the highest 2.06,
with a mean value of 0.33 (median 0.27). Regarding the P90/P10 ratio, we
obtain values between 1 and 77.28 with a mean ratio of 2.59 and a median of
1.93. The deciles of the coe¢cient of variation are displayed in gure 5.1.12
12Figure 5.5 in the appendix shows the deciles of the P90/P10 ratio.
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Figure 5.1: Deciles of coe¢cient of variation for bonus payments
Table 5.3 reports median values of the coe¢cient of variation and the
P90/P10 ratio in bonus payments for the years 2005 to 2007 by hierarchical
level. There is a slight tendency that the degree of variation increases with
the hierarchical level.
Level Median Coe¤. of Variation Median P90/P10 ratio
2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2005
6 0.27 0.29 0.33 2.40 2.12 2.24
5 0.34 0.34 0.36 2.32 2.35 2.29
4 0.33 0.30 0.35 2.27 2.17 2.33
3 0.23 0.22 0.21 1.85 1.80 1.76
2 0.26 0.25 0.23 1.91 1.82 1.77
1 0.20 0.25 0.22 1.47 1.93 1.77
Total 0.27 0.27 0.27 1.91 1.90 1.98
Table 5.3: Di¤erentiation over year and hierarchical level
It is interesting to note that there are also di¤erences in the degree of
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variation between the broader functional areas as reported in table 5.4.13
The highest rates of variation in bonus payments can be found in the capital
market-based functions treasury and capital markets as well as investment
banking and asset management. These areas are also characterized by very
high absolute bonus payments. In retail banking, however, we observe the
lowest levels of di¤erentiation combined with below-average bonus payments.
Funct. Area Median Coef. of Variation Median P90/P10 ratio
2007 2006 2005 2007 2006 2005
CP 0.33 0.40 0.38 2.30 2.57 2.48
CS 0.28 0.32 0.30 2.16 2.07 2.21
IB / AM 0.40 0.47 0.49 2.75 2.89 3.33
PB / CB 0.32 0.33 0.33 2.22 2.20 2.24
RB 0.26 0.25 0.23 1.91 1.82 1.77
TCM 0.57 0.54 0.51 4.47 4.49 3.52
Table 5.4: Di¤erentiation over year and functional area
But we also nd large di¤erences in the coe¢cient of variation even within
the more detailed specic functions. The coe¢cient of variation in Human
Resources, for example, ranges from 0 to 1.40 between companies, in Mar-
keting from 0.01 to 0.76, in Sales Assistance from 0.02 to 0.92, in Corporate
Finance from 0.65 to 0.86, and in IT Generalist functions from 0.03 to 0.44.
Similar di¤erences can be found for the other dispersion measures.
Figure 5.2 shows a kernel density plot of bonus payments for the lagged
quintiles of di¤erentiation measured by the coe¢cient of variation.14 It can
be seen that the distribution of bonuses in the lowest quintiles is much more
compressed with average values between 3,000 and 6,000 Euros, whereas
values above 10,000 Euros are almost not observable. Contrary to that,
employees in departments that belong to the upper quintiles are more likely
to receive higher bonuses, which are also less compressed.
13Due to a small number of observations, the modules investment banking and asset
management are pooled.
14For reasons of clarity, the gure is censored at a cut-o¤ value of 22,000 Euros, as this
is the 90th percentile of bonus payments.
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5.4.2 The Aggregate E¤ect
Table 5.5 reports estimation results of the baseline regressions with individual
xed e¤ects and the logarithm of bonus payments as dependent variable
using the balanced panel data set for the years 2005-2007. Key independent
variable is the respective measure of dispersion for the relevant cell in the
previous year. To account for potential within-cell correlation in the error
terms we report robust standard errors clustered on cell-level. All models
include the log of base salary, age, rm tenure, level, functional area, function,
career ladder, company, and year as further control variables. Recall that our
panel includes only employees that did not change the employer, hierarchical
level, functional area, function and career ladder throughout the whole period
2005-2007.
The results in table 5.5 show that there is a highly signicant positive
relationship between di¤erentiation and performance, i.e. an increase in the
degree of di¤erentiation in a departments bonus payments in one year leads
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to signicantly higher individual bonus payments in the subsequent year for
all three indicators. A one standard deviation increase in the coe¢cient of
variation (P90/P10 ratio) leads to an increase in bonus payments of about
10% (7%), all other factors constant. To give some indication about the eco-
nomic signicance of this e¤ect, we ranked all cells by the degree of di¤erenti-
ation and then created dummy variables for each quintile in the distribution
of the measures of dispersion. Therefore, additionally to the direct measure
of dispersion, the table also reports the results when these dummy variables
are included. The coe¢cient for the 5th quintile now gives an estimate of the
percentage change in performance when a supervisor who is among the 20%
of weakest di¤erentiators moves to the degree of di¤erentiation applied by the
20% strongest di¤erentiators. Note that these e¤ects are quite sizeable. For
the coe¢cient of variation the model in table 5.5 predicts a 31% increase15 in
performance when moving from rather undi¤erentiated incentives to highly
di¤erentiated bonus payments. The coe¢cients for the P90/P10 ratio and
the standard deviation of logs are even slightly higher with a predicted 33%
respectively 36% increase in subsequent performance. It is interesting to note
that the e¤ects are roughly monotonic in all specications, i.e. the e¤ects
increase when moving from the lowest quintile to the highest one.
We also check whether the results are robust even in years with di¤er-
ent economic conditions by using a balanced panel for the years 2006-2008.
Due to the rst inuences of the nancial crisis on bonus pools and individ-
ual bonus payments, these results may be biased as bonus payments may
be reduced in the majority of companies. Additionally in 2008, the con-
sultancy changed the job evaluation method and introduced new functional
areas which cannot be perfectly mapped to the older methodology. There-
fore, the 2006-2008 balanced panel is characterized by a smaller number of
observations, because we have to drop all employees belonging to the new
areas. But the main results are basically robust, as can be seen in table 5.13
in the appendix. All dispersion indicators have a positive coe¢cient and
are signicant in two of three specications. The same is true if we include
quintiles into the regression model.
15Note that e0:2693 = 1: 31. See e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for details.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di¤erentiationt 1 0.5036** 0.0239*** 0.6588***
(0.2167) (0.0093) (0.2009)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.2053*** -0.0541 -0.0548
(0.0693) (0.0413) (0.1443)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1554** 0.1944 0.0564
(0.0661) (0.1267) (0.0636)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2271*** 0.2525** 0.1673**
(0.0752) (0.1200) (0.0743)
5th Quintilet 1 0.2693*** 0.2882*** 0.3080***
(0.0959) (0.1101) (0.0902)
Ln Base salaryt -0.4566 -0.3418 -0.3394 -0.3740 -0.3886 -0.6278**
(0.3114) (0.3387) (0.2930) (0.2936) (0.2927) (0.2553)
Age 0.0147*** 0.0104*** 0.0128*** 0.0142*** 0.0135*** 0.0170***
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0024)
Observations 25587 25587 25587 25587 25587 25587
R2 within 0.091 0.064 0.079 0.078 0.092 0.084
Additional control variables are tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder,company and year
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.5: Fixed e¤ects regression results with measures of dispersion for
balanced panel 2005-2007
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5.5 Levels, Functional Areas, and Career Lad-
ders
It is important to investigate whether this e¤ect holds when the sample is
restricted to di¤erent subgroups of employees as the e¤ect of di¤erentiation
may depend on the type of job. In some areas it may be rather simple to
give di¤erentiated performance ratings, for instance, as objective measures
of individual performance are widely available (such as nancial performance
indicators). But in other areas it is quite di¢cult to assess the individual
performance of employees. In addition, di¤erentiated ratings often automat-
ically lead to relative performance evaluation of employees.16 As has for
instance been pointed out by Lazear (1989), this may even generate incen-
tives to sabotage colleagues and reduce cooperation and teamwork. Hence,
it is conceivable that di¤erentiation may even be harmful in certain areas of
an organization.
5.5.1 Hierarchical Levels
We start by investigating the e¤ects of the hierarchical level. To do this
we rst included interaction terms between the measures of di¤erentiation
and each of the six hierarchical levels in the baseline regression model. The
reference category is level 1, the lowest level in the data set.
These regressions yield some surprising results, which are shown in table
5.6. First of all, the e¤ects of di¤erentiation on subsequent bonus payments
are increasing in the hierarchical level an employee is located at. From level
3 upwards, we nd a highly signicant positive relationship between di¤er-
entiation and future performance. But the e¤ects seem to be reversed at the
lowest levels: di¤erentiation here seems to have a negative overall e¤ect on
subsequent performance, even if not all coe¢cients are signicantly di¤erent
from zero.
We also reran the baseline regressions for subsamples each containing only
16This is automatically the case when the supervisors are forced to follow a given dis-
tribution of performance grades.
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di¤erentiation t 1 -0.3756 -0.0221** -0.1053
(0.3245) (0.0109) (0.3189)
Di¤erentiationt 1  Hier 2 -0.5222 -0.0350 0.7724
(0.4130) (0.0573) (1.0129)
Di¤erentiationt 1  Hier 3 0.2552 0.0295* 0.1716
(0.4763) (0.0166) (0.3657)
Di¤erentiationt 1  Hier 4 1.1694*** 0.0426*** 0.9289**
(0.3961) (0.0153) (0.4501)
Di¤erentiationt 1  Hier 5 1.2021*** 0.0803*** 1.0401**
(0.3677) (0.0182) (0.5297)
Di¤erentiationt 1  Hier 6 2.2351*** 0.1212*** 1.6390***
(0.7135) (0.0242) (0.5761)
Ln Base salaryt -0.1754 -0.2949 -0.3474*
(0.2707) (0.2823) (0.2051)
Observations 25587 25587 25587
R2 within 0.149 0.095 0.107
Additional control variables are age, tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder,
company and year. a Reference category: Level 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.6: Interactions between measures of dispersion and hierarchical levels
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two adjacent hierarchical levels. The results for the coe¢cient of variation
and the P90/P10 ratio are reported in tables 5.14 and 5.15 in the appen-
dix.17 The rst two columns contain the results for the two highest levels
in the sample, columns 3 and 4 for the levels in the middle of the hierarchy
and the last two columns for the lowest levels (typical entry levels). These
estimates conrm our results because the coe¢cients for the direct measures
of dispersion are the larger the higher the hierarchical level an employee is
located at. Analyzing the quintiles of dispersion for the intermediate and
upper levels, there is a strong tendency that more di¤erentiation is bene-
cial for individual performance. For instance, at the highest levels, the 20%
strongest di¤erentiators attain subsequent bonus payments which are, on av-
erage, more than 30% higher than those of the weakest di¤erentiators. Due
to the higher number of observations the results are much more robust for
levels 3 and 4. We also can conrm the reversed e¤ects at the lowest levels:
di¤erentiation here is harmful, as can be seen in column 5 of tables 5.14 and
5.15. But the e¤ects are non-linear and there is no clear pattern visible:
Intermediate levels of di¤erentiation seem to have a positive e¤ect on future
performance, as indicated by the positive and signicant coe¢cients of the
2nd and 3rd quintile in the estimates with the P90/P10 ratio as measure of
dispersion. But it is quite interesting to note that the performance e¤ects
of the strongest di¤erentiators are negative or almost disappear. The oppo-
site is true for the middle and upper hierarchical levels, where the coe¢cient
for the 2nd quintile is signicantly negative in estimates with the P90/P10
ratio, as can be seen in columns 2 and 4 of table 5.15. A small increase in
the di¤erence between the 90th and the 10th percentile seems to have a neg-
ative e¤ect on subsequent bonus payments. Hence, we may conclude in the
spirit of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) that rms should either di¤erentiate
enough or do not di¤erentiate at all.
Of course it is important to understand why di¤erentiation seems to be
harmful or does not show strong benecial e¤ects at the lowest hierarchical
levels respectively. One possible explanation builds on the observation that
17Estimates with the standard deviation of logs as dispersion indicator conrm the
results presented here.
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for jobs at lower levels objective measures of individual performance are very
rarely available. As it is well known from the empirical personnel psychology
literature (see e.g. Murphy and Cleveland (1995)), subjective performance
assessments are often very strongly biased. In that case the incentive e¤ects
of di¤erentiated ratings may be weak as those ratings may be very noisy indi-
cators of individual performance and the drawbacks of di¤erentiated ratings
may outweigh the benets. At higher hierarchical levels nancial indicators
more closely capture the performance of employees. In addition, managers
and high-level functional experts are more visible in the organization which
makes assessing their performance easier. In that case a higher degree of dif-
ferentiation indeed may capture di¤erences in true performance and therefore
should have stronger incentive e¤ects.
Furthermore, employees within a certain unit typically work closely to-
gether at lower levels in the hierarchy. Strong di¤erentiation may then cause
within-team competition and therefore can have detrimental e¤ects when co-
operation is very important. But managers at higher levels lead separate
teams of lower level employees and such detrimental e¤ects of di¤erentiation
should be less severe.
5.5.2 Functional Areas
Given the sizeable di¤erences in the e¤ects at the various hierarchical levels
we should also expect di¤erences between the functional areas. Recall that
most of the employees in our data set are working in the retail banking area.
This area is, as opposed to the other areas, characterized by a high level of
standardized, direct sales activities. Hence, objective measures of individual
performance are more readily available making di¤erentiated ratings easier.
Furthermore, the structure of the retail banking departments is di¤erent as
we observe only a small number of cells in this area comprising a large number
of employees.
To test if the aggregate results are driven by certain characteristics of the
retail banking area, we reran the baseline regressions for a subsample where
retail banking is excluded. The results are shown in table 5.7. It can be seen
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that the baseline results remain qualitatively unchanged, as each coe¢cient
of the direct measures of dispersion is positive and signicantly di¤erent from
zero. The coe¢cients of the highest quintiles are even larger than those in
the baseline regressions.18
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007 (retail banking excluded)
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio Std. dev. of logs
Di¤erentiationt 1 0.3923** 0.0196** 0.5943***
(0.1898) (0.0077) (0.1724)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.1911** 0.0943 -0.0918
(0.0931) (0.1133) (0.1387)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.2408*** 0.3014** 0.1744*
(0.0862) (0.1181) (0.0907)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2252*** 0.3034** 0.2623***
(0.0795) (0.1221) (0.0949)
5th Quintilet 1 0.2811*** 0.4256*** 0.3732***
(0.0818) (0.1007) (0.1008)
Ln Base salaryt -0.5152 -0.3884 -0.3400 -0.5868*** -0.3891 -0.6952**
(0.3983) (0.3856) (0.0092) (0.3023) (0.2926) (0.2689)
Age 0.2015*** 0.2054*** 0.0088*** 0.2441*** 0.0097*** 0.2533***
(0.0721) (0.0701) (0.0033) (0.0499) (0.0034) (0.0477)
Observations 11343 11343 11343 11343 11343 11343
R2 within 0.115 0.099 0.109 0.147 0.125 0.136
Additional control variables are tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder, company and year
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.7: Fixed e¤ects regression results with measures of dispersion (retail
banking excluded)
In a second step we estimate the performance e¤ects of di¤erentiation
for subsamples of the functional areas. Besides retail banking, the other an-
alyzed areas include corporate and private banking and corporate services,
which comprise lower-skilled customer support and administration jobs like
secretaries and reception desks. We further include corporate production con-
taining typical (cross-divisional) support functions such as human resources,
18Table 5.16 shows results for the balanced panel 2006-2008 with retail banking employ-
ees excluded, which conrm the results presented here.
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nance/accounting, marketing, legal, and economics as we expect that in
this area it is relatively hard to make di¤erentiated performance ratings and,
hence, the e¤ect of di¤erentiation on performance should be weak or even
negative. Additional subsamples include investment banking and asset man-
agement as well as treasury and capital markets.
Note that there are substantial di¤erences among the functional areas,
as can be seen in tables 5.8 and 5.9. Di¤erentiation has the strongest e¤ect
in private and corporate banking and retail banking, with a one standard
deviation increase in di¤erentiation levels leading to about 20% higher bonus
payments, all other factors constant. This may not be surprising as these are
areas with direct sales activities and objective measures of performance are
more readily available making di¤erentiated ratings easier.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Panel 2005-2007)
CP CS IB/AM PB/CB RB TCM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV Bonust 1 0.6134*** -0.7232** 0.5870 0.6408*** 1.8414*** 0.4182
(0.2246) (0.3549) (0.3539) (0.1598) (0.6559) (0.2756)
Ln Base salaryt -0.5745** -0.2747 -0.3149 -0.1672 -0.3390 -0.4854
(0.2695) (0.6715) (0.2850) (0.3098) (0.4344) (0.2891)
Age 0.2819*** 0.0430 0.3874*** 0.1866*** 0.0075* 0.3134***
(0.0582) (0.1127) (0.0700) (0.0284) (0.0039) (0.0549)
Observations 4041 5131 481 1169 14244 521
R2 within 0.210 0.099 0.327 0.282 0.173 0.140
1 Std. dev. increase 16% -14% 20%a 20% 19% 8%a
Additional control variables are tenure, level, function, career ladder, company and year. a Statistically not
signicant from zero. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust stand. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.8: Fixed e¤ects results for subgroups of functional areas (coe¢cient
of variation)
It is further quite interesting that the e¤ects are positive and sizeable in
corporate production where we would have expected weaker positive e¤ects
as objective performance measures are rather hard to nd. We also nd a
positive relationship between di¤erentiation and performance in investment
banking and asset management and treasury and capital markets. But these
results are insignicant in some of the specications, most likely due to the
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small number of observations. Note that we observe a negative coe¢cient for
corporate services which includes customer support and administration jobs,
again areas in which performance seems very rarely objectively measurable.
This e¤ect may partly be explained by the fact that the majority of positions
in the service area are low-skilled jobs located at the bottom of the hierarchy.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Panel 2005-2007)
CP CS IB/AM PB/CB RB TCM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P90/P10 Bonust 1 0.0162 -0.0173** -0.0123 0.0304*** 0.1873** 0.0129***
(0.0106) (0.0079) (0.0194) (0.0094) (0.0904) (0.0041)
Ln Base salaryt -0.5369* -0.5268 -0.4076 -0.0171 -0.0394 -0.4389
(0.2750) (0.7529) (0.2909) (0.3890) (0.3636) (0.2846)
Age 0.2929 0.0863 0.3617*** 0.2115*** -0.0090 0.2741***
(0.0640) (0.1232) (0.0784) (0.0390) (0.0069) (0.0585)
Observations 4041 5131 481 1169 14244 521
R2 within 0.164 0.029 0.286 0.244 0.155 0.149
Additional control variables are tenure, level, function, career ladder, company and year
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.9: Fixed e¤ects results for subgroups of functional areas (P90/P10
ratio)
Further analyses show that the e¤ect of di¤erentiation varies strongly
across hierarchical levels within and between the functional areas. While
di¤erentiation in the retail banking area is harmful at the lowest levels in the
hierarchy, it has a strong positive e¤ect at intermediate levels. At the top
levels the coe¢cient is negative but not statistically signicant. At lower lev-
els, cooperation is important and team incentive schemes are very common,
so that higher levels of di¤erentiation are harmful and induce counterpro-
ductive e¤ects. This may also explain the negative coe¢cient in the services
area. In corporate banking and private banking, we nd very strong positive
e¤ects at the top levels of the hierarchy, compared to intermediate levels.
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5.5.3 Managers or Professionals
The argument that di¤erentiation is more benecial for managerial jobs can
also be tested di¤erently by making use of an additional feature of the data
set: The jobs considered are separated into four di¤erent career ladders: one
management ladder and three expert/professional ladders (sales, support and
professional). Each ladder spans di¤erent hierarchical levels. Note that there
are experts even at higher hierarchical levels. These are typically employees
with a high functional expertise but without general managerial responsibili-
ties. Given the above explanation we expect that di¤erentiation should have
the strongest e¤ect on performance in the managerial ladder. To analyze
this e¤ects we include interaction terms between the di¤erent measures of
dispersion and the career ladders into the baseline regression model.
This is indeed conrmed by the results reported in table 5.10, where the
professional ladder has been chosen as reference group. Column 1 reports
regressions results for all hierarchical levels in the data set. But as some of
the career ladders are not present at each level, we also report results for the
intermediate levels 3 and 4, where all four ladders can be found.
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2005-2007
All levels Level 3 Level 4
CV Bonust 1 0.5349*** 0.4670* 0.3934***
(0.1003) (0.2589) (0.0781)
CV Bonust 1  Management
a 1.9988*** 1.9296** 2.0963***
(0.2355) (0.9695) (0.1978)
CV Bonust 1  Sales -0.5941 -1.5756 2.0067***
(0.5918) (1.1532) (0.6063)
CV Bonust 1  Support -1.2788*** -0.9733*** -0.1078
(0.2760) (0.3545) (0.4285)
Observations 25587 6793 6362
R2 within 0.206 0.158 0.357
Additional control variables are base salary, age, tenure, level, functional area, function,
career ladder, company and year. a Reference category: career ladder professional
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust stand. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.10: Interactions with career ladders (coe¢cient of variation)
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The e¤ect of di¤erentiation on individual bonus payments in the subse-
quent year has, on average, a positive and signicant e¤ect for employees in
the professional ladder. But this e¤ect is much stronger for managerial em-
ployees, as the interaction term is very large. The result seems to be robust in
all specications and both with the coe¢cient of variation and the P90/P10
ratio as measure of di¤erentiation.19 The negative e¤ect for employees in
support functions is in line with the previous results for the entry positions,
as the majority of employees in this career ladder is working at the lowest
levels.
To get a deeper understanding of the e¤ects of di¤erentiation on per-
formance within the main career ladders, we replicate the baseline model
for a subsample of the two largest career ladders, the management and pro-
fessional ladder. This yields some interesting results. In the management
ladder, the highest levels of di¤erentiation result in large increases of bonus
payments in the following year, compared to the weakest di¤erentiators. But
for functional expert positions, the pattern is quite di¤erent. First, the coef-
cients are much smaller than in the regressions for management employees.
And, more interestingly, for professional employees the interaction terms of
the 3rd, 4th and 5th quintile are very similar. This indicates that higher
degrees of di¤erentiation do have a positive e¤ect on performance for expert
positions, but not an increasing e¤ect at higher levels as compared to the
management ladder.
5.6 Robustness of Results and the E¤ects of
Di¤erentiation on Firm Performance
To check the robustness of our results, we replicate the baseline estimates for
the coe¢cient of variation using a panel data set with the organizational unit
as panel variable. As explained above, a unit is identied by a unique com-
bination of year, company, module, function, career ladder and hierarchical
19The results for the P90/P10 ratio are shown in table 5.17 in the appendix.
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level.20 As the results in table 5.11 show, the positive performance e¤ects of
higher di¤erentiation levels can be conrmed, as the values of the quintiles
are quite comparable to the results in table 5.5.
Dependent variable: Log. of average bonus payments
Unit-level panel 2005-2007
CV Bonust 1 0.0805
(0.0982)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.0211
(0.0742)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1360*
(0.0787)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2224***
(0.0841)
5th Quintilet 1 0.2283**
(0.0921)
Observations 850 850
R2 within 0.130 0.153
Additional control variables are tenure, function, module, career ladder,
ln base salary, age, tenure and year.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses
Table 5.11: Robustness check with collapsed data set
Finally, to rule out that there is a problem of reverse causality we did a
simple falsication exercise by running xed e¤ects regressions with the coef-
cient of variation as dependent variable and the lagged logarithm of bonus
payments as independent variable in the collapsed data set. We use the same
set of control variables like in the regressions in table 5.5. The coe¢cient of
the lagged logarithm of bonus payments is insignicant (coe¢cient 0:0227;
p-value>0.1), which supports the idea that di¤erentiation indeed drives per-
formance and not vice versa.
In the previous sections, we focused on the e¤ects of di¤erentiation on
individual rather than rm performance. In a next step we provide rst
indications on the e¤ect of increasing variation in bonus payments within or-
ganizational units on the long-term performance of companies. We therefore
20Note that a company comprises several units.
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convert our individual-level data set into a rm panel data set21 and merge
it with company information from the BankScope data set, a leading global
database of banks nancial statements.22 For each company, we nally have
information on average bonus payments and base salaries, the average value
of the coe¢cient of variation in bonus payments (the mean of all organiza-
tional units in a company) as well as rm indicators like the return on average
equity (ROE), the return on average assets (ROA) and net income.
In the aftermath of the nancial crisis it is often proposed that incentive
schemes, mainly in the nancial services sector, encouraged excessive risk-
taking behavior of employees. This indicates that employees only focussed
on short-term goals that were (immediately) payo¤-relevant rather than on
the long-term performance of the rm. Figure 5.3 shows a scatter plot that
depicts the relationship between the return on equity in time t and the coe¢-
cient of variation in bonus payments in t 1 for the years before the nancial
crisis.23 Each marker represents a rm-year observation in the period 2004-
2007. It can be seen that there is a positive, linear relationship between rm
performance and previous di¤erentiation levels.
We now turn to the rst year of the nancial crisis and analyze average
changes in ROE and ROA from year 2007 to 2008. Figure 5.4 gives a rst
indication of a negative relationship between average di¤erentiation levels
in the pre-crisis period. i.e. average values of the coe¢cient of variation
from 2004-2007, and the growth rate of the return on equity from year 2007
to 2008.24 Hence, rms that di¤erentiated more between employees in the
past show, on average, higher reductions in the ROE change rate with be-
ginning of the crisis, what supports the notion that increased di¤erentiation
may have enforced risk-taking behavior. But it is important to note that
much more data have to be collected to make robust and statistically sig-
nicant predictions, as these analyses are only based on a small number of
observations.
21An observation unit is a company-year combination.
22See http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/BANKSCOPE.aspx.
23Due to condentiality reasons, axis labels are not shown here.
24Figure 5.6 in the appendix conrms this result for the ROA.
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Figure 5.3: Return on equity and lagged CV Bonus (2004-2007)
5.7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the e¤ects of di¤erentiation in bonus payments among
employees within organizational units. Standard economic reasoning suggests
that di¤erentiation should increase performance, as it implies higher powered
incentives. We indeed nd a highly signicant and economically substantial
average e¤ect of di¤erentiation on performance.
However, a more di¤erentiated picture arises when we look at subsamples.
The e¤ect is even stronger at higher hierarchical levels. The most striking
observation however is that di¤erentiation seems to be harmful at the lowest
levels.
The results give some indications for the design of compensation schemes
in practice. One implication is that the higher a position in the corporate
hierarchy the more rms should strive to enforce di¤erentiated performance
ratings, maybe through the introduction of recommended performance dis-
tributions or management panels. However, at lower levels it may even be
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Figure 5.4: Change in ROE from 2007 to 2008 and average CV Bonus (2004-
2007)
worthwhile to abandon di¤erentiated bonus payments. For instance, at those
levels, team bonus payments that treat employees equally may be an attrac-
tive alternative to generate incentives. But of course further research is
necessary to explore these questions in more detail.
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5.8 Appendix to Chapter 5
Functions Functions
Asset Allocation Human Resources
IT Administration / Support Credit & Approval
IT Applications Development Corporate/Institutional Relationship
IT Architecture Legal
Asset Management Support Middle Market Account Management
Audit Marketing
Securities & Settlements Money Markets
Administration / Support Money Transfers
Cash Management & Custody Service Strategic Planning & Corp.Development
Corporate Finance Purchasing
Client Relationship Management Performance Measurement
Compliance Project Management
Corporate A¤airs Portfolio Management
Contact Centre Corporate Banking Product Developm.
Customer Service IT Project Management
IT Database Analysis & Development Sales & Marketing
Asset Management Product Development Corporate Treasury
Dealing Retail Banking Product Development
Economics Quality
Equity Trading Analytics/Modelling
Financial Advice Risk Management
Fixed Income Retail Sales
Fund Management Structured Finance
Finance / Accounting Sales Assistance
Foreign Operations Structured Products
IT Business Analysis Commodity Trading
IT Generalist / Miscellaneous Technical / Product Specialists
General Management Training
Table 5.12: Examples of specic functions
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Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2006-2008
Coef. of variation P90/P10 ratio SD of logs
Di¤erentiationt 1 0.6302 0.0445** 0.7972**
(0.4650) (0.0214) (0.3208)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.1683 0.1417 0.1665
(0.1320) (0.0999) (0.1326)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1408 0.2976** 0.2000
(0.1691) (0.1199) (0.1563)
4th Quintilet 1 0.0137 0.1530 0.1120
(0.2133) (0.1364) (0.1923)
5th Quintilet 1 0.1931 0.3647*** 0.3130**
(0.1771) (0.1374) (0.1572)
Observations 15249 15249 15249 15249 15249 15249
R2 within 0.025 0.048 0.017 0.079 0.036 0.047
Additional control variables are base salary, age, tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder
company and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust std. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.13: Fixed e¤ects regression results with measures of dispersion for
balanced panel 2006-2008
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Panel 2005-2007)
Level 5+6 Level 3+4 Level 1+2
CV Bonust 1 0.8956*** 0.6496*** -1.0727***
(0.1288) (0.2006) (0.4025)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.1888 0.0543 0.1366
(0.1347) (0.1057) (0.1509)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1907 0.0630 0.1553
(0.1633) (0.1038) (0.1363)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2441 0.2232** 0.1769
(0.1752) (0.0930) (0.2869)
5th Quintilet 1 0.3075 0.3235*** -0.0289
(0.2235) (0.1032) (0.2847)
Observations 3540 3540 13155 13155 8892 8892
R2 within 0.239 0.117 0.165 0.120 0.098 0.027
Additional control variables are base salary, age, tenure, functional area, function, career ladder,
company and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust std. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.14: Fixed e¤ects regression results for hierarchical levels (coe¢cient
of variation)
158
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Panel 2005-2007)
Level 5+6 Level 3+4 Level 1+2
P90/P10 Bonus t 1 0.0630*** 0.0180** -0.0186
(0.0119) (0.0086) (0.0221)
2nd Quintilet 1 -0.2027*** -0.1647*** 0.0837*
(0.0420) (0.0411) (0.0458)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1926 0.0835 0.3117***
(0.1666) (0.0650) (0.1070)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2514 0.2864*** -0.1345
(0.1563) (0.0696) (0.1980)
5th Quintilet 1 0.3132* 0.2573*** 0.0138
(0.1697) (0.0726) (0.1254)
Observations 3540 3540 13155 13155 8892 8892
R2 within 0.269 0.118 0.110 0.137 0.008 0.098
Additional control variables are base salary, age, tenure, functional area, function, career ladder,
company and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust std. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.15: Fixed e¤ects regression results for hierarchical levels (P90/P10
ratio)
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments
Balanced panel 2006-2008 (retail banking excluded)
Coef. of variation P90/10 ratio SD of logs
Di¤erentiation Bonust 1 0.7772* 0.0529* 0.8002***
(0.4041) (0.0283) (0.3065)
2nd Quintilet 1 0.0976 0.1172 0.1704*
(0.0823) (0.0826) (0.1022)
3rd Quintilet 1 0.1491 0.1383 0.1433
(0.1001) (0.0954) (0.1104)
4th Quintilet 1 0.2372 0.2173* 0.2950**
(0.1669) (0.1183) (0.1431)
5th Quintilet 1 0.3151** 0.2946*** 0.2817**
(0.1380) (0.1100) (0.1246)
Observations 11483 11483 11483 11483 11483 11483
R2 within 0.109 0.111 0.088 0.116 0.111 0.123
Additional control variables are base salary, age, tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder
company and year. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust std. errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.16: Fixed e¤ects regression results with measures of dispersion for
balanced panel 2006-2008 (retail banking excluded)
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Figure 5.5: Deciles of P90/P10 ratio for bonus payments
Dependent variable: Logarithm of bonus payments (Panel 2005-2007)
Overall Level 3 Level 4
P90/P10 Bonust 1 0.3627* 0.0109 0.0115*
(0.1967) (0.0132) (0.0062)
P90/P10 Bonust 1  Management 0.1768*** 0.3194*** 0.2689***
(0.0680) (0.0192) (0.0746)
P90/P10 Bonust 1  Sales 0.0091 -0.0109 0.5550***
(0.0515) (0.0310) (0.1593)
P90/P10 Bonust 1  Support -0.0431** -0.0523** 0.0048
(0.0187) (0.0245) (0.0697)
Observations 25587 6793 6362
R2 within 0.146 0.144 0.298
Additional control variables are age, tenure, level, functional area, function, career ladder,
company and year. a Reference category: career ladder professional
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered for cells in parentheses
Table 5.17: Interactions with career ladders (P90/P10 ratio)
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Figure 5.6: Change in ROA from 2007 to 2008 and average CV Bonus (2004-
2007)
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